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ABSTRACT 
igh European energy demands, the difference in prices amongst Europe and 
ambitious gas producers, have produced a scenario of high competition in 
a region that suffers a lack of fossil resources still required for energy 
generation.  Therefore, other sources are under the scope of various countries to 
mitigate these issues.  Shale gas is one fuel that presents a scenario that would decrease 
European dependence on imported gas. Although shale gas production is unlikely to 
give the energy security desired to the whole Europe, it would make a difference for 
the communities that will adopt it. However, shale gas has acquired a bad reputation 
with the public, mainly because of its extraction methods. This bad reputation is 
attributed to hydraulic fracturing, technology well-known as fracking, and its risks 
associated towards air and water pollution. Therefore, companies, institutions and 
governments are looking for other alternative methods of extraction with more 
environmentally friendly processes. 
Producing extensive high-pressure pulse waves at the base of the wellbore by using 
detonation is a promising potential technique for shale gas extraction. A fundamental 
study of deflagration to detonation transition using recirculated shale gas formation 
with pure oxygen as an oxidiser has been studied to design a system with lower DDT 
distance and higher pressure waves. 
Three proposed cases of UK shale gas composition were studied. Chemical 
equilibrium software GASEQ and chemical kinetic software CHEMKIN-PRO were 
used to estimate the product parameters. Results showed that the effect produced by 
diluents, such as carbon dioxide, are eliminated by the use of higher hydrogen content 
carbon-to-hydrogen species for the three cases proposed. OpenFOAM CFD was used 
to calculate the deflagration to detonation transition parameters in stoichiometric 
hydrogen air mixtures to evaluate different obstacle geometries on the transition 
phenomenon to improve the detonation process. The shape and layout of obstacles 
were found to have a significant effect on flame acceleration, and subsequent 
detonation propagation. The interaction of transverse pressure waves generated at the 
obstructions governs the propagation mechanism. The transverse waves and its 
frequency appear to play a pivotal role in supporting the detonation wave.
H
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It was found that rectangular shape obstacles reduce the reaction time, while triangular 
ones achieved detonation with the minimum run-up distance. On the other hand, semi-
circular shape obstacles generate the highest pressure in a detonation tube. The 
outcome from numerical calculations and CFD were the guide to construct an 
experimental rig of 21.2mm diameter and 1500mm length tube with different obstacle 
configurations to demonstrate the concept of pulse detonation for shale rock cracking. 
Experimental work has been performed to determine the potential of shale gas 
production in the Dullais Valley, South of Wales. It was found through several tests 
using BS standard volatile analyses, Transmission Electron Microscopy and pyrolysis 
RockEval evaluation that the potential of extraction in this region is fair, with similar 
concentrations of pyrite but with low energy content compared to those resources 
located in the Midlands and Yorkshire. However, the use of controlled pulse detonation 
could be the ideal technology for extraction in Wales, as low sulphur (S) content will 
produce lower unwanted emissions, with a process that can promote opening of pores 
and further gasification of oil based molecular, with a subsequent increase in shale gas 
production, topic that requires further research. 
Finally, a 2-dimensional simulation was performed using ANSYS Parameter Design 
Language (APDL) to investigate the effect of pressure pulse generated by the 
detonation tube on a pre-crack. Results showed that the layer close to the applied load 
will be displaced, which means that it will be smashed. The maximum Von Mises 
stresses were found to concentrate at the perforating hole corners, while the region 
immediately after the crack tip is susceptible to compression stresses. The Same 
behaviour was found for the stress intensity factor. According to that, it is believed that 
the cracks will propagate diagonally from the perforating hole base. 
Therefore, the current work has theoretically demonstrated the technology for shale 
gas recovery, with an optimised geometry consistent of internal obstacles, for a region 
with potential for shale gas exploitation. 
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1 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 General Introduction 
The combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing were the main reasons 
for the shale revolution overran United State over the last decade. Shale gas production 
increases have decreased both natural gas wholesale prices and dependability on 
imports, which led to a significant competitive to manufacturers. 
Adoption of such technology in Europe could open many horizons. Economically, 
beside its direct impact on the prices, as it will lower wholesale prices and potentially 
lower household gas and electricity prices, shale gas industry could trigger the creation 
of significant new jobs. Europe’s economy could also benefit from domestic shale gas 
production as it generates vast sums of tax revenues. Environmentally, as reducing 
greenhouse gas emission is one of the most essential goal globally, natural gas 
extracted from shale will reduce emissions in a cost-competitive way.  
Furthermore, the security of EU gas supply has been a priority since the last decade. 
Besides energy efficiency and completion of the internal energy market, the increase 
in domestic energy production in the EU will diversify supplier countries and routes. 
Shale gas could partially compensate for declining conventional gas production 
provided. 
However, current technologies lead to the usage of fracking, a controversial hydraulic 
technique that has suffered considerable criticism in Europe. Therefore, companies 
and institutions are looking for other alternatives with more environmentally friendly 
processes. One of these processes uses Explosive/Propellant systems (EPS) to crack 
the rock avoiding waste by-products. However, using explosives in shale wells needs 
considerable improvement to achieve the production rates obtained with fracking. On 
the other hand, the detonation phenomenon is known since the end of the 19th century. 
This technique has high efficiencies compared to deflagration (combustion at low 
velocities) with high potential to compete with fracking in terms of shale recovery and 
EPS in its low environmental impact. 
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 Natural Gas and Oil 
Natural gas and oil share many similarities, these two hydrocarbons, which among 
others referred to as fossil fuels, are essential to modern lifestyle. Both of conventional 
gas and oil are less dense than water, this characteristic allows them pour up through 
earth's geological layers and being substituted by ground water until they found a 
geological layer consists of impermeable stones does not allow them to pass through. 
While oil, which is heavier and more complex carbon formation than natural gas, 
always comes out from the underground, natural gas comes from different sources. 
Often it is found associated with oil fields, also it is found in what is called natural gas 
fields by its own. Nevertheless, natural gas can be produced through natural processes. 
On the other hand, divergence points between those hydrocarbons over their 
similarities.  The place where the difference is most obvious is the compressibility. 
While oil is non-soluble, in either water or alcohol, unctuous flammable 
incompressible substance, gas is lightweight gasiform compressible fluid. The prices 
of gas beside its environmental impact made many industrials applications replacing 
oil with gas as main fuels. Gas is cheaper and more reliable in being imported from 
one place to other [1]. In addition, the gas can be regarded as less hazardous to the 
environment as it burns brighter, hotter and cleaner, so it is a smoke free heat and light 
source [2]. 
 Why EU needs more gas? 
There are many factors influencing fossil gas production. One of the most important 
factors is world energy demand, which is related mainly to population and income 
growth. Primary energy demand will increase by 41% between 2012 and 2035 
according to Energy Outlook 2035. Industry represents the main sector for energy 
consumption. Residential, services and agriculture (referred as other) represent the 
second energy consumer with energy mainly consumed as electricity. The third sector 
represented by transport [3], as seen in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1. Energy consumption by sector [3]. 
Another factor influencing gas production is the difference in prices between Europe 
and gas producer countries, which have a trading partnership with Europe. The 
European Commission paper states that the EU industrial gas prices are three to four 
times higher than those in the US or Russian prices, and 12% higher than in China [4]. 
This has been mainly driven by a shale gas revolution. The growth of shale gas 
production in addition to the global economic downturn at the beginning of twenty 
first century led to that difference in prices especially in the US, as it is illustrated in 
figure 1.2. 
Undoubtedly, renewable energy constitutes an important solution for the EU energy. 
However renewable energy share represented only 8% of the total primary energy 
consumption in 2010 [5]. While this share is planned increase to 25% by 2030 [6], 
about 26% of Europe’s energy demands will be covered by gas by this time [3], figure 
1.3. 
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Figure 1.2. Source of gas supply for three different regions [3]. 
 
Figure 1.3. Primary energy consumption source [6] 
 Shale Gas  
Generally speaking, gas has been divided into two types, the first is conventional gas 
and the second is unconventional gas. Conventional gas has been described as the gas 
that can be extracted by the wells’ natural pressure. Natural gas, generally, could be 
considered as cleaner-burning when it’s compared with coal and oil. The first 
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commercial natural gas well was drilled in 1821 in the United States, this well 
produced gas until 1858. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, intrastate 
pipelines and municipal natural gas distribution systems have been developed[7]. 
Different techniques would probably be used when the wells’ natural pressure go too 
low, after the consumption of fields, like injection of water or gas in the wells, but 
these wells will still produce conventional gas. When the drilling is not enough to 
make the gas flow up the well, and other recovery processes are required to extract the 
gas, that gas is called unconventional gas. Shale gas is natural gas trapped within shale 
formation deep underground. Shale rocks are fine-grained sedimentary rocks formed 
from deposits of mud silt, clay and organic matter. 
Shale gas primarily consists of methane and small amounts of ethane, propane and 
butane with carbon dioxide and other gases. Shale gas extraction is linked to two key 
technologies, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, Fracking. Conventional and 
unconventional gas is essentially the same, the term unconventional simply refers to 
the extraction method and rock formation [8]. 
 Economic Impact 
The economic assessment of domestic shale gas production can be described into two 
parts. The first is the direct economic impact by reducing dependence on gas imports. 
In 2012, the Europe Union dependency rate on imported gas raised to 65.8% from 
only 50.9% a decade before [9]. As such dependability can rise to 89% by 2035, 
domestic production can reduce it to between 62% to 78% [10]. 
The other part of the domestic production is the indirect impacts. This part contains 
many positive aspects which are in the interest of communities that will host gas 
exploration and production, creating employment for the local work force as well as 
its impact on energy market [11]. Compared to new employment opportunities 
provided by the shale gas production in the US, which was about 600,000 in 2015 and 
expected to rise to 870,000 by 2035, similar opportunities have been estimated to be 
created in Europe. This might even be as high as 800,000 new jobs by 2035 and up to 
1.1 million by 2050 [11]. The demand for infrastructure and construction services will 
be triggered by domestic gas production increase. This expansion will directly affect 
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the gas extraction sector and indirectly most other industries, which will lead to create 
more employment opportunities [10].  
Tax revenues are one of the indirect economic impacts of shale gas production. Taxes 
will be paid by the gas extraction industry when wells are drilled, pipelines are 
constructed, and production facilities are built and operated. In addition, taxes will be 
paid by labour force and through energy consumption [10]. 
Furthermore, energy prices in Europe will be affected by shale gas production. A 6% 
to 14% of gas prices and 3% to 8% of electricity prices could be reduced in the case 
of high shale gas production [10]. This, in turn, will influence Europe’s business 
competitiveness, as it will reduce about 1% to 10% of industrial production costs, 
which represents the energy cost [11]. 
 Environmental Impact 
Nowadays, environment represents a major concern for all communities, especially 
when energy consumption and its accompanying pollutants emissions have increased 
substantially in recent decades. There are many different kinds of environmental 
pollution, but the ones related to fossil fuels exceed any other pollution sources. 
Greenhouse effects, acid rain, and air pollution are the most pollution issues related to 
fossil fuels burning [12]. 
The main pollutants emitted from fossil fuels combustion consist of carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide and other particulates like ashes 
particles. Natural gas is the cleanest burning of all fossil fuels, as it is shown in figure 
1.4, remarkably lower levels of almost all pollutants are emitted by gas combustion, 
with virtually no ash or particulate matter [13]. 
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Figure 1.4. Fossil fuel emission levels [13] 
1.6.1 Greenhouse 
Greenhouse effects represent the main causes of climate change. Solar radiation is the 
main natural source of energy as it stems from the sun towards the Earth through 
atmospheric gases in the form of visible short-wave light, long heat waves and some 
of the ultraviolet waves that cannot be absorbed by the ozone. The ground absorbs this 
energy, which causes an increase in its temperature, and starts emitting it to the 
atmosphere as long thermal waves. The gases in the atmosphere absorb these waves 
and retain the heat, then it re-radiates it back to the Earth, leading to increased ground 
surface temperature [14]. 
The gases that absorb thermal waves are called greenhouse gases. Water vapour, 
carbon dioxide and ozone are the main greenhouse gases. Figure 1.5 shows the 
individual contribution of each greenhouse gas absorber. Water vapour contributes to 
the main part of the greenhouse effect with 60% share. The second most important 
greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide, which partakes of 26% [15]. Any hydrocarbon 
burning results in carbon dioxide and water vapour, and since this water vapour cannot 
be compared to the amount evaporated by oceans, then the crucial rules here are played 
by carbon dioxide emission [15].  
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Figure 1.5 The individual contribution of each greenhouse gas absorber [15] 
 
Natural gas combustion emits 29% less carbon dioxide than oil and 43% less than coal 
to produce the same amount of energy released [13]. In the United States, carbon 
dioxide emissions were in the lowest rates in 2012 since 1994, figure 1.6. Coal burning 
reduction was the main reason. Coal combustion based power generation were shifted 
to natural gas power generation due to declining prices, mainly because of shale gas 
production [16]. In Europe, the greenhouse gases emissions could be reduced (by 41% 
to 49%) in case that shale gas power generation substitute coal based generation[17]. 
 
Figure 1.6 The Annual energy-related carbon emissions (metric tonnes of carbon dioxide) [16] 
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1.6.2 Acid Rain 
Acid rain is produced from dissolved sulphuric acid and nitric acid in the atmospheric 
water droplets. Beside carbon dioxide and water vapour, hydrocarbons combustion, 
especially coal and oil, emit certain amounts of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. 
These two oxides undergo, in certain circumstances, chemical reactions with the 
atmospheric substances to become acids and dissolved in water droplets. These water 
droplets in turn eventually may fall to the ground as acidic rain [18].  
The greatest effect of acid rain is its impact on bodies of water and aquatic 
environments, besides its impact on soil and plants. Acid rain dissolves aluminium out 
of the soil and releases it as aluminium sulphate or aluminium nitrate. These can be 
absorbed by the root of trees which cause direct damages to it, also preventing trees 
from absorbing calcium and magnesium, which are basic to the nutrition. Finally, these 
aluminium compounds find its way from soil to lakes and streams making the water 
toxic to aquatic animals [19]. 
As natural gas emits substantially no sulphur dioxide and about 17% nitrogen oxides 
of what oil or coal emit, then natural gas guarantees less pollutants emission caused 
by acid rain. 
1.6.3 Air Pollution 
Although the greenhouse effect influences environment and economic, and acid rain 
impacts aquatic life and plants, it takes greater media and environmental attention than 
air pollution which can play a pivotal role, in many direct ways, on human beings by 
making them suffering through illness.  
In addition to the main greenhouse gases and the gases producing acid rain, there are 
other pollutants emitted by fossil fuels. Troposphere ozone, which is a major part of 
smog with fine particles, is responsible for a number of health issues especially the 
ones related to the respiratory system. It can also hurt plants and crops. Ozone is not a 
direct product of fossil fuel combustion, but is produced by mixing nitrogen oxides 
with organic chemicals that have a high vapour pressure at room temperature, known 
as volatile organic compounds. In the presence of sunlight, smog is formed with 
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problems that are the worst in the summertime [20]. Volatile organic compounds are 
emitted to the atmosphere either naturally or human-induced. Fossil fuel deposits, 
volcanoes, vegetation and even trees represent natural sources of volatile organic 
compounds. Transportations exhaust, mainly gasoline and kerosene engines ones, with  
some building and household materials, like cleaners, disinfectants, paints and others, 
represent the main man-made sources of volatile organic compounds [21].  
As it was mentioned above, natural gas emits only 17% of nitrogen oxides that coal 
and oil emit with substantially no particulate matter, so it does not contribute notably 
to smog creation [13]. Natural gas could be used instead of other more polluting fossil 
fuel in the summertime, when the temperature is higher and smog is more likely to be 
formed. 
Carbon monoxide could be a fatal gas when it is highly concentrated, principally 
because it is unseen and non-sniffed. Carbon monoxide prevents the body to have 
enough oxygen making people feel dizzy and tired. Engines release carbon monoxide 
when burning fossil fuels. Emissions are higher if engines do not work properly and 
the mixture is rich with fuel. Natural gas emits more carbon monoxide than oil, 21% 
more, but it emits 81% less than what coal does [13]. 
 Gas vs. Oil and Coal 
Gas from either well or shale formation can enhance other dirtier fossil fuels 
applications in many sectors, particularly in electric generation and heating. The use 
of gas together with or replacing of other fossil fuel leads to a reducing of harmful 
pollutant emissions. Reburning, cogeneration, combined cycle generation and fuel 
cells, which are relatively new technologies associated with electric generation, can 
support this goal. Gas infrastructure represents the main obstacle in the proliferation 
of natural gas power plants. It is considerably easy to deal with and modify natural gas 
power plants once the infrastructure is in place. Using the above modern technologies 
can double power plant efficiency [13].  
Renewable energy, such as wind turbines and solar power facilities, is the most 
environmental friendly power supply. However, these kinds of power do not supply a 
guaranteed and reliable energy. Nuclear energy, since Fukushima disaster, has been 
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excluded from many international considerations too [8], [22], [23]. Therefore, other 
methods for gas usage improvement are required. 
1.7.1 Reburning 
Reburning is a process for injecting natural gas into other fossil fuel furnaces or 
boilers. This will lead to the reduction of nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxide 
emissions. Air and fuel are divided and introduced to the combustion chamber from 
several points, ensuring the creation of several zones with different temperatures and 
stoichiometries. 
Referring to figure 1.7, there are three stages, or zones, for reburning, in the first stage, 
which is called main combustion zone, about 80% of fuel is burned with as less as 
possible oxygen to keep the combustion almost complete (not 100%). In the second 
stage, the secondary fuel, which is preferred to be volatile to ensure well mixing and 
well burning, is injected without oxidizer to make fuel rich mixture. To achieve 
maximum nitrogen oxides reduction, it needs to maintain the stoichiometric ratio in 
this zone of about 0.9. In the third stage, also known as reducing zone, oxidiser is 
injected with a controlled rate to ascertain complete combustion of all fuel [24].  
 
 
Figure 1.7 Schematic of reburning technology [25] 
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Reburning might lead to not-complete combustion, which in turn leads to carbon 
monoxide and soot emission. Hence, combustion control in the third zone is important 
to reduce any unburnt compound as well as nitrogen oxides reduction [26]. 
Natural gas is the most preferred reburning fuel, firstly because it is a volatile fuel and 
contains little amount of nitrogen. Besides it easily mixes with unburnt fuels from zone 
one and requires very small amounts of energy to reburn. Finally, using natural gas as 
a reburning fuel will reduce other fossil fuels by about 15%, that means other 
pollutants like sulphur dioxides and carbon monoxide are going being reduced in a 
direct proportion [27]. 
1.7.2 Combined Heat and Power Generation (Cogeneration) 
Producing electric power and steam, either for heating or industrial purposes, is a 
merged technology called cogeneration. In other words, cogeneration is “designed to 
produce both heat and electricity from a single heat source” [16]. Thermal heat energy 
wasted in the exhaust gases by the turbine at the end of the generation cycle can be 
used to produce steam through a boiler for heating or cooling purposes. This 
technology is very efficient both economically and technically to increase efficiency 
and decrease thermal waste in the energy supply sector [27]. 
Cogeneration systems can be classified into two configurations, illustrated in figure 
1.8: 
• Gas turbine (or engine) based regenerator system: Natural gas or biogas are 
used in gas turbine to generate electricity, a heat recovery unit could be added 
to capture heat released through the exhaust stream of the combustion system 
and converted to steam or hot water. In this system, heat is a by-product of 
power generation [28]. 
• Steam turbine based regenerator system: unlike the first configuration, 
electricity generation in these systems is the by-product of heat generated by a 
boiler. Steam or hot water surplus can be recycled for other uses. This kind of 
systems is more convenient for solid fuels (biomass or coal) [28]. 
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Aside from these benefits, cogeneration helps to burn less fuel, which is translated to 
fewer pollutants emission into the air. Natural gas power generation plants are more 
flexible and efficient where cogeneration concepts are applicable readily [29]. 
 
a. Gas turbine with heat recovery unit 
 
b. Steam boiler with steam turbine 
Figure 1.8 Combined heat and power generation system configurations [28] 
1.7.3 Combined Cycle Generation 
In combined cycle generation configurations, a heat recovery steam generator is used 
to capture heat from hot exhaust gases released by gaseous or liquid fuel combustion 
turbines to generate steam in the boiler that feeds a steam turbine. Unlike cogeneration, 
in this system both combustion turbine and steam turbine are used to generate 
electricity. Sometimes more than one combustion turbine is used to drive one steam 
turbine. Thermal efficiency is almost doubled using this configuration. While it is 
about 30%-35% in a standard thermal power station, it can reach about 60% with 
stations using combined cycle generation. Combined cycle generation systems, like 
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cogeneration, consume less fuel to produce more energy, thus it produces fewer 
emissions [22], [13], [17], [27].  
In the foreseeable future, and because of the Fukushima disaster in 2011, combined 
gas cycle generation can be considered as the only viable strategy to fill nuclear power 
generation gap. Especially because of their relatively moderate capital costs and low 
fuel prices [8]. 
1.7.4 Fuel Cells 
The chemical potential energy of the fuel is converted through an electrochemical 
reaction in the presence of an oxidizer directly into electricity or as a by-product into 
heat in fuel cells. Fuel cells can run indefinitely as long as they are supplied with fuel 
(hydrogen) and an oxidizer. Although there are different types of fuel cells, they all 
share the same principles. Two electrodes immersed in an electrolyte. Hydrogen atoms 
travel from the anode where it is divested from its electron by a chemical reaction and 
converted to ions. The later travels to the cathode through the electrolyte to combine 
with oxygen atoms and the returning electron from the electrical circuit to form water. 
Hydrogen for the cells can be obtained from natural gas [30]. 
Generally, fuel cells are classified into two categories, low-temperature fuel cells and 
high-temperature fuel cells. The high-temperature fuel cells do not require an external 
reformer to crack hydrogen rich fuels, as that could happen within the cell itself due 
to its high-temperature operation. This process, which is called internal reformer, 
would reduce fuel cell cost significantly [13], [31], [30]. 
 
 Shale Gas in Europe 
Europe is the third largest energy consumer in the world, after China and USA. About 
40% of its energy is produced using imported fossil fuels. Europe is heavily dependent 
on imported natural gas, accounting about 24% of the total energy consumed in the 
continent [3], [32]. All the EU28 countries consume more fossil fuels than they export, 
as seen in figure 1.9. In fact, some of these countries produce essentially no fossil fuel 
and depend 100% on imported sources [33]. 
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Figure 1.9 Production to consumption ratio for the biggest fossil fuel consumers in the world 
[32] 
The European Commission determined the EU energy goals by economic 
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability [34]. These goals are applicable 
in case Europe produced its own fossil fuel. Shale gas is one of the scenarios that 
would decrease Europe dependence on imported gas. Although shale gas production 
is unlikely to give the energy security desired for the whole Europe, it will make a 
difference for the communities that will adopt it. Because of lack in drilling tests, the 
volume of recoverable gas in Europe is widely varied. Based on the literature review, 
EU Joint Research Centres suggested three estimates, high with about 17.6 trillion 
cubic meters (tcm), best about 15.9tcm and low about 2.3tcm, spread over four large-
scale onshore basins in Europe [35], these basins are shown in figure 1.10. 
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Figure 1.10 Unconventional natural gas resources in Europe [36] 
 Shale Gas Extraction 
Shale gas is trapped in tiny pore spaces within the shale formation very deep 
underground, in depths ranging between 1,500-3,000 meters. The impermeable and 
highly compact nature of the rock containing shale gas makes very difficult to extract 
commercial quantities of gas in ordinary vertical drillings. Hence, production of vast 
quantities of shale gas from one well bore requires two specific techniques to be used 
in the field, horizontal drilling and fracturing. 
Subsurface exploration is a very important factor in determining whether shale gas 
extraction has commercial potential or not. This process lasts for several years, and it 
includes several topics. It starts with an analysis of various rock samples taken from 
outcrops to estimate the area and thickness of the formation that contains shale gas. 
The composition of this rock formation is also required. The first two parameters will 
help with the reservoir dimensions and the third with its response to fracturing. Then 
one or two conventional vertical wells are drilled to take samples to measure porosity 
and permeability to estimate the amount of gas in place. Finally, it is time for 
horizontal drilling. It is preferred to drill one or two new wells rather than the wells 
used in the last step, and fracturing, mostly hydraulic, is applied. Production will 
continue for several weeks in order to assess the profitability and the impact on society 
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and environment after fracturing. The encouraging results will stimulate the next steps 
[37], [38]. 
Drilling starts with a vertical well, much like any other conventional hydrocarbon well, 
but just before the drill reaches the shale formation it is diverted so that the well 
becomes horizontal and runs parallel to the ground through the shale layer until a target 
distance is reached. This allows more of the reservoir to come into contact with the 
well bore. Production casing is inserted into the wellbore, and cement is crammed 
between the casing and the wall of the hole all through the well [39]. 
Once drilling is completed, it is now time to perforate and frack the area. A perforating 
gun is lowered by wire line into the casing.  An electrical current is sent down and sets 
off a charge that shoots small holes through the well bore side walls. Next, the well 
will have to be fracked. Hydraulic fracturing consists of pumping millions of gallons 
of water, sand, and an extensive list of manmade chemicals through the drilled hole. 
As the mixture is forced through, the shale is pressured to fracture.  This creates a 
fairway connecting the reservoir to the well and allows the released gas to flow to the 
wellbore [39], [40], [41]. Figure 1.11 explain typical hydraulic fracturing operation. 
 
Figure 1.11 Typical hydraulic fracturing operation [39] 
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 Fracture Technologies 
The main concern of shale gas extracting is how to achieve it. Hydraulic fracturing 
technology has been used for hydrocarbon wells stimulation since the mid of the last 
century. However, this technology has become very common since shale gas started 
following this technology in conjunction with horizontal drilling [22], [42]. 
There are three main technologies of fracturing: 
i. Hydraulic fracturing. 
ii. Pneumatic fracturing. 
iii. Dynamic loading fracturing. 
Hydraulic fracturing uses liquid fluid to perform the fracturing of the formation. This 
technology can be subdivided according to the base fluid. Mainly, fracturing fluid 
consists of three parts, based fluid, additive chemicals and proppant. This technology 
is subdivided according to the based liquid fluid, but water based hydraulic fracturing 
is the most famous type. However, some alternative fluids might be used in certain 
circumstances, such as when water based fracturing is inefficacious or water sensitive 
formation. Table 1.1 below shows the essential base fluid types with their main 
composition and expected results [42], [43]. 
Pneumatic fracturing is used in shallow, brittle and water-sensitive unconventional oil 
and gas formation. This technique is used when remediation of contaminated soil and 
groundwater is demanded as it is found to be the most cost effective way to do that. 
Air or any other gas, like nitrogen, is injected with flow volumes exceeding the natural 
permeability of the rock and pressures higher than the formation natural strength. Due 
to gas compressibility effects, the injection pressure in pneumatic fracturing is double 
or triple to the injection pressure in hydraulic fracturing[42], [44]. 
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Table 1.1 Fluids used for hydraulic fracturing [42], [43]. 
Base fluid Fluid type Main composition Used for 
Water Based 
Slickwater 
Water + sand + chemical 
additives 
lesser width and greater 
fracture length 
Linear fluids 
Gelled water, Guar, HPG, 
HEC, CMHPG 
Short fractures, low 
temperature 
Cross-linked fluid 
Crosslinker + Guar, HPG, 
CMHPG, CMHEC 
Long fractures, high 
temperature 
Viscoelastic surfactant 
gel fluids 
Electrolite+surfactant 
Moderate length 
fracture, moderate 
temperature 
Foam Based 
Water based foam 
Water and Foamer + N2 or 
CO2 
Low-pressure 
formations 
Acid based foam Acid and Foamer + N2 
Low-pressure, 
carbonate formations 
Alcohol based foam Methanol and Foamer +N2 
Low-pressure, water-
sensitive formations 
Oil Based 
Linear fluids Oil, Gelled Oil 
Short fractures, water-
sensitive formations 
Cross-linked fluid Phosphate Ester Gels 
Long fractures, water-
sensitive formations 
Water Emulsion Water + Oil + Emulsifiers 
Moderate length 
fracture, good fluid 
loose control 
Acid based 
Linear Guar or HPG 
Short fracture, 
carbonate formations 
Cross-linked Crosslinker + Guar or HPG 
Long, wide fractures, 
carbonate formations 
Oil Emulsion Acid + Oil + Emulsifiers 
Moderate length 
fracture, carbonate 
formations 
Alcohol based 
Methanol/water mixes 
or 100% methanol 
Methanol + water  
Emulsion based 
Water-oil emulsions Water + Oil  
CO2-methanol CO2 + water + methanol  
Cryogenic fluids 
Liquid CO2 CO2  
Liquid nitrogen N2  
Liquid helium He  
Liquid natural gas 
LPG (butane and/or 
propane) 
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Fracturing with dynamic loading, also known as dry fracturing, is a technique where 
no fluids are used. The fracturing occurs by inducing a dynamic loading, even by 
explosive propellant systems or electrical impulse at the bottom of the wellbore. The 
explosive propellant system consists of two stages. The first stage is a high 
accumulative detonation produced by a multistage propellant combustion. The second 
one is to create a multiple fractures in shale rock, this is achieved by a low explosive 
propellant which will generate high pressure gas at high rates. Even though the 
fractures made by dry fracturing are much smaller than the ones made by hydraulic 
fracturing, this technology has its own advantages. The solution for environmental 
concern is one of the main advantages in addition to the economic side. The dry 
fracturing technology can be a very economical alternative, as it requires much less 
on-site, specialised equipment and, in addition, it resolves many of the environmental 
problems associated with shale gas production in Europe. Also, it resolves some of the 
problems associated with waterbased hydraulic fracturing processes that may damage 
water sensitive shale formations or other gas-bearing formations [42], [45]. A brief 
comparison of hydraulic fracturing with dry fracturing is given in table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2 Comparison of fracturing technologies [45] 
Consideration Water Based Dry Fracturing 
Environmentally friendly N Y 
Fluid availability ? - 
Fluid recycling Y - 
Chemicals used Y N 
Reservoir compatibility ? Y 
Fracture creation Y Y 
Proppant carrying Y ? 
Recovery to pipeline N N 
Heavy metals flowback Y N 
Frack cost 1 <<1 
Fluid left in formation Y - 
Well clean up Y Instant production 
Frack geometry predictability N Y 
Tilting stress development Y N 
Zone water in flux risk 1 >>>1 
Fracture length 1 >>1 
Active flow frack perforation ? Y 
Fracked well performance  1 >1 
Local road damage risk Y N 
Environmental risk Y Y 
NOx and CO2 in pumping Y N 
Return on investment 1 <<<1 
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 Objective of The Work 
Producing extensive high-pressure waves at the base of the well bore by using 
detonation is a potential technique for shale gas extraction. This technique might 
overcome both small distance cracking of dynamic loading fracturing and the 
environmental disadvantages for fracking. The detonation phenomenon is known 
since the end of the nineteenth century. Detonation waves have been defined as “shock 
wave with energy evolution inside the wave front”. The interaction of shock waves 
travelling ahead of the flame with the boundary layer formed by the precursor shock 
is the important factor to trigger the detonation. The crucial role is played by 
thermodynamic interactions and the induction time. 
The main objectives of this study can be summarised in the next points: 
• Designing an experimental rig to generate pressure pulse waves produced by 
detonation using natural gas and pure oxygen as combustible fuels for a range 
of equivalence ratio. 
• Study the health and safety issues accompanied by detonation using hazard and 
operability study (HAZOP). In addition to making risk assessment to the 
system and the occupied environment. 
• Numerically analyse the detonation products using 0-D and 1-D codes to 
predict the highest pressure, temperature and velocity for the purposes of 
design and to find the optimum equivalence ratios that can be used in 
experimental work. 
• Investigate the influence of obstacle geometry on deflagration to detonation 
transition characteristics by simulating different obstacle geometries set inside 
a 1in outer diameter pipe proposed to carry out the experimental work. 
• Study the effect of produced pressure pulse waves on cracking a perforated 
area of shale rock and find the crack propagation in that area. 
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 Thesis Structure  
This thesis is structured of nine chapters. These chapters are organised as follow, 
• Chapter one is a general introduction review the impact of using natural gas as 
a substitution of other kinds of fossil fuels on various aspects. In addition to 
the shale gas resources in Europe and the way of its extraction.  
• Chapter two starts with defining combustion phenomena and main flame 
propagation stages identified by researchers. Detonation models have been 
described along with the effect of confinement, obstruction and initiation 
modes, followed by a review of some previous work in deflagration to 
detonation transition for several types of fuels. Finally, the health and safety 
legislations in Britain and Europe have been addressed briefly. This chapter 
has finished by the HAZOP study requirements and procedures. 
• Chapter three describes the design of proposed apparatus and its concept. Rig 
layout and setup was the subsequent section in this chapter along with the 
related detailed HAZOP study and risk assessment. 
• Chapter four presents the 0-D and 1-D numerical analysis using GASEQ and 
CHEMKIN-Pro software. Results of these codes are drawn with respect to 
range of equivalence ratio to find the best configuration that will be used in 
experiments. 
• Chapter five presents the results of 2-D CFD simulation of the deflagration to 
detonation transition of stoichiometric hydrogen/air mixture in the proposed 
experimental detonation tube. Several internal geometries, obstacles, shapes, 
etc., have been examined here.  
• Chapter six is based on experimental tests obtaining some of the shale rock 
characteristics out of samples obtained from the Dulais Valley, South Wales, 
and compare them with some others obtained from the Bowland-Hodder area. 
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• Chapter seven is a two-dimensional study performed to predict the pressure 
pulse produced using detonation tube on a pre-crack propagation generated 
primarily by perforating. 
• Chapter eight discusses all the obtained results from the last chapters 
comprehensively and highlights the major findings. 
• Chapter nine draws together the conclusions from each of the previous 
chapters and suggests areas for further study. 
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2 Chapter 2 From 
Deflagration to 
Detonation 
 Introduction 
Self-propagating combustion waves are classified depending on flame velocity and 
pressure variation. Thus, they are classified into two types, Deflagration and Detonation. 
A brief description of deflagration and a more detailed description of detonation waves 
are discussed in this chapter. Detonation phenomenological description and the most 
famous theories applied to justify the enormous and sudden change in gas properties 
across the flow, as well as the boundary and initial conditions that effect this phenomenon 
are going to be addressed here. Also, this chapter will mention methods to analyse 
deflagration to detonation transition phenomena and discuss some experimental and 
numerical with fundamental governing equations for flow and flame characterisation. 
The following part of this chapter talks about health and safety for deflagration to 
detonation transition, emphasizing hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) associated 
with detonation. After a brief discussion on some fuels used to generate detonation, the 
main purpose of using unconventional fuel, precisely shale gas, to initiate detonation is 
also discussed. This leads onto a justification for the rest of the work in this thesis. 
 Combustion Phenomena 
When reactants ignited, by any mean of ignition source, a combustion wave is generated 
and propagates away from the ignition source. As the combustion wave passes through 
reactants, reactants are transformed into products by breaking the chemical bonds of their 
molecules and releasing the stored chemical energy. This energy is then converted to 
thermal and kinetic energy, which in turn significantly influence thermodynamics states 
of the substance across the combustion wave. Physical and chemical processes, which are 
generated by the gradient fields across the wave, lead the combustion wave to be self-
sustained. 
Depending on fuel and oxidiser mixing location, combustion is divided into premixed, 
diffusion and partially premixed combustion. While in premixed combustion the fuel and 
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oxidiser are mixed outside the combustion chamber, the formers are introduced separately 
into the combustion chamber in diffusion, also known as non-mixed, combustion. 
Partially premixed combustion is a combination of the last two combustion types, where 
the fuel and oxidiser are not completely mixed before they are introduced into the 
combustion chamber[46]. 
Flame speed, which is the speed at which the flame front travels in an unburned mixture, 
is related to many factors such as equivalence ratio, dimensions and shape of the 
combustion chamber, presence of obstacles, and other factors. This speed will determine 
the flame propagation waves scenario as deflagration, deflagration to detonation 
transition DDT, or detonation [47]. 
Although deflagration and detonation are similar processes, they represent opposite limits 
of the spectrum of reactive flow phenomena. It is of importance to define and distinguish 
between deflagration and detonation combustion waves. The findings of Bertheldt [48] 
and Mallard and LeChatelier [49] in 1881 stimulated the study of chemical reaction in 
this important topic of combustion. The velocity propagation was measured a year later 
by Bertheldt and Vieille, who developed a theory to explain the experimental data [50]. 
Photographic techniques, using a rotating drum camera, enabled Mallard and LeChatelier 
[51] to notice the oscillatory movements of the flame front preceding the transformation 
from the initial uniform motion to high velocity combustion[51]. 
 Flame Propagation 
In the initial stage of flame propagation, just after ignition, the main source of the flame 
acceleration is the increasing surface area of the flame[52]. When the flame hits the back 
and side walls of the confinement pipe, the flame propagation will pass through four 
stages as distinguished by Clanet and Searby (1996)[53]. In the first stage, the pipe’s walls 
do not affect the flame front propagation, thus taking a hemispherical shape. In the second 
stage, as the pipe’s walls start to affect the flame propagation, the radial flame propagation 
velocity towards the walls is assumed to approach the laminar flame velocity. At the same 
time, as the flame surface area is enlarged and changes its shape to what is known as 
finger shaped flame, the axial velocity will boost and be much higher [54]. 
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Clanet and Searby found empirical relations for the time when the flame reaches the pipe 
wall, twall , and for the time when the flame front changes from spherical to finger shaped, 
tsphere, as following [53]: 
𝐭𝐰𝐚𝐥𝐥 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟔 (
𝐫
𝐒𝐥
) ± 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐 ( 𝐫
𝐒𝐥
)       Equation 2.1 
𝐭𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐞 = 𝟎. 𝟏 (
𝐫
𝐒𝐥
) ± 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐 ( 𝐫
𝐒𝐥
)       Equation 2.2 
where r is the pipe radius and Sl is the laminar burning velocity. 
Also, depending on the time variation of the volume of the burned gases and equating it 
to the mass consumption rate of fresh gas, an analytical relation between twall and tsphere 
can be driven: 
𝐭𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐞 = 𝐭𝐰𝐚𝐥𝐥 −
𝐫
𝐒𝐥
𝟏
𝟐𝛂
𝐥𝐧(𝐙𝐰𝐚𝐥𝐥
𝐫
)       Equation 2.3 
where α is the expansion ratio, and Zwall is the axial position of the flame front when it 
first touches the pipe side wall. They have found that, the time when the flame reached 
the pipe wall is almost the time when experiments show the first rise in pressure, as 
indicated in figure 2.1. 
The next stage of the flame propagation happens when the inversion to a tulip flame shape 
begins. The expression “ tulip flame” was first called by Salamandra et al. in 1959 to 
describe the sudden change of flame shape from forward finger to backward cusp [55]. 
The increase of pressure before the flame front cause a flow in the direction opposite to 
the flame front propagation. 
 
Figure 2.1 Pressure at the closed end of a shock tube for stoichiometric propane-air flames [56] 
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As in the two last stages, Clanet and Searby were able to develop empirically a linear 
function of radius to laminar burning velocity ratio to calculate the time when the tulip 
flame happens as: 
𝐭𝐭𝐮𝐥𝐢𝐩 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟑 (
𝐫
𝐒𝐥
) ± 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐 ( 𝐫
𝐒𝐥
)       Equation 2.4 
From their experiments, Clanet and Searby concluded that the major cause of the tulip 
inversion is the Rayleigh-Taylor instability. This instability results from the pressure and 
density gradients in presence of an acceleration or deceleration at the burnt light fluid and 
unburnt denser mixture interface surface. 
The last stage covers the flame propagation after the tulip inversion. The flame surface 
inversion leads to decrease in the surface area which in turn leads to flame deceleration. 
In such a case where the pipe is long enough and in absence of acoustic waves, this 
deceleration is followed by an acceleration that results from the increase of the flame 
surface area when the flame becomes concave towards the unburnt mixture again. Due to 
the new acceleration, the same mechanism of instability can generate a new tulip 
inversion, and the flame propagation is decelerated once again [9], [12]. Figure 2.2 shows 
these processes. 
 
Figure 2.2 The four stages of flame propagation in confined geometry. 
a. Hemispherical shape.    b. Finger shaped.  c. tulip flame. d. flame surface inversion.      
 
a 
b 
c 
d 
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 Deflagration Waves   
Deflagration waves are expansion waves that propagate at low subsonic velocity, the 
pressure falls across the reaction zone and the products move in a direction opposite to 
the wave propagating direction [57]. 
When an ignition source is ignited in a fuel-oxidiser medium, the flame initially 
propagates as a sphere outward from the ignition point. The relatively large increase of 
sphere surface area in all direction leads to high flame acceleration and propagation. If 
the medium is confined in a pipe, the flame will be quenched, as it reaches the 
confinement walls. This will allow the flame to propagate in one direction, when the 
ignition source is placed near one of the pipe’s ends, with a hemispherical shape[52]. 
Deflagration can be divided according to turbulence presented in the unburned gases into 
laminar or turbulent. If there is no initial turbulence presented in the unburned gases, 
deflagration undergoes laminar flames and their shape is modified depending on number 
of instabilities. When turbulent is presented, a variety of turbulent combustion 
propagation regimes will be presented due to the interaction between the flame and 
turbulence [58]. 
 
 Detonation Waves 
Detonation waves are compression waves, the density increases across it and the products 
move in the same direction of the wave motion. Detonation waves move at a supersonic 
velocity, the reactants ahead keep their initial conditions prior to detonation arrival, and 
therefore, the thermodynamics states across it increase precipitously. 
The detonation phenomenon was discovered by the end of the nineteenth century when 
the diagnostic tools development by the time enabled observation of rapid combustion 
phenomena and measurement of combustion waves propagation velocity. A first theory 
predicts detonation velocity, which is based on Rankin and Hugoniot analysis of 
conservation equations across a shock wave. The theory was formulated independently 
by Chapman [59] and Jouguet [60]  shortly after the discovery of the phenomenon. 
Zeldovich[61], vonNeuman [62] and Doring [63] took in to account the time that radicals 
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take to form and initiate the reaction using Rankin-Hugoniot curves, thus developing 
another theory. 
Although detonation wave speed has two possible solutions, strong and weak detonation, 
these two solutions converge when the speed of detonation goes to a minimum, and there 
is no solution provided for detonation below this minimum velocity. For the strong 
detonation, the flow downstream the detonation wave is subsonic and pressure and 
density are higher than those for weak detonation with supersonic downstream flow.     
2.5.1 The Chapman-Jouguet Theory 
The detonation wave in the C-J theory has been considered as a discontinuity with infinite 
reaction rates, with all energy added instantaneously in the chemical reaction zone that 
follows the shock. Both reactants and products are modelled as perfect gases.  
C-J theory refers to the criterion for the choice of the detonation velocity for a given 
explosive mixture. While Chapman choose the minimum velocity solution based on 
experiments, Jouguet determined the entropy variation along the Hugoniot curve to locate 
the minimum value, which is noted to be corresponding to sonic condition downstream 
the detonation wave. However, it has been shown that the minimum velocity solution, 
just like the minimum entropy solution, gives sonic flow downstream of the detonation 
wave. 
Mass, momentum and energy conservation laws are applied with a steady one-
dimensional assumption across a control volume shown in figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 Control volume for a moving wave in combustible mixture. 
The relative velocity of unburned and burned gases with respect to the shock wave 
velocity are denoted with the ‘prime’, and are given by: 
𝐮𝐮
′ = 𝐮𝐬 − 𝐮𝐮         Equation 2.5a 
us ub uu 
pu 
Tu 
ρu 
pb 
Tb 
ρb 
 Chapter Two: From Deflagration to Detonation   
 32    
       
ub
′ = us − ub         Equation 2.5b 
where subscripts u, b and s are stand for unburned gases, burned gases and shock 
respectively. Hence, the continuity, momentum and energy equations are: 
𝛒𝐮𝐮𝐮
′ = 𝛒𝐛𝐮𝐛
′          Equation 2.6 
𝐩𝐮 + 𝛒𝐮𝐮𝐮
′𝟐 = 𝐩𝐛 + 𝛒𝐛𝐮𝐛
′𝟐        Equation 2.7 
𝛄
𝛄−𝟏
𝐩𝐮
𝛒𝐮
+
𝟏
𝟐
𝐮𝐮
′𝟐 + 𝐪 =
𝛄
𝛄−𝟏
𝐩𝐛
𝛒𝐛
+
𝟏
𝟐
𝐮𝐛
′𝟐       Equation 2.8 
where u is velocity, ρ is density, p is pressure, q is the heat release per unit mass of 
reactants due to chemical reaction, and γ ratio of the specific heat of the gas 
When unburned gases are in stagnation, the equations above can be written as: 
𝛒𝐮𝐮𝐬 = 𝛒𝐛(𝐮𝐛 − 𝐮𝐬)        Equation 2.9 
𝐩𝐮 + 𝛒𝐮𝐮𝐬
𝟐 = 𝐩𝐛 + 𝛒𝐛(𝐮𝐛 − 𝐮𝐬)
𝟐       Equation 2.10 
𝛄
𝛄−𝟏
𝐩𝐮
𝛒𝐮
+
𝟏
𝟐
𝐮𝐬
𝟐 + 𝐪 =
𝛄
𝛄−𝟏
𝐩𝐛
𝛒𝐛
+
𝟏
𝟐
(𝐮𝐛 − 𝐮𝐬)
𝟐      Equation 2.11 
Combining mass conservation with momentum conservation equations yields the 
Rayleigh relation: 
(𝐩𝐛 − 𝐩𝐮) = 𝛒𝐮𝐮𝐬
𝟐 (𝟏 −
𝛒𝐮
𝛒𝐛
)       Equation 2.12 
The Rankine-Hugoniot relation yields by substituting Rayleigh relation into energy 
conservation equation; 
𝒒 =
𝛄
𝛄−𝟏
(
𝐩𝐛
𝛒𝐛
−
𝐩𝐮
𝛒𝐮
) −
𝟏
𝟐
(𝐩𝐛 − 𝐩𝐮) (
𝟏
𝛒𝐛
+
𝟏
𝛒𝐮
)       Equation 2.13 
The schematic of the Rankine-Hugoniot curve is shown in figure 2.4, where point A 
represents the unburned gases state. All the Rayleigh lines describe the process starting 
from point A. The Rayleigh line intersection with the Rankine-Hugoniot curve represents 
the final burned state. However, there are two particular lines that are tangential to the 
Rankine-Hugoniot curve, at points D and E. With the horizontal and vertical lines of 
unburned gases states passing through the Rankine-Hugoniot curve at B and C, five 
regions along the curve are distinguished. 
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Figure 2.4 A schematic of Rankine-Hugoniot curve and Rayleigh lines shows the region 
distinguished along the curve 
Two regions, where pb<pu and 
1
ρb
 > 
1
ρu
 , underneath E represents a strong deflagration 
region, and from C to E, represents weak deflagration. The other two regions, where pb>pu 
and 
1
ρb
 < 
1
ρu
 , represent weak detonation from B to D, and the strong detonation from D 
and up. The last region, where pb>pu and 
1
ρb
 > 
1
ρu
 , represents an impossible solution 
because there is no positive slop as the Rayleigh line definition states: 
𝛒𝐮𝐮𝐬 = √
(𝐩𝐮−𝐩𝐛)
(
𝟏
𝛒𝐛
−
𝟏
𝛒𝐮
)
         Equation 2.14 
Point D represents the point where us is at its minimum and is equal to the summation of 
the sound speed in the product and the product gases speed: 
𝐮𝐬 = 𝐜𝐛 + 𝐮𝐛         Equation 2.15 
Also, the product gases entropy below this point is lower than the entropy of the product 
gases at the point itself and above. All of that, makes this point the only stable solution 
for the detonation, as Chapman and Jouguet stated in their theory. 
2.5.2 ZND Detonation  
Zeldovich [61], von Neumann [62] and Doring [63] independently developed detonation 
model well known as ZND theory. Starting from C-J theory, taking into account the 
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detonation wave structure, they considered a trivial delay time to the energy to be released 
after the shock with finite reaction rates. 
The shock wave, followed and strengthened by the reaction region, will increase the 
pressure and temperature of the reactants upstream the shock to ensure a high rate reaction 
so that the energy released is enough to keep the shock moving at high speed while 
assuming no reaction takes place in the shock wave region.  
Figure 2.5 shows the behaviour of physical properties through a detonation wave 
according to the ZND theory. Four regimes are indicated, the first regime is the state of 
unburned gases. The next regime refers to the shock wave, the physical properties here 
change dramatically as explained above. The deflagration regime follows, and is 
subdivided into induction zone and heat addition zone. Although chemical reaction takes 
place in this regime, the physical properties in the induction zone are almost flat due to 
the very slow reaction rate. As the reaction rate soars in the heat addition zone, the 
physical properties will change sharply and C-J state will be reached by the end of this 
regime. 
 
Figure 2.5 Physical properties behaviour through a ZND detonation wave. 
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 DDT Phenomenon 
Deflagration waves are inherently unstable waves, for that their turbulent reaction front 
leads to increase their propagation speed [64], until this speed reaches the boundary 
conditions where the propagation undergoes a sudden transition to detonation. The low 
energy required to trigger a deflagration makes it the more probable mode of combustion 
to happen. However, experiments have shown that, under certain conditions when the 
flame velocity continuously accelerates until it reaches about half the CJ detonation 
speed, a spontaneous onset of detonation takes place [65]. 
As it is illustrated in figure (2.4), the lower part of Rankine-Hugoniot curve represents 
the deflagration solutions, while the upper part represents the detonation solutions. Hence, 
transition from deflagration to detonation solutions is thought of as a jump from the lower 
to the upper part of the curve [47]. Nevertheless, precursor compression waves generated 
ahead of the deflagration flame due to products expansion will travel through reactants 
raising their temperature and changing the initial state. As the Rankine-Hugoniot curve 
depends on this initial state, it will change and give different deflagration solutions [66]. 
Higher temperature reactants cause faster compression waves apt to catch up the previous 
ones, and so on until all waves merge at a point forming a shock wave. Finally, when 
detonation is triggered, its wave is supersonic, therefore the initial state is considered as 
the original undisturbed conditions, which will go back to the original Rankine-Hugoniot 
curve. 
The distance required for deflagration to transform into detonation (predetonation 
distance) is affected by many factors. The most dominant ones are discussed in the next 
section. 
2.6.1 Boundary conditions 
Boundary conditions exerts a strong influence on the propagation of detonation waves. It 
has been proved in many experiments that the presence of obstacles in pipes containing 
moving flames cause rapid flame acceleration. Turbulence is the result of that presence. 
Turbulence, in turn, increases the local burning rate by increasing both the surface area 
of the flame and the transport of local mass and energy. This leads to higher flow velocity 
in the unburned gas. All of these actions, under appropriate conditions, will lead to 
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detonation[64]. For that, in smooth channels without obstacles only turbulent deflagration 
regimes can be achieved [67]. 
The predetonation distance can be decreased by initial flow turbulence increases, which 
is an essential factor to influence deflagration to detonation transition [68]. In a tube with 
nonslip walls, the flame–sound interaction also strongly influences the oscillations of a 
flame front. Flame–sound interaction happens mainly due to the acoustic mode between 
the closed tube end and the flame front. Oscillations are stronger in wider tubes, in 
sufficiently wide tubes violent folding of a flame front can be observed [69].  
In a duct filled with an explosive gas mixture, the mixture properties and the duct 
geometry, which includes the wall surface roughness, governs flame propagation. The 
interaction of transverse pressure waves generated at the rough wall governs the 
propagation mechanism, not the boundary layer turbulence. The transverse waves, and its 
frequency appears to play a role in supporting the detonation wave [70]. 
Deflagration-to-detonation transition in reactive gases usually occurs in confined or 
partially confined spaces, the shape and layout of obstacles have a significant effect on 
flame acceleration, and subsequent detonation propagation. The flame accelerates as its 
surface bends with the flow around obstacles, which leads to formation of shocks ahead 
of the flame. These shocks are reflected by obstacles and propagate back to interact with 
the flame. When shocks become strong enough, their collisions with obstacles ignite the 
gas mixture, and detonations form [71]. 
The effect of obstacles geometry on the shock wave has been numerically studied by Sha 
et.al. (2012) [72] and (2014) [73]. Reflected wave and expansion wave were found to be 
generated by interaction between incident shock and obstacle. Both waves interact with 
the main shock and oppositely influence it. While the reflected shock increases pressure 
of incident shock, the expansion one decreases it. The shape and dimensions of the 
obstacle has also investigated by the researchers. The pressure of incident shock front was 
found to be highly influenced by the width of upper side and the height and angle of 
windward side, but neglectable effect by the leeward side. Higher pressure can be 
achieved with wider upper side and higher and more acute triangles obstacles [72], [73].  
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The method and location of initiation has its share of importance, a commercial spark 
plug, electrode or even an additional small tube filled with a sensitive mixture with 
conventional spark plug can be used [74]. 
Heat and momentum losses through the confining walls are one of the detonation 
propagation factors. The confinement tube diameter effects detonation velocity. There is 
a critical tube diameter for detonation to propagate, which is about a thirteenth of the 
detonation cell width for a given explosive mixture. The detonation cell is a 
multidimensional structure which includes both the detonation wave and transverse wave. 
Another boundary condition that affects the propagation of detonation is the walls 
roughness. It is found that the presence of spiral wires could highly reduce the normal CJ 
detonation velocity [75]. 
 Methods to analyse the DDT phenomenon 
Understanding the deflagration to detonation transition phenomenon, either for safety 
purposes or due to its potential application to high thrust propulsion systems, has led 
researchers to conduct many studies since the last century. These studies can be classified 
into two main categories, experimental and numerical. 
2.7.1 Experimental Method 
Many experimental investigations have been conducted to understand various aspects of 
detonation. Detonation initiation is one of the most interesting processes in experiments, 
and it can be divided into direct and indirect initiation. As the detonation is a strong shock 
followed and supported by the chemical energy released by reactants, the igniter required 
to provide a strong shock for a sufficient duration in order to generate direct detonation 
initiation. Electrical discharge, high power lasers or condensed explosive charges are 
usually used to produce such a high energy [76]. 
Spherical detonation was the first observed direct initiation in 1923. A powerful mercury 
fulminate igniter was used to detonate carbon disulfide (CS2) with oxygen in an 
unconfined geometry [77]. No detonation was produced when the same experiment was 
repeated using an ordinary spark. In 1949, Shepherd [78] used a confined geometry to 
demonstrate the direct initiation of detonation using the pressure wave from a blasting 
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explosive to ignite the reactants. Exploding wire [79] and spark gaps [80] are two other 
techniques used to establish direct initiation of detonation in oxy-fuel mixtures. The 
amount of energy deposited in the later techniques, were difficult to be estimated. 
However, the various flame acceleration mechanisms related to confining geometry play 
a pivotal role in detonation initiation. In a normal deflagration to detonation transition 
(DDT), the onset of detonation would require further flame acceleration once a 
deflagration is ignited. The distance travelled for the acquisition of this acceleration from 
the ignition point to the detonation formation is usually referred to as the DDT length. 
The DDT length is influenced by the pipe geometry, diameter, length and wall roughness. 
It is also influenced by the fuel-oxidiser type and equivalence ratio, and the ignition 
method and location. Finally, the initial mixture conditions have been shown to play an 
influential role on DDT length. 
Porowski et al. [67] carry out an experimental study in a 6m long circular cross section 
tube with inner diameter of 140mm. Stoichiometric hydrogen-methane-air with different 
methane concentrations at ambient conditions was used to study the effect of obstacles 
locations and configurations on flame propagation, acceleration and transition to 
detonation. The transition to detonation was noticed to be more likely with higher 
methane concentration when the blockage area is 40% and the distance between obstacles 
is three times the pipe diameter [67].  
The effect of spark timing in addition to geometry and equivalent ratio was investigated 
by Meyer et al. [81]. Shchelkin spiral, extended cavity with spiral and co-annular 
geometries were used with a 2 in inner diameter tube for H2/Air fuel. It was concluded 
that there is a fundamental difference in local explosion propagation between a Shchelkin 
spiral geometry and axisymmetric obstacles. The extended cavity before the Shchelkin 
spiral generate strong early detonations that are quicker to vanish. The nature of transition 
to detonation remains the same for different equivalence ratios, its only effect will be on 
the location of transition. The primary impact of spark timing was on the progression of 
the detonation wave further downstream the tube [81]. 
Detonation limits are other fundamental property of explosion with vast share of interest. 
Many attempts have been made to develop a general theory about detonability limits, but 
it has been impossible due to the strong dependence on tube geometry, fuel and ignition. 
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For methane-air mixture in high length to diameter ratio, detonations were successfully 
initiated by Zipf et al. (2013) [82] for mixture containing between 5.3% to 15.5% methane 
by volume. These finding are wider than the limits ascertained by Wolanski et al. in 1981 
[83], where detonation was attained at 8% to 14.5% methane in methane-air mixture. 
Vanderstraeten et al. (1997) [84] stated that the lower explosion limit for methane 
concentration was of 4.6±0.3% and upper explosion limit was of 15.8±0.4%, and the 
maximum pressure rise occurs at a methane concentration of about 9.5% of the total 
mixture volume [84], as it illustrated in figure 2.6. 
Initial pressure and temperature of combustible mixtures has a slight effect on the 
detonation velocity, but the acceleration process can be sensitive to the initial pipe wall 
temperature or mixture humidity [81], [82]. Although detonation velocity is essentially 
independent of initial pressure, increasing initial pressure results in decreasing reaction 
time and hence decrease the run-up distance to achieve DDT [85], [86]. Thus, it is evident 
that further research is still needed. 
 
Figure 2.6 Lower and upper explosion limits and maximum pressure ratios for methane air 
mixture at atmospheric conditions [84]. 
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2.7.2 Numerical Method CFD 
Since 1970’s when the computer developments made it possible to numerically simulate 
complicated phenomena, substantial attempts have been made to analyse and understand 
detonation. Due to its relatively simpler chemical kinetics and potentially catastrophic 
consequences in case of any accidentally release, hydrogen is often used as fuel in 
numerical studies [87], [88]. Intricate nonlinear reactions in addition to other physical 
processes like turbulence, shock waves and flame interaction made the simulation of 
deflagration to detonation transition one of the most challenging problems in combustion 
[89].  
However, vast numerical and simulation works related to DDT show good agreement 
with experimental results. A good recapitulation of ten-year theoretical and numerical 
efforts to comprehend DDT has been made by Oran et al. [90]. They stated, “the turbulent 
flame itself does not undergo a transition to detonation”, but it helps to create an 
environment to generate ignition centres in the reactant zones to contribute with the 
detonation. The interaction between shocks and flames with obstacles and boundary 
layers represent another assistant factor to create such an environment. An obstructed 
channel filled with hydrogen-oxygen mixture were simulated to find how the ignition 
centres, or hot spots, formed under turbulent flame effect, and how those hot spots can 
support a spontaneous reaction wave and if this wave can undergo a successful transition 
to detonation. Yet, detonation observed in this simulation was unable to surpass obstacles 
[90].  
Ciccarelli et al. (2008) [91] published a detailed review about experimental and numerical 
studies related to flame acceleration and DDT in both smooth and obstructed ducts. Flame 
processes and detonation propagation are controlled by interplay of many spatial and 
temporal physical scales related to chemistry, turbulence and confinement. Nevertheless, 
it is extremely difficult to analyse all phenomena involved because of the wide range of 
existing scales [91]. 
Detonation waves as a fundamental combustion process was the major theme that 
Shepherd (2009) [92] focused on in his experimental, modelling and simulation review. 
Mixture types, boundary and initial conditions identified the behaviour of detonation front 
structures and their paradigm. Using systematic variation of the reactants composition, an 
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experimental and numerical evidence was presented for the transition between 
combustion regimes. On the other hand, more difficulties regarding physical and chemical 
models are faced for simulation. 
 Fuels for DDT 
Gaseous fuels are the common fuels that used to carry out detonation experiments due to 
ease in getting homogeneous mixtures in single-phase mixtures. However, remarkable 
efforts have been done by many researchers to sustain detonation in liquid fuels (two-
phase fuel). There are multiple factors, such as droplet size, droplet breakup and the 
presence of fuel vapour that affect the detonation initiation and its sustain [93]. It is found 
by many researchers that droplets size must be sub 10µm in order to sustain detonation 
[94], [95]. Furthermore, when the liquid fuel droplets are about 2µm similarities in 
behaviour can be seen in the transition to detonation process with gaseous detonation. 
Nevertheless, detonation using gaseous fuels is much easier and more achievable, and it 
depends strongly on the fuel-oxidiser combination. The sensitivity of a mixture to 
detonation can be measured by a parameter named detonation cell width (λ), the smaller 
the cell size the more sensitive to detonate [96]. Figure 2.7 shows a pattern for detonation 
cells for hydrogen/air mixture. Detonation parameters, pressure and velocity, depend on 
fuel to air ratio in addition to initial pressure and temperature. Table (2.1) shows the 
pressure, velocity and cell width for stoichiometric fuel with air and oxygen at ambient 
condition (298K and 1.01325bar) [97]. 
 
Figure 2.7 Cellular pattern on sooted foil created by hydrogen/air mixture at 20kPa [97]. 
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Table 2.1 Detonation parameters for stoichiometric mixtures at ambient conditions [97]. 
Fuel 
Volume % uCJ(m/s) pCJ(bar) λ (mm) 
Air Oxygen Air Oxygen Air Oxygen Air Oxygen 
Hydrogen 29.6 66.7 1971 2841 15.6 19.0 6-10 1-2 
Acetylene 7.75 28.6 1867 2425 19.1 34.0 10-15 0.1-0.2 
Ethylene 6.54 25.0 1825 2376 18.4 33.7 24-26 2-3 
Ethane 5.66 22.2 1825 2372 18.0 34.3 50-59 1-2 
Propane 4.03 16.7 1801 2360 18.3 36.5 40-60 0.5-1 
Methane 9.48 33.3 1804 2393 17.2 29.6 250-350 2-4 
2.8.1 Hydrogen  
As it seen in table (2.1), hydrogen has a smaller cell size than other hydrocarbons in air, 
and then it is more likely to detonate. For that, hydrogen poses the major concern in safety 
studies when the probability of deflagration to detonation transition is taken into account 
[87]. Another important factor influencing detonation is the detonability limits, 
mentioned above in section 2.7.1. While the cell size depends mainly on fuel and diluent 
concentration, and initial conditions, detonability limits depend on both initial and 
boundary conditions for certain fuels. 
Eder et. al. (2000) [98] used hydrogen and air experimentally to investigate lean 
detonation limits of hydrogen based on the mixture composition and geometry of the 
detonation tube. A coaxial shape pipe was used in the experiments, the gap between the 
inner and outer pipes was filled with varied temperatures oil controlled by a heating cable. 
Obstacles with different blockage ratios, in addition to spacing and total length, have been 
also used to promote turbulence. Optical measurement techniques as well as conventional 
ones have been used to detect and record transition processes. They concluded that the 
initial conditions have more influence on the transition phenomenon than boundary 
conditions. The propagation velocity essentially is influenced by the heat flux to the 
confining walls. Also, they found that the peak pressure of supersonic deflagration can be 
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twice higher than the detonation peak pressure, therefore they stated that “detonation is 
not the most dangerous combustion mode” [98]. 
Meyer et al. [81], used H2/Air in different configurations to enhance the transition from 
deflagration to detonation They concluded that between detonation limits, the equivalence 
ratio affects the location of transition rather than its nature [81]. The flame propagation 
of stoichiometric hydrogen-air mixture and its transition to detonation has been studied 
experimentally and numerically by Rudy (2011) [99]. Different configurations with 
different blockage ratio obstacles at atmospheric conditions were used. Detonation 
velocity stability has been found to be highly affected by obstacle configurations. 
Increasing the spacing between the obstacles decreases the differences between the 
velocities. This difference seems obvious for higher blockage ratio. The reduced reaction 
kinetic mechanism used in numerical simulations caused unconformity for quantitative 
comparison with experiments for detonation wave propagation. However, there is a good 
congruence between numerical results and experiment [99]. 
Table 2.2 Flammability limits of hydrogen in air and pure oxygen [100]. 
Oxidiser 
Flammability Limits, vol% Detonability Limits, vol% 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Air 4.0 75 18.3 59 
Pure Oxygen 4.5 94 15 90 
Using pure oxygen with hydrogen increases detonation probability, as it reduces the cell 
size and widens the detonation limits. Hydrogen-oxygen was the preferred combustible 
mixture in many studies [81], [86], [100], [101], [102], mainly because of its simplified 
chemical kinetics. Besides H2/O2 has lower ignition energy required for the trigger [103]. 
It has been shown numerically that there is a minimal concentration of hydrogen to 
achieve fast deflagration, which is inversely proportional to the mixture initial 
temperature. In order to ensure deflagration to detonation transition, hydrogen 
concentration must be higher than the minimal concentration [56].  
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2.8.2 Hydrocarbons 
Although hydrogen has a low detonation cell size, hydrocarbons have higher detonation 
pressure, especially when they detonate with oxygen as an oxidiser (see table 2.1). 
Detonation of hydrocarbons is of particular importance for real life applications related 
to process industries. 
Fuel composition has a greater effect on flame speed and transition to detonation in 
hydrocarbons fuels than in hydrogen. Chatrathi et. al. (2001) [105], performed 
experiments for different fuels at different equivalence ratios, using one pipeline system. 
They found that for hydrocarbon fuels the flame speed accelerates rapidly near the 
stoichiometric range. When the equivalence ratio goes further from stoichiometric 
condition, the rate of acceleration declines until the flame speed drops significantly and 
the flame quenches. On the other hand, hydrogen sustains detonation for an equivalence 
ratio range of 0.79 to 1.59 [105]. 
Stoichiometric methane-oxygen mixtures diluted in nitrogen were used by Ciccarelli et.al. 
(2013) [70] to investigate flame propagation and bead layer top surface influence in a 
smooth and rough surfaces rectangular channel for different initial pressure. For a 
smooth-walled channel, it is the piston action of the combustion products that limits the 
flame speed to the products speed of sound. In a very rough-walled channel, it is the 
sidewall boundaries that drive the flame acceleration and thus it is not limited to the sonic 
back boundary. Once the front velocity is sufficiently fast there is a transition to a direct 
shock ignition mechanism. It is shown that the interaction of transverse pressure waves 
generated at the rough wall governs the propagation mechanism, not the boundary layer 
turbulence. The transverse waves and its frequency appears to play a role in supporting 
the detonation wave. 
Kundu et.al. (2016) [106] discussed the parameters that influence methane-air explosions 
phases, deflagration, detonation and transition stage respectively. The paper highlights 
the summary of results from several researchers that investigated the impact of the 
concentration, initial conditions, ignition, obstacles and geometry on flame acceleration 
and potential transition to detonation. It is found that the explosion pressure reaches its 
maximum value at methane concentrations of about 9.5%, figure 2.8. Even though the 
maximum pressure of explosion is affected by initial temperature, it falls down with initial 
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temperature rise. It is found that the initial pressure does not influence the maximum 
explosion pressure, but it does increase the upper explosion limit [84], [105]. However, 
at elevated initial pressure the probability of detonation in hydrocarbon fuel is almost 
equal to hydrogen-air detonation [107]. 
 
Figure 2.8 Explosion pressure of methane/air mixture for different initial pressure [106]. 
Detonation sensitivity can be measured using detonation cell size. Hence, acetylene 
(C2H2) has been involved in many detonation research efforts for two reasons. First, it 
has a smaller cell size compared to other hydrocarbon fuels and hydrogen. Second, 
acetylene has flexibility regarding wide detonation limits[107][108]. 
2.8.3 Hydrogen/Hydrocarbons Blends 
 Promising combustion performance of hydrocarbon/hydrogen blends directed attention 
toward their use in combustion applications. The presence of hydrogen in hydrocarbon 
blends works on widen flammability limits and increase the flame stability range. Adding 
hydrogen will increase the probability of explosion, detonation in particular, in pipeline 
systems as it reduces the DDT length and the auto ignition delay time and increase the 
flame speed [109].  
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The influence of adding methane to stoichiometric hydrogen-air mixtures on the 
detonation cell size was investigated using smoked foil techniques by Porowski et al. 
(2011) [110]. Matlab application subscripts 2D Fourier transform were used to calculate 
the average detonation cell size. They found that adding 10% of methane to the hydrogen 
air mixture increased the cell size three and a half times of the cell size of hydrogen air 
mixture [110]. Zhang et al. (2016) [111], used the same technique to register the cellular 
detonation structure. They introduced ZND induction zone lengths to explain the 
difference of the cell size for three cases of combustible mixtures. Three different 
compositions of methane-hydrogen-air mixture (stoichiometric, higher content of 
methane and higher content of hydrogen) were used in circular tubes with three annular 
gap configurations at 293K and different initial pressures. Depending on the recorded 
cellular detonation structure, the detonation was found to become stronger as the 
hydrogen content increased in the mixture, and it reaches the onset of detonation limits 
earlier with an increase of concentration. They concluded that the cell size is smaller for 
higher methane content mixture for the same condition, and the cell size decreases when 
the initial pressure increase [111]. 
The effect of diluent types and their concentration, in addition to equivalence ratios and 
initial pressures, on the time required for detonation development (DDT time) has been 
investigated by Schultz et al. (1999) [112]. Hydrogen, ethylene or propane fuels were 
investigated individually with oxygen as an oxidiser and diluted by argon, carbon dioxide, 
helium or nitrogen. The DDT time for ethylene-oxygen was found to be the shortest 
among the three fuel types. As it was mentioned in section 2.7.1, this time decreases with 
initial pressure increase.  
Although the dilution of fuel-oxygen mixtures reduces thermal energy, it changes the 
mixture heat capacity and as a result it peaks combustion temperature. For that, the 
molecular mass of the diluent has a great effect on DDT time. So, helium dilution causes 
the detonation velocity to increase and therefore decrease the DDT time, while carbon 
dioxide increases DDT time and significantly inhibits deflagration to detonation process 
[112]. 
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2.8.4 Natural Gas 
Safety concerns related to explosive gas mixtures that form in coal mines and in the 
pipeline system initiated many studies to address deflagration to detonation transition. 
Natural gas- air mixtures are not high sensitive mixtures to be detonated, but in certain 
circumstances such mixtures can experience detonation. Natural gas composition, 
confining geometry and initial conditions have utmost importance on transition processes. 
Methane forms 82%-99% of natural gas by volume, in addition to ethane, propane and 
other gases [113]. Natural gas- air mixtures have been used by Zipf et al. [114] and 
Gamezo et al. [113] in a 73m length and 105cm inner diameter tube to determine the 
detonation characteristics. In both sets of experiments, a plastic bag filled with 
stoichiometric methane-oxygen mixture has been used to initiate the detonation. The 
normal flammability limits of methane (5% to 16%) was almost encompassed by 
detonation limits. The minimum average cell size, 20-30cm, was produced slightly above 
stoichiometric conditions, 10-11% of natural gas in the mixture. The cell size is about 
double at the lower limits and reaches up to four times at upper limits. 
Turbulence produced by obstacles has also great effect on the flame acceleration. Kundu 
et al.[106], discussed various types of obstacles employed to understand the 
characteristics of explosion. Blockage ratio is the common and the most important 
parameter for all obstacle types. Still, parameters like length and pitch must be considered 
for construction of Shchelkin spirals as an example. This particular obstacle has an 
enormous effect on explosion characteristics of methane-air mixtures. Orifice plates, 
various shape obstacles and even wall roughness and their relation to transition time and 
distance, especially for methane, are well discussed by other researchers [106]. 
2.8.4.1 Usage of Shale for Detonation  
 Shale gas consists mainly of methane, for that it is not an easy process to detonate it. 
Using pure oxygen as an oxidiser will reduce the detonation cell size and enhance 
detonation characteristics. In addition, a proper geometry with suitable obstacles can have 
a tremendous impact on flame speed and lead to shorten the DDT distance. However, the 
presence of other gases in the shale gas composition affect detonation in different ways. 
Hydrocarbons, such as ethane and butane, and other alkanes in shale gas composition 
 Chapter Two: From Deflagration to Detonation   
 48    
       
increase detonation chances [115]. In contrast, inert gases, carbon dioxide in particular, 
inhibits detonation transition or at least highly increase the DDT time [112]. 
Stamford and Azapagic (2014) [116] proposed three cases for shale gas composition, they 
named it as best case, central case and worst case depending on the parameters they 
considered in their study. Methane concentration ranging between 73% in the best case 
to 55% in the worst. Methane concentration decrease in the central and worst case is 
accompanied with an increase in more sensitive to detonation hydrocarbons and decrease 
in carbon dioxide concentration [116].  
Table 2.3 Shale gas composition as suggested by Stamford et al. [116]. 
Best Case Central Case Worst Case 
• CH4 0.61kg/m3 
•  C2H6 0.04kg/m3 
•  C4H10 0.04kg/m3 
•  Other alkanes 0.02kg/m3 
•  CO2 0.13kg/m3 
•  He 0.001kg/m3 
•  Hg 2×10-7kg/m3 
•  Rn 400Bq/m3 
• CH4 0.555kg/m3 
•  C2H60.075kg/m3 
•  C3H8 0.05kg/m3 
•  C4H10 0.02kg/m3 
•  Alkanes0.03kg/m3 
•  CO2 0.115kg/m3 
•  H2S 0.045kg/m3 
•  N2 0.03kg/m3 
•  He 0.001kg/m3 
•  Hg 2×10-7kg/m3 
•  Rn 400Bq/m3 
• CH4 0.5kg/m3 
•  C2H6 0.11kg/m3 
•  C3H80.105kg/m3 
•  Alkanes 0.04kg/m3 
•  CO2 0.1kg/m3 
•  H2S 0.09kg/m3 
•  N2 0.03kg/m3 
•  He 0.001kg/m3 
•  Hg 2×10-7kg/m3 
•  Rn 400Bq/m3 
 Crack Propagation in Shale Rock 
Unconventional gas and oil is the gas and oil needs unconventional methods to be 
extracted. As this unconventional gas is trapped in the petroleum source rock in minuscule 
spaces, production of commercial quantities of shale gas from one wellbore have been 
assessed via two specific techniques, horizontal drilling and fracturing. Although there 
are many studies have been dedicated to find reliable and efficient methods of modelling 
fracture system, it was indisputably proved that there are no two shale deposits are alike 
even along a wellbore [117]. Moreover, the hypotheses adopted by the researchers 
distorted their results from reality. Assumptions such as dealing with the shale as an 
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isotropic material and ignoring the crack branching and natural fractures already existed 
in the formation [118]. 
Studying crack propagation in materials is part of fracture mechanics, which was first 
developed by Griffith in 1921 [119]. Griffith (1924) [120] stated that rupture surface is 
produced when stress generates enough energy to exceed a threshold [120]. Thereafter, 
Irwin in 1957 [121] introduced Stress Intensity Factor (SIF) as the stress intensity in the 
vicinity of crack tip caused by remote or residual stresses. SIF is associated with crack 
growth rate and it indicates the failure criteria due to fracture [121]. The Linear Elastic 
Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) theory stated the threshold of crack growth for brittle 
materials as [118], [122], 
𝐊𝐈 ≥ 𝐊𝐈𝐂        Equation 2.16 
where KI is stress intensity factor and KIC is the critical stress intensity factor, also known 
as fracture toughness. Fracture toughness is a measured material property, found by 
loading standard specimens until crack extends. SIF is usually expressed as, 
𝐊𝐈 = 𝐂𝛔√𝛑𝐚        Equation 2.17 
where σ is nominal stress in N/m2, a is crack length and C is constant depending on the 
crack geometry [122]. 
 
Figure 2.9 Crack plane orientation relative to bedding plane [123]. 
Chandler et. al. [123] reported the fracture toughness measurements on Mancos shale for 
three different fracture orientations, as seen in figure 2.9. It is found that the fracture 
toughness is lower with crack plane parallel to the bedding, and cracks trend to deviate 
towards parallel bedding orientation [123]. Moradi et. al. [124] have studied the crack 
width, crack opening displacement (COD), in hydraulic fracturing. It is demonstrated that 
the COD is the “key parameter” for a successful hydraulic fracture, as it provides a route 
for proppant to access and also proportional to oil and gas production rate. Furthermore, 
they presented a model dealing with interaction between hydraulic fractures and natural 
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fractures already existed in the formation. It is found that the propagation path is changed 
or even completely disappeared by natural fractures [124]. 
Zeng, YiJin et.al. [125] proposed a numerical model comprises the interaction of 
hydraulic fractures stage spacing and the wellbore stress redistribution. The redistribution 
of stresses induced by a certain stage fracturing parameters may activate complex natural 
fractures in the direction of horizontal wellbore. On the other hand, only minor change in 
stresses were found in the direction perpendicular to the horizontal wellbore [125]. Many 
factors, like crack deflection, crack surface friction, material anisotropic and crustal 
stresses, influence the interaction between fracture and crack propagation, branching and 
direction. Zeng X. et. al. [126] have given an explicit formula depends on crack surface 
friction and crustal stress to express the critical conditions that deflects hydraulic crack 
into weak interfaces. Applying their theory to real hydraulic fracture problem, the 
researchers concluded that further increase in hydraulic fracturing pressure introduces 
shearing crack mode rather than opening crack mode. Hence, in this mode of crack the 
crack propagation does not influenced by crack surface friction or crustal stress [126]. 
 Health and Safety in DDT 
Safety considerations were an important motivation for many researches to investigate 
deflagration to detonation transition. Although detonation is the most devastating 
accidental explosion event that could develop, incidents in industry are generally low 
compared to other potential hazards. The major conundrum of detonation lies in the 
inability to predict whether and where detonation will develop or not using any proven 
scientific method. Besides, the extreme pressure and potential damage which would be 
greater in localized regions are a major concern. Unfortunately, risk cannot be completely 
eliminated in combustion processes, thus there are criteria as to what is an acceptable risk 
level. The best accepted way to reduce risk is to reduce the consequences. 
Enormous dynamic loads run with high pressure and velocity, along with the absence of 
general rules and imagining the consequences of damage made detonation experiments 
one of the most dangerous experimental approach in combustion, herein must be replete 
with warning and safety equipment. Pressure and temperature detection instruments, 
pressure relief valves, flashback arrestors and other equipment with purge and venting 
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processes are essential appurtenances in any rig or system prepared to hold detonation 
experiments.  
Consequently, different risk assessment models must be applied to predict and analyse 
the potential cause and consequences of each hazard to humans and facilities. Meanwhile, 
it is highly significant to provide appropriate protections and recommendations for 
optimizations of any project. Indeed, all of these actions could improve and ensure health 
and safety effectively in the workplace. 
2.10.1 British and European Legislation 
 In order to ensure safety of employees and others in the work place, large number of fire 
and explosion regulations and legislations have been introduced. Excluding, or at least 
reducing, the risks and hazards of dangerous substances and processes is the main issue 
to be addressed by such legislations. In 1974, the Health and Safety at Work Act was set 
up by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom to ensure the 
occupational health, safety and welfare at work.  
Working in explosive atmospheres, or with explosive materials, is a matter covered by 
wide range of legislations in the United Kingdom and Europe [127]. The Control of 
Substances Hazardous to Health 2002(COSHH) and Dangerous Substance and Explosive 
Atmosphere Regulations 2003 (DSEAR), are one of the MUST DO risk assessments in 
Cardiff University laboratories. Control measures equipment and personal productive 
equipment are compulsory to be used with explosion and detonation experiments. 
DSEAR implements the ATEX user directive, which targets work places containing 
potentially flammable and explosive atmosphere to be provided with safety equipment.  
The main objective of all such legislation is to identify hazards and to mitigate the 
associated risks by describing the procedure that must be carried out in case of hazardous 
conditions [128]. In addition, it focuses on encouragement of positive human behaviour 
and correct reaction in case of an accident to achieve the requirements of health and safety. 
One of the well known quantitative risk assessments is HAZOP, hazard and operability 
study, which is a structured analysis used to identify design defects and its consequences. 
Despite the fact that this type of risk assessment entails considerable time, it helps to 
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assess and record all deviations from design intent that will create risk and hazard, thus 
allowing prompt correction. 
2.10.2 HAZOP 
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) at the detailed design stage can be considered 
as an important element in any system to prevent major accidents in the plant or during 
operation. A HAZOP study is a systematic technique to “identify potential hazards and 
operability problems caused by deviation from the design intent of both new and existing 
process plants” [129]. The word hazard is defined as any source of potential harm or 
adverse health effects on something or someone under certain conditions, while 
operability refers to the ability to maintain a whole industrial establishment or a system 
in it, in a safe and reliable operational condition. Deviation refers to any aberration from 
the agreed-upon design, and the design intent describes the concepts and criteria for the 
design [129]. 
Potential hazards and operational problems are identified using the HAZOP in terms of 
both plant design and human error. Essentially, every part of a process is methodically 
asked to find out how deviations from normal operation happen and whether further 
protective measures, change in operating procedures and design are required [130]. 
To carry out a HAZOP study, a complete design with design intent and a detailed P&ID 
schemes are needed. However, this study should preferably be carried out as early in the 
design phase as possible in order to have influence on the design. For all of that, the 
HAZOP should represent the final step of the detailed design which will check it. The 
main objective of the HAZOP is to identify the cause and the consequences of reckoned 
faults of equipment and conjugated interfaces in the complete system. 
As a first step for the HAZOP study, the process flow diagrams, piping and 
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) and layout diagrams should be available, in addition 
to the following information: 
• Material safety data sheets. 
• Provisional operating instructions. 
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• Equipment data sheets. 
• Start-up and emergency shut-down procedure. 
The key element of the HAZOP are [130]; 
• HAZOP team 
• full description of process 
• relevant guide words 
• conditions conducive to brainstorming 
• recording of meeting 
•  follow up plan. 
The HAZOP team 
A HAZOP team should consist of approximately five to seven members [131]. A 
chairperson should be an independent member and have no responsibilities for the process 
and the operation performance. One of the main responsibilities for the chairperson, who 
should have a very good experience in HAZOP techniques, is to choose a skilled team. 
This team must contain a technical secretary, Engineering disciplines, management, and 
plant operating staff, all should possess a good understanding of the plant and its 
operations to ensure all aspects are covered. 
The secretary will be responsible for preparing the HAZOP worksheets, recording the 
discussion in the HAZOP meeting and preparing draft reports. A good HAZOP participant 
should be active and avoid endless discussion of details, everybody’s contribution is 
important, and they have to be responsible. 
Full description of process 
Process and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs), which is also known as Engineering Flow 
Diagrams, represent the essential information needed in the HAZOP study. A member of 
the HAZOP team, at least, should be an expert knowing these diagrams and all symbols 
and instrumentations represented on them. Not all information will be available on the 
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P&IDs, therefore, it is necessary to have full details of all instrument specifications and 
definitions, as well as pipeline size and design parameters and working properties, like 
pressure, temperature, flow,…etc. 
Other information should be also available and might be required during the HAZOP 
study, i.e. layout and site plan drawings, safety data sheets, relevant code and standard 
and operating, start-up and emergency shut-down procedures. However, only the P&IDs 
are going to be reviewed and all the other drawings and documents are used for reference 
purposes.  
Relevant guidewords 
The relevant guidewords (also known as key words) can be divided into two types, 
primary guidewords (also known as parameters) and secondary guidewords. The primary 
guidewords are a particular aspect of a design intent related to a process condition or 
parameter, mainly related to safety or operability. For example, some of the safety 
guidewords are temperature, pressure, flow, level,…etc., while operability guidewords 
are isolate, maintain, drain,….etc. 
Secondary guidewords refer to possible deviations of the design intent that might happen 
during the process. These guidewords tend to be a standard set. The success of the 
HAZOP in the detection of design and operability problems is highly influenced by the 
choice of suitable guidewords [130]. Guidewords help the team members to imagine the 
deviation of the design intent, by applying them, in turn, to all the parameters, or primary 
guidewords, for every process line within the P&ID, in order to identify unexpected faults 
from the design intent. 
Basic HAZOP secondary guidewords are: 
• No: which refers to none of the design intent is achieved, also mentioned as not 
or none. 
• More: refers to an increase in the parameter quantity, also mentioned as more of 
or higher. 
• Less: refers to a decrease in the parameter quantity, also mentioned as less of or 
lower. 
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• As well as: refers to occurrence of an additional activity accompanying the design 
intent, also known as more than. 
• Part of: when only a part of the design intent is achieved. 
• Reverse: refers to the incidence of opposite of the design intent. 
• Other than: when completely another activity is happening, also known as other. 
• Sooner than: when the activity takes place before the design intent, also known as 
early. 
• Later than: the activity appears too late for design intent, also known as late. 
• Where else: the design intent happens in a different place. 
Conditions conducive to brainstorming 
As a risk assessment tool, a HAZOP is often described as a brainstorming technique [132]. 
Brainstorming is considered a powerful technique especially with a group of people, as it 
creates new ideas, solve problems, motivates and develops teams. However, 
brainstorming is not a simple and random activity, it needs to be well-organized. 
Brainstorming involves all team members and it gets them working together. All ideas are 
managed and structured by the chairperson. Also, the chairperson has to encourage every 
member to be involved and effective. 
Structured brainstorming sessions stimulate the fanciful thoughts for a HAZOP, which 
will ensure that the deviation of design intent is comprehensively studied [133].  
Recording of meeting 
There are many approaches that have been developed by companies to record meetings 
and document HAZOPs. These approaches can be fall within two major categories [130]: 
• Recording by exception. 
• Full recording. 
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The first way refers to record only the key findings. This approach looks to record the 
negative consequences accompanying the potential deviations. Although, this way of 
recording reduces the time taken in both meeting and the subsequent HAZOP report, the 
produced analysis would be hard to be described. 
In order to produce a full and comprehensive report, which will include all deviations and 
causes, the second approach might be used. This way of recording demonstrates 
unambiguously that a rigorous study has been carried out. Each guideword combination 
is applied to every process  line within the P&ID and followed by “no Cause could be 
identified, No action required existing - safeguards considered adequate, or alternatively 
that no Consequence arose from the Cause recorded” [129]. 
Nowadays, the second approach is considered to be more appropriate to record HAZOP 
meetings, as it eliminates the time issues mentioned earlier with the use of a computer. 
Besides, this kind of reporting makes it easier to perform assessment of the safety for 
future process modifications. 
2.10.2.1 HAZOP Limitations 
It is a fact that a HAZOP incorporates general experience available for the team involved 
in the study, and gives excellent identification of critical deviations and its causes 
associated with hazardous effects to people and working environment. However, the 
primary limitation of this kind of study is that, it is time consuming, as it requires long 
time to be performed. Also, the tendency to look at many insignificant consequence 
deviations. The team decides whether the deviations are meaningful depending on their 
own collective experience. They have a propensity to disregard interventions of the 
operator. Finally, a HAZOP study does not take in account the occupational or chronic 
hazards [134]. 
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3 Chapter 3 
Conceptual 
Design 
 Introduction 
This chapter describes the system proposed to be used for increase of pressure at 
variable frequencies in order to crack shale rock for gas extraction. Thereafter, the 
detonation tube rig setup, with equipment and measurement instruments are laid out 
and briefly described. The normal procedure to supply the system with fuel blends and 
pure oxygen for the experimental work is provided, so as the abnormal procedure for 
the cases of ignition failure or any other system fault. 
Finally, the risk assessments (HAZOP, DSEAR and COSHH) for the system and 
environment are assessed and presented in this chapter.   
 Design of Non-Aqueous Appliance 
The system is a device that enables the use of pulse detonation for the increase of 
pressure (and temperature) at variable frequencies in order to crack shale rock for gas 
recovery. The concept has been developed from the notion of a topic called 
“Explosion/Propellant Systems EPS” for non-aqueous shale gas exploitation, using 
state of the art systems to improve efficiency and reduce environmental/social 
concerns.  
The use of new alternative fuel sources at large scale will be a reality in the near future 
as oil and conventional fossil gas depletion in several parts of the world are becoming 
more significant. The increase of energy prices and the lack of supply have triggered 
various political and economic issues around the world, denoting the complex nature 
of this problem. Thus, governments and energy suppliers have look at the possibility 
of exploiting a fuel source that is highly available all around the world, shale gas.  
However, the exploitation of this resource is highly controversial, as it requires a 
process called Fracking, which uses high amounts of water and ~2% chemicals for the 
extraction of gas. The likelihood of earthquakes and the damaging effects to the 
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environment have started social movements against the process, especially in regions 
such as Europe where the community feels high responsibility towards climate change 
and environmental improvement.  
The concept of explosions in the shale wells has been studied for over 130 years [135]. 
Most of the attempts have been based on the use of explosives (i.e. TNT, grenades, 
rocket propellants, etc.) under water, with very poor control on the process. Moreover, 
single explosions tend to produce just minor cracks in the geological structures, as the 
propagation of the waves is limited to a very short time interval and high amplitudes 
[136]. However, the technique is considered as being environmentally friendly for 
shale gas and shale oil extraction giving better return on investment (ROI). The EPS 
has none of the impacts of hydraulic fracking such as fluid compatibility, wettability, 
formation heavy and light metal leachates, smectite expansion, that lock up the 
fractures with hydraulic fracking.  
Thus, the use of a system capable of improving the efficiency of the process through 
the control of its pressure wave characteristics, frequency, amplitude and location 
could be of great benefit to the industry globally. Localised increase of the pressure 
wave amplitude or frequency could allow the propagation of longer cracks with higher 
extraction rates. The high temperature of the combustion gases would allow the higher 
diffusivity of the shale molecules towards the flue gases. In order to increase process 
efficiency, shale gas from the well could possibly be used as the main fuel in 
combination with pure oxygen fed from the surface. Variable pressure wave 
frequencies would enable matching to the natural resonance of different formations to 
be made, thus elongating the cracks and increasing shale gas extraction.  
In order to reduce the size of the system, specially shaped tubes would be used to 
improve detonation, whilst a multiple ignition system would provide higher energy to 
the mixture to reduce the length of the transition process. An advanced cooling system 
would be required to provide mechanical and thermal integrity. At the tip of the device, 
axial vanes will be used to direct some shale gas inside of the system. The former will 
be compressed before being delivered to the detonation tubes. A blockage component 
at the end of the system would almost seal that particular region of the well, allowing 
for the build-up of pressure and temperature for the cracking of the shale rock. 
Development is still required for all these concepts, specially the cooling system, the 
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short transition deflagration to detonation process and the improvement of shale gas 
recovery at high pressures. The system is illustrated in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Non-aqueous acoustic aviator for shale gas recovery system. 
3.2.1 Fundamental Concept of the DDT     
Deflagration to detonation transition involves initiating a deflagration, the flame then 
accelerates due to turbulence provided by obstacles. Detonation is defined as a shock 
wave propagating at supersonic velocities. According to this, the deflagration must 
accelerate to a critical velocity so that the precursor shock strength is such that 
autoignition occurs in the shocked mixture.  
The detonation front propagates into unburned gas at a velocity higher than the speed 
of sound, and is sustained by the energy released by the combustion process. As the 
traveling detonation wave is supersonic, the gas ahead of the detonation remains 
undisturbed. The chemical process releases energy and triggers a volumetric 
expansion of the burned gases which drives the shock wave. Thus, detonation is due 
to the confluence of hydrodynamic and thermo-chemical processes. A detonation wave 
in which there is a strong interaction between these processes is said to be self-
sustaining. 
3.2.2 Rig Setup 
Several attempts have been undertaken to get the optimal design for the current 
system. The optimum adopted the best materials and a design that provides adequate 
safety and security factors. The first design trial was based on using three parts of 
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seamless stainless steel pipes connected by flanges, figure 3.2. Multi parts were chosen 
in order to have the ability of changing the length of the shock tube to achieve the 
transition from deflagration to detonation. All diagnostics and ignition instruments 
were designed to be added by drill holes on the tube body. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 First design of detonation tube. 
The high cost for constructing and material in addition to the HAZOP 
recommendations compelled us to look for alternative designs. HAZOP study 
suggested that making holes in the tube may create stress concentration points, which 
will create a high potential failure points. For all of that, a 316-stainless steel seamless 
tubing of 25.4mm outer diameter and 2.1mm wall thickness copes with working 
pressures up to 214bar, thus having sounded as the best option in terms of material and 
technical considerations, figure 3.3. Length and diagnostics instruments can be 
controlled using LET-LOK fittings. 
 
Figure 3.3 Final design of detonation tube. 
Unfortunately, the time consuming HAZOP study occurred at the same time as a 
laboratory renovation and its refurbishment. This forced us to change the place of 
where the rig has been set up, and changed the layout of nodes 1 and 2 to fit the space 
and satisfy the risk assessments. 
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3.2.3 Rig Layout 
The rig layout was built of a seamless circular stainless-steel pipe with 21.2mm inner 
diameter and 1500mm length to achieve the deflagration to detonation transition. The 
numerical data obtained by GASEQ and CHEMKIN were used to predict the 
maximum values for the pressure, temperature and other parameters, which were used 
to choose the pipe specifications and mixture composition in the first experiments. The 
data obtained by OpenFOAM has guided us for the best selection of obstacles. 
A HAZOP study was performed for the experimental rig dividing it into four nodes. 
The first looks into delivering the fuel gases. Other part of this node is responsible for 
delivering pure oxygen into the main rig tube. The fuel mixture and pure oxygen are 
kept apart until they reach the main rig cylinder for safety purposes. 
Node 2 is the mixing chamber and the pipeline responsible for delivering the fuel gases 
mixture into the shock tube. The mixing chamber is a cylinder where the mixture is 
left for about thirty minutes to undergo satisfactory mixing so that homogeneity is 
ensured. Node 3 is the main part of the experiment rig system. It consists of one inch 
(25.4mm) OD pipe with an exhaust/vacuum system used to get rid of the air in the rig 
prior to fill it with the combustible mixture and oxygen, or to exhaust a failed “to 
ignite” mixture. The last node is the burned gases exhaust and the diagnostic and 
ignition systems. 
3.2.4 System Parts 
All the parts used in the experimental rig are detailed below: 
• Pipes 
The pipes used in the experiments were circular seamless smooth stainless-steel pipes. 
The pipes are manufactured complying with ASTM A213, A269 316L specifications 
[137]. Two different diameters were used, a 3.65mm for delivering fuel gases and pure 
oxygen to a 25.4mm pipe where the experiments are held. 
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The wall thickness of the 6.35mm tubes is 0.91mm, with a maximum allowable 
working pressure of 359bar. For the 25.4mm pipe, the wall thickness is 2.1mm and the 
maximum allowable working pressure is 214bar. 
• Pipe fittings 
Most of fittings used are stainless steel 316 HAM-LET tube fittings with LET-LOK 
mechanism. The allowable pressure rating for the male and female tapered pipe thread 
ends are 552bar and 455bar for the 6.35mm pipe and 365bar and 303bar for the 
25.4mm pipe [138]. Some NPT (National Pipe Tapered) or BSP (British Standard 
Pipe) are used to fit particular parts in the system. 
• Flashback arrestor 
For safety purposes, all lines containing combustible gas are equipped with flashback 
arrestors. The flashback arrestors offers the following safety elements: 
- A flame trap. 
- A contamination filter. 
- A flame arrestor. 
- A non-return valve. 
- A temperature activated cut-off valve. 
Flame arrestors work to quench the flame front and prevent the flame from travelling 
back to the gas source. Also it works as a low pressure none-return valve designed to 
prevent the backflow of gas. Figure 3.4 is a longitudinal section of flashback arrestor 
used in designed rig. 
 Chapter Three: Conceptual Design  
64 
 
Figure 3.4 Flashback arrestor [139]. 
• Check valve 
Check valves used in this experimental system are HAM-LET H-400 series, shown in 
figure 3.5. It provides an accurate operating point, mean allowing working pressure 
(MAWP) of 207bar. This type of valve is normally closed. Initial flow passes when 
the differential pressure between inlet and outlet reaches 0.02bar. The valve is made 
of stainless steel 316, the end connection is 6.38mm LET-LOK tube fitting. 
 
Figure 3.5 HAM-LET H-400 series check valve [140]. 
• Relief valve 
A high-pressure service relief valve HAM-LET H-900HP series is used here. This 
valve is intended to be used in high pressure applications, up to 413bar, and is 
constructed from stainless steel 316 with 6.35mm LET-LOK tube fitting end 
connection. The valve is normally closed, it will open when the system reaches the set 
pressure level, and re-closed when the pressure falls below that level. The nominal 
pressure range of the valve used in the present system is 3.4-24bar, set at 4bar. 
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• Needle valve 
HAM-LET H-300U needle valves are used here, figure 3.6. The MAWP is 345bar with 
stainless steel construction. The valve has a 6.35mm LET-LOK end connection with a 
regulating stem to achieve a degree of flow control. 
 
Figure 3.6 HAM-LET H-300U needle valves [140]. 
 
 
• Rotameter 
Two different meter specifications of Brooks Sho-Rate flow meters have been used in 
the current system. The fuel lines are equipped with 1355/D 150mm glass tube scale 
length and 316 stainless steel horizontal female 3.175mm NPT adapters. The flow 
range is 0.025 - 0.25l/min and the design pressure is 14 bar. The oxygen and carbon 
dioxide lines are equipped with 1355/G flow meters. Flow range goes from 0.25 – 
2.5l/min and the designed pressure rating is 13.8bar. 
• Pressure gauge 
Two pressure gauges of direct bottom mount are used. One gauge where vacuum is 
required, the other gauge in the gas feeding lines. All gauges used are dry case stainless 
steel Burdon tube, with bottom entry and safety pattern glass window. 
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• Shut-off valve 
Two-piece ball valve stainless steel 316 HAM-LET H-700 series have been used in 
nodes 1 and 2 of the designed rig. The valves are rated to a maximum pressure of 
135bar. 
In order to isolate the combustible gas mixture and oxygen feeding from the 25.4mm 
shock tube, a HAM-LET H-500 three-piece ball valve is used. This valve, figure 3.7, 
offers large ports for high flow, tight shutoff and low operating torque. It is a stainless 
steel 316 construction and bears MAWP up to 206bar. 
 
Figure 3.7 HAM-LET H-500 series shut-off valve [141]. 
• Mixing chamber 
All gaseous fuels and carbon dioxide are brought to a stainless steel 500cc sampling 
cylinder, figure 3.8. This cylinder works as an accumulation point that helps in mixing 
the fuel mixture and keeps the fuel lines as far as possible from the place where the 
fuel mixture will mix with the oxidiser. The cylinder used is seamless cold-finished 
stainless steel with NPT thread ends and an operating pressure rated to 124bar. 
 
Figure 3.8 Sample cylinder used as a mixing chamber [140]. (All dimensions in mm) 
290 
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• Ignition system 
The premixed gas mixture is ignited using an ordinary automotive spark plug mounted 
at the beginning of the first section of the main rig body. A satronic ® ZT930 high 
frequency ignition unit is used along with the spark plug. 
• Pressure diagnostics and data acquisition 
The pressure along the detonation tube is measured using 211B4 PIEZOTRON Kistler 
pressure transducers, shown in figure 3.9. Pressure transducer is assembled with a 
cooling adapter and mounted to the detonation pipe through a machined pipe plug 
screwed on a female branch tee. The system used to record the signals from the 
pressure transducers is 5165A-Four-Channel Kistler LabAmplifier. 
 
Figure 3.9 211B4 PIEZOTRON Kistler pressure transducer [142]. 
 HAZOP 
In order to overcome any deviation from the design intent that could result in a major 
accident, a full HAZOP study has been conducted for the recent work. The HAZOP 
team was formed by Mr. Martyn Griffiths (School Safety Officer) as a chairperson, 
Dr. Agustin Valera-Medina (supervisor), Mr. Gareth Hunt (School Technical Services 
Manager), Mr. Malcolm Seaborne (Technician) and the researcher, in order to identify 
the cause and the consequences of reckoned faults of equipment and conjugated 
interfaces in the complete system. Starting with version one of a P&ID, figure 3.10, 
there were seven versions of the later along the HAZOP team meetings. More 
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instruments and equipment were added every meeting to ensure safety, until the last 
version (version seven) had been agreed on, figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.10 P&ID for the first designed pipelines. 
The engineering flow diagram has been divided into the four HAZOP nodes to 
simplify the HAZOP study and to conduct the study systematically from the cylinder 
regulators to the exhaust tank. A full description for every node provided as follows. 
 
Figure 3.11 P&ID for the assembled pipelines. 
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Relevant primary and secondary guidewords had been chosen by the team to cover all 
the expected deviation as much as possible. Parameters like pressure, temperature, 
ignition … etc., were examined periodically with the basic secondary guidewords like 
more, less, no … etc., to discover possible causes of deviation from the design intent 
and the consequences. The best protection and safeguard was to act with 
recommendations for improvement 
3.3.1 Node 1 
Node 1, the red dashed box in figure 3.11, is the pipeline which responsible for 
delivering the fuel mixture to the mixing chamber and the pure oxygen directly to the 
rig. At the beginning, all the pipelines, including the oxygen line, were feeding the 
mixing chamber. During the HAZOP study it was found that there would be a high 
risk of oxygen entering any fuel line. In addition, there would be risks of having an 
ignition in any place other than the designed exact location, inside the shock tube, 
node 3. For all that, it decided to separate the fuel lines from the oxidiser line until 
they reach the shock tube. 
The node was subdivided into seven branches, a branch for every gas line. Ammonia, 
methane, ethane, carbon dioxide and nitrogen for purging all lines and for (purging the 
mixing chamber) all pour in the mixing chamber from one side. From the other side, 
an oxygen line with another nitrogen line pour immediately to the shock tube. 
3.3.2 Node 2 
The mixing chamber being used is a 500cc stainless steel cylinder. The shale blends 
will be mixed in this prior to injection to the detonation tube. This will provide a 
suitable location to enable all gases to mix completely for the required concentrations. 
3.3.3 Node 3 
The detonation tube, is a 21.2mm diameter stainless steel pipe and is where the ignition 
phase of the experiment. This is divided into four sections. The first section consists 
of an exhaust/vacuum aperture; the fuel mixture is delivered from an aperture with the 
oxygen coming in from another opening. The end of this part is finished with a 206bar 
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shut off valve, which is used to prevent flashback reaching the gas supplies in the 
earlier nodes. 
The final three sections are each of 500mm in length. Each part is equipped with an 
internal combustion spark plug at its beginning. These sparks plugs will provide the 
ignition for the experiment. Pressure transducers are distributed along the three 
sections. 
This node also has the exhaust which is responsible for expelling the used propellants 
through a rupture disk to guarantee smooth and fast flow of exhaust gases to prevent 
back pressure building up in the main rig pipe. 
3.3.4 Node 4 
Node 04 consists of two parts. The first one is the rupture disc and the exhaust to the 
extractor system. The second part is the ignition system and measurement instruments. 
The ignition of the blend is facilitated through an ordinary automotive spark plug 
mounted at the beginning of the first section of the main rig body. A satronic ® ZT930 
high frequency ignition unit is used along with the spark plug. A 211B4 PIEZOTRON 
pressure transducers are used to measure the pressure pulse, shown in figure 3.9. The 
transducers are distributed along the detonation tube as one immediately after the 
spark plug in the first section, and the second one is by the end of the first section. The 
two other transducers are at the middle of the second and last sections. 
   HAZOP Spread Sheet 
Once the HAZOP parameters and guidewords are prepared and the P&ID sketch of 
the node under discussion is laid out, systematic questions are applied along each line 
of the P&ID. The results are recorded in a spreadsheet. System, part under discussion 
and the design intent for the part are mentioned at the top of the page followed by 
twelve columns. The guidewords applied for every parameter to determine the 
deviation and verify the cause and consequences. Measures are proposed to mitigate 
or at least manage risk. Likelihood, severity and level of risk for every step of the study 
is measured and recorded in the next columns. Table 3.1 shows the assessment of risk 
to health after additional control measures. 
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Table 3.1 The assessment of risk to health after additional control measures. 
parameter Scoring range Scoring criteria 
Likelihood of 
Harm 
1-5 
1-Very Unlikely 
2-Unlikely 
3-Likely 
4-Very Likely 
5-Extremely Likely 
Severity of 
Injury or Illness 
1-5 
1-First Aid is adequate 
2-Minor Injury 
3-Three Day Injury 
4-Major Injury 
5-Fatal or Disabling Injury 
Risk 1-25 
1-5 Low (No further action required) 
6-11 Medium (Appropriate additional control                
measures should be implemented) 
12-25 High (Additional control measures must be 
implemented.  Work must not commence 
until such measures are in place) 
The next column is team recommendations to overcome the deviation followed by the 
person among the HAZOP team who is responsible for doing the recommendations 
and the timescale for doing them. The set of HAZOP spreadsheets are shown in 
appendix A. 
  Operating Procedure 
One of the main subjects that HAZOP study has focused on was the operating 
procedure preparation. In order to minify risks, three types of procedures have been 
prepared, as follows. 
3.5.1 First Run Procedure 
Due to high rescue of detonation itself in addition to using pure oxygen as an oxidiser, 
periodic inspection for safety are highly recommended. Checking all pipelines, valves 
and safety equipment must be done before each run followed by a period of leaving 
the system. First of all, all pipe lines and fittings must be visually checked for any 
apparent defects or abnormal appearance. All pipes in the system must be pressurised, 
using nitrogen, slightly above the design intent pressure to be checked for any leak. 
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Instruments must be checked to ensure fully performance. Finally, all electrical 
connections must be checked, and the ignition system must be tested. 
3.5.2 Normal Procedure 
The experimental work is operated in single-shot mode. The pipelines are supposed to 
be filled with nitrogen from prior experiment trial. All valves are closed, shutoff valves 
are all in horizontal layout. The following procedure must be followed prior to each 
experiment. 
Nitrogen is expelled from node 1 lines through node 2 to the exhaust opening at the 
beginning of node 3, refer to figure 3.11, by pushing the fuel gases and carbon dioxide 
through pipelines. In order to ensure using pure oxygen as the only oxidiser in the 
experiments, node 2 and node 3 are vacuumed through vacuum opening at the 
beginning of node 3. The desired amount of fuel gases is accumulated in node 2 
(mixing chamber) before it moved to the main rig. For health and safety purposes, 
oxygen is added to the rig after purging node 1 and node 2 by nitrogen. Finally, oxygen 
line is purged with nitrogen and allow the nitrogen to flow into the exhaust tank, node 
4. This will extinguish any fire might leave the detonation tube. 
Experiment now is ready to be held in detonation tube, node 3. It is very important to 
check the exhaust burst disk, node 4, is not hampered or stuck by any means to avoid 
backpressure build up. Check all connections, electrical and measurement instruments, 
and press ignition button. When the test is finished purge the detonation tube with 
nitrogen to confirm it is free of any fuel gases or oxygen. 
3.5.3 Abnormal Procedure 
In case there was any problem happens anywhere during the procedure mentioned 
above. Any gases added to mixing chamber or detonation tube must be seeped out. 
When the fault occurs while adding fuel gases, purge all lines with nitrogen through 
the exhaust at the beginning of node 3. Otherwise, when the fault occurs while or 
before delivering oxygen to the system which means the fuel gases are already in the 
shock tube, purging is achieved throuh exhaust tank, node 4. 
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  Risk Assessments 
Conducting an experiment involves flammable gases with an oxidizer and an ignition 
source. Therefore, risk assessments and a meticulous procedure must be completed 
prior to the experiment taking place. This is to ensure that all risks involving the 
experiment are limited as much as possible, the safety of everyone present is assured 
and that the procedure will produce the best possible results whilst maintaining the 
upmost safety.  
Regarding to this experiment, the risk assessments that must be addressed are the 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations “COSHH”, Dangerous 
Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations of 2002 “DSEAR” and ATEX 
risk assessments. COSHH regulations regard the need for the control of the possible 
exposure to hazardous substances to prevent health issues. DSEAR relates to the 
possibility of an explosive atmosphere forming and the necessary ventilation required. 
ATEX requires equipment and protective systems intended for explosive atmospheres 
to be designed and manufactured to minimize the occurrence and limit the severity of 
accidental explosion. 
3.6.1  DSEAR Risk Assessment 
Based on the DSEAR Regulations, the risk assessment in the work place should take 
into account all following parameters: the dangerous substances, the suitability of the 
space, appropriate equipment and protective systems, safety measures and emergency 
arrangements. The British standard for DSEAR states that protective measures must 
be applied in areas where concentration of flammable gases can be dangerous. 
The DSEAR risk assessment aims to maintain the working area, where the experiment 
is held, below the lower explosive limit (LEL) of a particular gas in case of any 
accidental fuel leakage. This results in no explosive atmosphere being formed. This is 
achieved via calculating the magnitude of the mass flow rate of a flammable substance 
released from a pipe, ventilation rate and the volume over which this ventilation is 
required. The calculation results in the minimum space required to control the ignition 
source. 
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In the present experiments, five different gases are used, methane, ethane, carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen and oxygen. The two inert gases, carbon dioxide and nitrogen, are 
not required to be analysed. The oxygen is the oxidiser itself. Thus, the DSEAR 
analysis has been done for methane and ethane and is shown in appendix B1. 
3.6.2  COSHH Risk Assessment 
A COSHH risk assessment aims to protect people against risk to their health arising 
from exposure to hazardous substance. It looks into the potential of harmful substances 
during the experiment, the measures to prevent these issues and measures to deal with 
any problem if it does happen. Risk consideration created by hazardous substances 
must be written in the COSHH assessment, with procedures that need to be followed 
to prevent or adequately control any exposure. Particular care must be taken with the 
introduction of new substances and new processes/experiments. 
The COSHH risk assessment for the present experimental system are shown in 
appendix B2. 
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4 Chapter 4 0-D & 1-D 
Numerical Analysis 
 Introduction 
The use of computational means to simulate complex combustion processes before 
experiments provided stronger background for a more robust design. The effect of 
change in initial conditions or reactants composition on final equilibrium properties 
and products species concentration are well predicted using chemical thermodynamics 
and kinetics.  
Numerical solutions using NASA chemical equilibrium software GASEQ with three 
composition scenarios proposed by literature have been conducted. The same 
composition scenarios have been analysed using chemical kinetic software 
CHEMKIN-PRO. The specific setups for computations performed using GASEQ and 
CHEMKIN-PRO in recent works are described. Thermodynamic properties of 
products are calculated for different fuel fractions of the total reactants volume. The 
three shale gas compositions scenarios/pure oxygen mixtures are compared with 
hydrogen/air mixture for design purposes. 
  GASEQ 
GASEQ is a Microsoft Windows programme written in Visual Basic 3 used to 
calculate chemical equilibrium for combustion and other processes. The combustion 
calculations are made on the basis of thermodynamic equilibrium and minimisation of 
the free energy equation [143]. GASEQ can be used to predict the effects of initial 
conditions and composition on equilibrium reaction with the final product parameters 
and species concentrations. As seen in figure 4.1, reactants, initial pressure, 
temperature and set of products must be introduced to GASEQ. The initial (reactants) 
and final (products) thermodynamic properties for the defined process are then 
calculated. 
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4.2.1 GASEQ Description 
Chapman-Jouguet detonation is one of the problem-solution types GASEQ deals with, 
thus species of three shale gas composition scenarios suggested by Stamford and 
Azapagic [116] (mercury and Radon are omitted) are used as reactants with pure 
oxygen as oxidiser, with various hydrocarbon/oxygen sets used as reactants. Initial 
temperature and pressure are set at 300K and 1.01325bar, respectively. GASEQ 
provides a wide range of equivalence ratio, an automatic increment of equivalence 
ratio values from 0.2 to 4, depending on oxygen concentration in the mixture, was set 
to change the stoichiometric values. 
 
Figure 4.1 Screen shot of GASEQ calculations for the Best-case gas composition. 
The mass/mole fraction (for reactants and products) and thermodynamic parameters 
are calculated using the two-dimensional secant method to solve the basic energy and 
momentum equations 
𝐩𝟏 − 𝐩𝟐 + 𝛒𝟏𝐮𝟏
𝟐 − 𝛒𝟐𝐮𝟐
𝟐 = 𝟎      Equation 4.1 
𝐡𝟏 − 𝐡𝟐 +
𝟏
𝟐
(𝐮𝟏
𝟐 − 𝐮𝟐
𝟐) = 𝟎      Equation 4.2 
where p is pressure, ρ is density, u is velocity and h is enthalpy. The subscribes 1 and 
2 refer to the states before and after the detonation wave, respectively. 
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The velocity of gases downstream of the detonation wave is assumed to be the speed 
of sound in the burnt gases, the upstream velocity is calculated from the continuity 
equation 
𝛒𝟏𝐮𝟏 = 𝛒𝟐𝐮𝟐        Equation 4.3 
To start the iterative secant method, the initial value of pressure ratio for C-J detonation 
is estimated to be (p2 p1⁄ )0 = 15, which is found to be satisfactory for a number of 
chemical systems by Gordon and McBride [144]. According to them, the estimation 
of temperature ratio has higher importance than pressure ratio, hence the temperature 
of the flame (T2) is calculated corresponding to the enthalpy [144] 
𝐡𝟐 = 𝐡𝟏 +
𝟑
𝟒
𝐑𝐓𝟏
𝐌𝐰𝟏
(
𝐩𝟐
𝐩𝟏
)
𝟎
       Equation 4.4 
where Mw1 is molecular weight. 
In order to compare the validity of the CFD calculations with the numerical results 
from GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro, hydrogen/air mixtures are used to calculate 
thermodynamic parameters. Also, the mole/mass fraction for the three shale gas 
compositions with oxygen and for the hydrogen/air mixture calculated by GASEQ are 
used as input for CHEMKIN-Pro. The results obtained by GASEQ software for 
different equivalence ratios are compared to those obtained by CHEMKIN-Pro 
software and discussed later. 
4.2.2 GASEQ Setup and Method 
As illustrated in figure 4.1, the GASEQ software interface on windows requires three 
main inlets. At the upper left corner, the problem type must be specified. Nine different 
processes are provided, the latter process is CJ-Detonation. The reactants must be 
provided next step. Finally, to enter the reactants quantity, the desired amount needs 
to be added in mole or in mass unit. The units can be changed from the Unit tab at the 
toolbar. The most familiar reactions i.e. methane, hydrogen, propane and isooctane 
with air mixture are provided as templates.  
The standard sets of products can be entered manually to provide chemical balance. 
Hydrocarbons and hydrogen air products with some combustion features are provided. 
Reactants initial pressure and temperature can be changed from Reactants/Products 
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output properties. The total equivalence ratio is calculated by the software and shown 
in the box between the Reactants box and output box. 
An automatic increment for the case study can be set up by changing the equivalence 
ratio, after selecting the reactant to be varied, between two definite values by adding 
or multiplying the initial value with a certain number. The output properties are chosen 
by clicking them and can be printed on excel spreadsheet. It is possible to get the 
mole/mass fraction of reactants and products in the excel sheet, which is an important 
factor in CHEMKIN-Pro software. 
   CHEMKIN-Pro 
Unlike chemical thermodynamics (GASEQ), chemical kinetics modelling has the 
ability to provide full information related to the rates of the chemical processes. The 
mechanisms and rates of the chemical reactions and the factors that affect it are the 
main subject that chemical kinetics study. CHEMKIN-Pro is one of the most popular 
software to simulate chemical reaction and analyse chemical kinetics. It was originally 
designed by Sandia National Laboratory, then it was maintained and enhanced by 
Reaction Design Inc., which has recently become part of ANSYS [145]. 
4.3.1 Reaction Mechanism 
Wide range of thermodynamic properties and mechanisms can be calculated 
accurately and fast using CHEMKIN-Pro software. CHEMKIN-Pro uses an extensive 
library that contains various reaction mechanisms and thermodynamic information 
that depends on the Reaction Design’s Model Fuel Library, the most complete and 
thoroughly library assembled by the Model Fuel Consortium [146]. 
The Gas Research Institute mechanism, GRI-Mech 3.0, was designed to model natural 
gas and methane combustion. Although this mechanism is considered as one of the 
most popular single carbon reaction mechanism, it also includes other fuel combustion 
mechanism such as the detailed combustion reaction mechanism for hydrogen [147]. 
The detailed GRI-Mech 3.0 mechanism consists of 325 reaction steps and 53 species 
with associated rate coefficient expressions and thermochemical parameters. 
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4.3.2 CHEMKIN-Pro Description 
For the recent work, an incident shock wave model was employed in CHEMKIN-Pro 
with GRI-Mech 3.0 for predicting pressure and temperature after the shock. The initial 
mixture conditions with the composition of mole fraction and the incident shock 
velocity are required. The mole fractions calculated by GASEQ for the three cases of 
shale gas compositions and hydrogen/air mixture were used here. The initial pressure 
and temperature were 300K and 1.01325bar, respectively. 
In order to estimate the shock velocity, the equilibrium reactor model with Chapman-
Jouguet detonation option has been used with all mixtures above. Since both GASEQ 
and CHEMKIN-Pro software use Gordon and McBride NASA computer programme 
[148] in their calculation of chemical equilibrium compositions, the product 
parameters have been found to be similar from both codes. 
 
Figure 4.2 Screen shot of CHEMKIN-Pro. 
CHEMKIN utilises the Rankine-Hugoniot relations in a one-dimensional flow across 
the incident shock assuming that the enthalpy is a function of temperature alone, 
finding an expression for pressure and temperature ratio across the shock as, 
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To determine the temperature ratio that satisfies the above equation, a subroutine 
within CHEMKIN called ZEROIN [149] is used. The initial value of temperature ratio 
to start the iteration is calculated using equation 4.6, where the mixture is assumed to 
be as an ideal gas with constant heat ratio γ (specific heats are independent on 
temperature),  
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       Equation 4.6 
where M1 is the Mach number of the shock, and is calculated using a shock velocity 
provided. 
4.3.3 CHEMKIN-Pro Setup and Method 
Setting up CHEMKIN-Pro needs more details than GASEQ. Some factors used in 
CHEMKIN are extracted from GASEQ. The main interface window of the software 
contains different reactors laid out on the workspace. The shock reactors do not need 
an inlet and outlet flow stream and connections. The next step is to pre-process the 
chemistry set, this step is required before any further input. 
The reaction mechanism and rate coefficient file in CHEMKIN format 
(grimech30.inp) was utilised for the Gas Face Reaction File. The associated 
thermochemical file (thermo30.dat) was used for Thermodynamics Data File. After 
running the Pre-Processor, the Gas-Phase Kinetics Output can be checked from to 
ensure correct launch of the mechanism. 
A transient Solver is chosen as problem type from Reactor Physical Properties. Start 
and End time must be identified with the expected shock velocity and before shock 
temperature and pressure. The reactant species in mole or mass fraction is introduced 
in the subsequent step. The mass fraction of reactants used in CHEMKIN software 
was obtained from GASEQ software. The mixture equivalence ratio (Φ) is used to 
describe the stoichiometry. As the properties of products have been calculated over a 
wide range of equivalence ratios (0.2 – 4.0), the Parameter Study Facility in 
CHEMKIN was the best choice to use. However, using more than one hydrocarbons 
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fuel in different concentrations as reactants generated errors in execution, which led 
to introduce the fractions of reactant species for every equivalence ratio manually. 
The shock velocity can be calculated using the pressure of the shock predicted by 
Gordon and McBride NASA computer programme [148] with either GASEQ or 
CHEMKIN software. The pressure ratio relationship across the shock states: 
𝐮𝐬 = 𝐜𝐬√
𝛄+𝟏
𝟐𝛄
(
𝐩𝟐
𝐩𝟏
− 𝟏) + 𝟏      Equation 4.7 
The velocity obtained in CHEMKIN was used to calculate the velocity induced by the 
shock using equation 4.8 
𝒖 =
𝟐𝐜𝐬
𝛄+𝟏
(𝐌𝐬 −
𝟏
𝐌𝐬
)       Equation 4.8 
where, us is the shock velocity, cs is the speed of sound in shock conditions, γ is 
specific heat ratio, p2 and p1 are the pressure before and after the shock respectively, u 
is the induced velocity, and finally Ms is the shock Mach number. All results 
spreadsheets are then accumulated in one spreadsheet to be discussed and compared 
with GASEQ results. 
   Numerical Results and Discussions 
The reactants composition used in GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro codes are extracted 
from the three shale gas senarios proposed by Stamford and Azapagic [116], shown in 
table 2.3. Oxygen is added to the reactants so that the total equivalence ratio is ranged 
between 0.2 to 4.0. For both codes, the initial pressure and temperature are assumed 
to be 101.325bar and 300K respectively. In addition to that, CHEMKIN-Pro requires 
an estiamted shock velocity, which is calculated using equation 4.7 depending on 
GASEQ results.  
4.4.1 Pressure Gradient 
The pressure of products calculated using GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro is depicted 
with respect to the volume ratio of the fuel to the total mixture and shown in figure 
4.3. It is found that the pressure behaviour for the three cases is similar and the values 
correspond well with slightly higher values for those calculated by CHEMKIN. The 
values of pressure are higher by about 5% at the highest pressure and decrease to less 
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than 3% on the rich and lean sides. The most important cause for this disparity is the 
higher detailed combustion reaction mechanism used with CHEMKIN. Moreover, the 
time factor that has been taken into consideration in CHEMKIN-Pro. 
 
           (a)      (b) 
Figure 4.3 Products pressure versus fuel volume % for hydrocarbon/oxygen mixtures,  
a. GASEQ, b. CHEMKIN-PRO. 
Using pure oxygen as oxidiser made the pressure to peak at a point where the fuel 
volume reaches about 40% of the total oxy-fuel mixture volume. Also, increasing of 
hydrogen concentration in product species increases the pressure. The pressure of the 
products drops more steeply on the rich side than the lean side. The increase of higher 
hydrogen content hydrocarbons at the expense of methane in the third scenario for 
shale gas, the worst case, led to attain higher pressure than in the other two cases. 
However, the presence of nitrogen in the second scenario and the increase in its 
concentration in the third one led to decreasing the volume percentage of fuel for those 
scenarios. 
Figure 4.4 shows the product pressure for different volume ratios of hydrogen in 
hydrogen/air mixture. Once more, the CHEMKIN-Pro calculations were higher than 
GASEQ calculations, but it is now around 1% in the maximum of the reading, which 
was at a volume percentage of 32%, and less on both sides. Unlike a 
hydrocarbon/oxygen mixture, the hydrogen/air mixture declined less severity on the 
higher hydrogen ratio side than the lower one. The more rapid combustion of hydrogen 
compared to hydrocarbons leads to swift release of heat with less overpressure. 
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Figure 4.4 Products pressure versus hydrogen volume % for hydrogen/air mixtures. 
4.4.2 Velocity Gradient 
Velocity profiles of products calculated by GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro software are 
shown in figure 4.5. Although the trends of velocity behave in the same manner as 
pressure in figure 4.3, the maximum values of velocity are more shifted to the rich side 
of the mixture. The main factor responsible for this shift is products dissociation. This 
will increase total low molecular mass and density species in the products, as shown 
in figure 4.6, which leads to increase the velocity until a point where the total 
molecular mass of these species decreases with the rise of denser species. 
 
   (a)     (b) 
Figure 4.5 Products velocity versus fuel volume % for hydrocarbon/oxygen mixtures,  
a. GASEQ, b. CHEMKIN-Pro. 
Unlike hydrocarbon, hydrogen/air mixture products velocity persists increasing with 
hydrogen content increase, figure 4.7. This is mainly related to the continuous decrease 
in molecular mass of the products with the increase in hydrogen species, figure 4.8. 
However, the increase of velocity after stoichiometric conditions starts to be less sharp 
until it remain mainly flat for high hydrogen content detonations.  
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Figure 4.6 The most dominant products species versus fuel volume % for hydrocarbon/oxygen 
mixtures. 
Both GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro software calculations correspond well for hydrogen 
ranged from 19% to 46% of the total mixture. For the ratios out of this range, the 
product velocity obtained from GASEQ was slightly higher. This was mainly related 
to the more detailed reaction mechanisms required for these chemical reactions in 
CHEMKIN-PRO. This, in turn, affects the products heat capacity and the parameters 
used in equation 4.8 above to calculate induced velocity. 
 
Figure 4.7 Products velocity versus hydrogen volume % for hydrogen/air mixtures. 
 
Figure 4.8 The most dominant products species versus hydrogen volume % for hydrogen/air 
mixtures. 
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4.4.3 Temperature Gradient 
The product gases temperature for different fuel volume fraction for GASEQ and 
CHEMKIN-Pro software were significantly dissimilar in values. Many factors are 
responsible for this disparity. Tremendous impact was observed for the more accurate 
and precise multicomponent formulation and analysis that is utilised with CHEMKIN-
Pro rather than the average method which calculates the final equilibrium conditions 
that is used with GASEQ. 
Another factor is initiation of radicals associated to the more detailed GRI-Mech 3.0 
mechanism utilised in CHEMKIN-Pro, which consists of 325 reactions and 53 species, 
mentioned previously. These radicals and some of the combustion products will 
dissociate back into reactants, or even higher reactive species, at high temperature 
flames. This dissociation is an endothermic reaction and will be accompanied by 
energy absorption which will noticeably decrease the temperature in the products. 
Figure 4.9 shows the products temperature of detonation as a function of hydrocarbon 
percentage in the hydrocarbon/oxygen mixture for the three scenarios of shale gas for 
GASEQ (a) and CHEMKIN-Pro (b). It was found that the temperature of products 
calculated using GASEQ was about 65% higher than those calculated using 
CHEMKIN-Pro. However, this difference declines as the fuel volume ratio goes over 
50%. The maximum temperature for both software was achieved slightly above 
stoichiometry. Therefore, the behaviour of the trends for both software was highly 
matched on the lean side of the curve, while disparity increase with the increases of 
fuel volume percentage on the rich side.  
The temperature of hydrogen/air mixture products for GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro 
showed to be more equiponderance. GASEQ results were 2.9 times the results 
calculated by CHEMKIN-Pro at the maximum temperature, which was at fuel volume 
fraction of 32%, and decrease until GASEQ results reaches 2.5 of CHEMKIN-Pro 
results on both sides of the curve. 
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   (a)      (b) 
Figure 4.9 Products temperature versus fuel volume % for hydrocarbon/oxygen mixtures,  
a. GASEQ, b. CHEMKIN-PRO. 
 
Figure 4.10 Products temperature versus hydrogen volume % for hydrogen/air mixtures. 
4.4.4 Detonation Velocity 
The Chapman-Jouguet detonation velocity is achieved when the products velocity 
reaches the speed of sound in the burned gases conditions for a given temperature and 
pressure. The detonation velocity for common stoichiometric hydrocarbon/air 
mixtures is above 1800m/s, and it goes above 2300m/s for the hydrocarbon/oxygen 
mixtures [93][150]. Typical detonation velocity and pressure rise across the detonation 
wave for common hydrocarbons with air and oxygen are tabulated in table 2.1. 
Calculations of the detonation velocity for hydrocarbon/oxygen mixtures in the 
present work were done using GASEQ software. The results are depicted in figure 
4.11 below. The three scenarios of shale gases showed very high-match in detonation 
velocity for the whole fuel concentration ratios. The maximum detonation velocity 
was 2558m/s for the best scenario case, this value was shifted to the rich side and 
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achieved at fuel concentration of 47%. This was mainly because of the products 
dissociation, especially when pure oxygen is used as oxidiser. 
 
Figure 4.11 Detonation velocity versus fuel volume % for hydrocarbon/oxygen mixtures. 
The hydrogen/air and hydrogen/oxygen mixtures detonation velocity are shown in 
figure 4.12. Results show that hydrogen mixtures have much broader detonation 
velocity than hydrocarbons. Although hydrogen/oxygen mixture seems to increase 
more dramatically with fuel volume fraction, the detonation velocity is less compact 
at high concentrations. Figure 4.13 illustrates the products composition of 
hydrogen/oxygen mixtures. The decrease in oxygen concentration in the reactants led 
to decrease of the energy content in the products species, accompanied by the 
dissociation of products and the decrease of molecular mass caused by the increase of 
hydrogen in the products, led to a detonation speed increase. 
 
Figure 4.12 Detonation velocity versus hydrogen volume % for hydrogen/air mixtures. 
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Figure 4.13 Products species versus hydrogen volume % for hydrogen/oxygen mixtures. 
 Conclusions 
GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro have been used to calculate the thermodynamics 
properties for products of detonation. The product pressure and gas velocity results 
agree well for GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro for a broad range of total equivalence 
ratios. 
The pressure peaks at 41% of fuel volume to the total mixture volume, which is 
equivalent to 1.6 of total equivalence ratio. Two factors are responsible for deviating 
the equivalence ratio from stoichiometry. The first one is due to the use of pure oxygen 
as an oxidiser, the second is the increase of hydrogen content in product species. Less 
chemically reactive products produced by fuel rich mixtures combustion burns cooler 
than stoichiometric mixtures, which is considered a major advantage in the current 
particular application. 
Even though pressure produced by detonating hydrocarbons are higher than pressure 
produced by detonating hydrogen, using pure oxygen with hydrocarbons increases the 
product pressure by about 50% at the maximum products pressure. The products 
velocity increases by about 30% at its maximum. The detonation velocity of 
combusting shale gas blends with air reaches its maximum at total equivalence ratio 
of 1.2. However, referring to table 2.1, this velocity does not reach the detonation 
velocity threshold. On the other hand, detonation velocity of shale gas/oxygen blends 
exceeded threshold with wide range of total equivalence ratio, from 1.2 to 2.6. Figure 
4.14 shows the detonation velocity versus total equivalence ratio.   
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Figure 4.14 Detonation velocity versus total equivalence ratio for shale gas blend. 
Numerical results clearly demonstrated the possibility of detonating all the three shale 
gas scenarios as long as pure oxygen is used as oxidiser. Also, it was shown that the 
worst case, regarding the amount of methane, of shale gas composition was the best 
case of produced pressure, which is the main objective to be used in fracturing the 
shale formation.   
 Summary 
Numerical results using GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro codes have been presented in 
this chapter. Three shale gas scenarios proposed by Stamford and Azapagic [116] are 
used with pure oxygen to achieve the highest pressure in the detonation process, to be 
used in shale formation fracturing. Also, hydrogen/air blend has been used for the 
purposes of comparison. 
Both codes showed good agreement between each other and with results obtained from 
literature. The detonation velocity threshold for hydrocarbon/oxygen blend has been 
reached over fuel volume ratios ranging between 30% to 50%. The maximum pressure 
and velocity were achieved with a fuel volume fraction that exceeds 40% of the total 
hydrocarbon/oxygen mixture. 
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Figure 4.15 Detonation velocity versus fuel volume % for hydrocarbon/oxygen and 
hydrogen/air mixtures. 
Figure 4.14 shows a comparison between detonation velocity for hydrocarbon/oxygen 
and hydrogen/air blends for volume percentage of fuel to total mixture ranging 
between 27% to 47%. Although the detonation velocity of shale gas/oxygen mixture 
composition was higher by about 16% than the hydrogen/air mixture detonation 
velocity, it was found that they are both behave in the same manner over this range. 
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5 Chapter 5 2-D 
Numerical Design 
 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of two-dimensional CFD simulations of the 
deflagration to detonation transition at stoichiometric conditions for hydrogen/air 
mixture in the proposed detonation tube. The code used in this simulation was 
developed originally by Ettner [87] using OpenFOAM. The high-level and advanced 
programming language of the code is based on a finite volume approach. Many 
internal geometries, obstacles, shapes, etc., have been examined. Obstacle presence 
increases flame speed, which in turn generates intense turbulence. This leads to a 
reduction of the transition distance. 
The most effective obstacles are reviewed here. This has been identified depending on 
the lowest transition distance and higher pressure produced by the detonation tube. 
The temperature has been taken into account as it was required to keep the pipe wall 
temperature as low as possible to avoid oxygen autoignition. 
   OpenFOAM 
The Open Field Operation And Manipulation (OpenFOAM) software is an open 
source Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) toolbox. It is based on the finite volume 
method. The finite volume is a numerical method where the investigated physical 
domain is meshed and divided into a control volume at the centre of every node in 
such manner that the governing partial differential equations are discretised to 
algebraic equations. The algebraic equations then are solved for every cell, integrated 
over them and approximated for the entire domain. 
A C++ library is used in OpenFOAM to create executable files in the form of 
application files utilised to develop and solve a system of partial differential equations 
with suitable initial and boundary conditions. The OpenFOAM environment, such as 
other CFD codes, is structured in three parts, as indicated in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 OpenFOAM structure [151]. 
In the Pre-processing, the geometry of the domain is defined with the aid of a grid 
generation application. The solver is where the system equations are solved for the 
given grid. The final step is Post-processing, where the results are analysed and 
visualised. 
5.2.1 Modelling 
Deflagration to detonation transition modelling requires a wide range of combustion 
aspects to be studied. Laminar flames, turbulent flames, the acceleration and transition 
phenomenon, in addition to the detonation waves that must be taken into account when 
dealing with DDT simulation. Deflagration requires very low energy to be initiated 
[64], for that it is more likely to occur than detonation. However, deflagration is 
intrinsically unstable which will give the flame front a wrinkled shape increasing the 
flame surface area and its velocity as a result. In a confined geometry, the wall effects 
and interactions of the acoustic waves with the flame front generate turbulent flames. 
Further propagation can develop into detonation. 
In the OpenFOAM code used in the present work [87], the conservation of mass, 
momentum and energy equations together with the equation of state for ideal gas have 
been used for a compressible flow. A system of differential equations, included the 
mass fraction for all species, resulted from the above step to calculate the flow 
parameters during the chemical reaction. According to Godunov’s scheme, each 
contacting cell was considered to be a Riemann problem. Godunov’s scheme [152] is 
a conservative method used to calculate the convective flow on the cell surface without 
using a time expensive iterative scheme. 
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The Riemann problem is an initial value problem. It is numerically very expensive to 
have the exact solution for it. Therefore, various methods have been established to 
calculate an approximate solution. One of the most popular methods is the Harten-
Lax-van Leer-Contact (HLLC). HLLC works on direct calculation of numerical 
fluxes, for that it is considered as a time efficient Riemann problem solver. For more 
details see [87]. 
5.2.2 Solution Methods 
The turbulent flow equations employed in the current simulation have been solved 
using the Unsteady Reynolds Averaging Navier-Stokes (URANS) method. The 
URANS method is developed from RANS method. The main difference between 
RANS and URANS methods is the additional unsteady term that is presented in the 
momentum equation in URANS [153]. It depends on predicting the effects of 
turbulence on the mean flow field, yet it has had successful models of unsteady 
separated model [154]. 
Turbulent fluctuations are separated clearly from stationary main flow in RANS 
calculations, while in URANS both turbulent fluctuations and mean magnitude are 
considered as transient and subjected to temporal changes. The Reynolds averaged 
equations are solved in three-dimensions with time dependence [155]. Large Eddy 
Simulation (LES) quite differs from URANS regarding the mesh and time step 
requirements [72]. While LES targets the eddies of the turbulence itself, URANS 
models the turbulence and resolves only unsteady mean flow structures. For that, LES 
requires higher spatial and temporal resolution, and is more costly [156]. 
In CFD, there are two main approaches developed to calculate the flow parameters, 
the pressure-based approach and the density-based approach. Originally, the pressure-
based approach was developed to deal with incompressible and low-speed 
compressible flows, while the density-based approach, on the other hand, was 
developed for high-speed compressible flows. Nevertheless, both approaches are 
nowadays enhanced to be used on a wider range of flow conditions. The momentum 
equation is used in both approaches to obtain the velocity. The continuity equation is 
used to obtain density and the equation of state to obtain pressure in the density-based 
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approach. Continuity and momentum equations are manipulated to obtain the pressure 
field in the pressure-based approach. The density-based original formulation for high-
speed compressible flows offers the advantage of better shock capturing resolution 
with greater accuracy in terms of results, which in turn gives preference over the 
pressure-based approach for such cases [157]. 
The code used was originally designed to calculate the flow parameters and flow 
properties for the combustible mixture of stoichiometric hydrogen/air. This was 
suitable for this research as in the 2-D simulation document. The initial conditions are 
stagnant at atmospheric pressure and temperature. The compressible flow at low 
speeds can be considered an incompressible flow, with incompressibility meaning that 
density is independent of pressure. For that, the density-based solver cannot be used 
at the beginning of the solution where the flow is considered to be totally stagnant. 
Therefore, an additional solver is provided to start the solution. This solver was 
developed using the pressure-based approach to overcome the low Mach numbers at 
the beginning of the solution. When the velocity reaches a certain value, the density-
based approach solution would start using the outputs of the pressure-based approach 
as initial values. 
   OpenFOAM Setup 
As seen in figure 5.1, OpenFOAM is a C++ library. This library is structured in three 
parts, Pre-processing, Solving and Post-processing. The Pre-processing is where the 
geometry is defined to generate a computational mesh, the convenient boundary 
conditions are specified and necessary properties defined. The next step is where the 
governing differential equations are discretised and then iterated through the domain 
to get the final solution. Finally, using a post-processing step, the results can be 
visualised and analysed. 
5.3.1 Pre-Processing Stage 
5.3.1.1 Geometry and Mesh Generation 
OpenFOAM is designed to work with a 3-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, 
for that all geometries are generated in 3-dimensions. The 2-dimensional computations 
 Chapter Five: 2-D Numerical Design 
 
97 
are made by creating a 3-dimensional mesh and set the third dimension, where no 
solution is required, as a one cell thickness. 
 
Figure 5.2 Mesh grid. 
Many utilities are used to generate a mesh in OpenFOAM, like blockMesh and 
snappyHexMesh, which are the most popular utilities. However, the mesh can be 
generated using other software (ANSYS, Fluent, Gambit, etc.) and converted into a 
format that OpenFOAM uses. A 2-dimensional geometry with 21.2mm height and 
1500mm length was used to simulate the experimental tube by using the blockMesh 
utility, figure 5.2. This utility has all the basic elements needed to create any kind of 
mesh. 
At the outlet, the mesh is specified with a uniform parallelogram, segmented into 
hexahedral cells. The number of cells in x and y-direction depends on the mesh 
refining, while it is unity in the z direction. The blockMesh dictionary file contains 
eight vertices, a 3-dimensional point in space, forming a block with six patches called 
boundaries. Four of those patches, normal to x and y directions are dealt as walls, 
while the other two, normal to z direction, are considered as an empty front and back. 
That means there is no flow moving in the z direction. 
 
Figure 5.3 obstacles shapes. 
The next step was to add obstacles to the internal geometry along the x direction. Three 
types of obstacles (rectangular, semi-circular and triangular cross-sections) were used 
y 
z 
x 
a 
c b 
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to increase the flame turbulence, which will decrease the transition to detonation 
distance. The rectangular obstacles, figure 5.3a, were specified by using the topoSet 
utility. This utility is used to split the mesh into different regions. The obstacle box has 
been identified by two points, the lowest and highest points diagonally, and the mesh 
has been eliminated in a way the programme deals with it as a wall. 
Using the topoSet utility to create the semicircular obstacles showed a bumpy surface, 
which would certainly affect the calculations. A new blockMesh dictionary was 
written where the domain block was divided into nineteen blocks (ten for the smooth 
tubes and nine for obstacles in-between). Semicircles are drawn on the upper and 
lower end of the short blocks to represent the semicircular obstacles along the tube, 
see figure 5.3b. With triangular obstacles, figure 5.3c, the domain block has been split 
into three times the obstacle number plus one. 
The size of the mesh highly influences the time of computations, finer meshing sizes 
consumed more time in the solution stage. On the other hand, an accurate numerical 
solution of the equations robustly depends on the mesh size. However, the blockMesh 
utility allows the user to control the cell number in the domain in each axis. At the 
beginning, the domain was discretised into (1500,21,1) cells for (x, y, z) directions, 
this created 31,500 cells. More accurate and detailed results have been described when 
the cells duplicated in x and y-direction, to be (3000,42,1) which creates 126,000 cells. 
Further duplicate, (4500,42,1), led to an intolerable run time, and the results at the 
beginning of the solution process showed close results to the previous discretisation. 
Checking the mesh was the next and last step in mesh generation, this step checks the 
validity of the mesh, geometric and topological quality of the surface and the 
orthogonal quality and skewness. The average mesh non-orthogonality was zero and 
the maximum skewness was 4.7728×10-6. 
5.3.1.2 Boundary and Initial Conditions 
A set of files (points, faces, boundary and other files) is generated describing the 
geometry and mesh cells. Each boundary is associated with a boundary condition. In 
our particular case, there are two kinds of boundaries, as described in the previous 
section above. In the x-z and y-z plans, there are four walls set as zeroGradient, i.e. 
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the gradient of the respective quantity is zero on this boundary. The two walls in the 
x-y plane are set as an empty front and back, i.e. no flow through the z direction. 
A zero time folder is created to include all the initial conditions. The charge, which is 
stoichiometric hydrogen/air mixture, is set in the entire domain at atmospheric 
conditions and at rest. The reaction is started by setting the temperature at the first 
column of cells at the beginning of the domain higher than the autoignition of the fuel.  
5.3.1.3 Properties Dictionaries 
The properties dictionary contains thermophysical, chemistry, turbulence, and any 
other properties related to the simulation. The thermophysical properties define how 
the thermal, transport and mixture properties are calculated. The chemistry properties 
dictionary defines the chemical reaction rates, chemical timescale and released energy. 
In the present work, the reaction mechanism of GRI-Mech 3.0 [147] was used to 
calculate the coefficients for the above properties.  
The turbulence model has been included in the code used here. Any solver that 
includes turbulence modelling reads the turbulenceProperties dictionary, included in 
the constant folder. Within that file is the simulationType keyword that controls the 
type of turbulence modelling to be used. The simulation of the turbulent model was 
performed using the Reynolds-Average Stress (RAS) model with amended 
coefficients. The amended RAS turbulence model coefficients are defined in an 
appended sub-dictionary. Another dictionary was used to define additional properties 
like turbulent Schmidt number and viscosity. 
5.3.2 Solving Stage 
As the mixture is at stagnation and atmospheric condition at the beginning of the 
simulation, it was necessary to develop two approaches to solve the case. Pressure-
based approach for the stagnant beginning and density-based approach when the 
velocity reaches a certain value. The main difference between the two approaches is 
how the three conservation equations are coupled. Whereas the density-based solution 
calculates the density field using the mass conservation equation and the pressure field 
is calculated using the equation of state, the pressure and velocity fields in a pressure-
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based solution are calculated by manipulating the mass and momentum conservation 
equations. Although a pressure-based solution is a cost-efficient solution with large 
time steps, the density-based solution offers a much better resolution to capture the 
shock in addition to the possibility of faster convergence rates as it is primarily 
designed for compressible flow.   
The simulations for the three internal geometry cases studied in this work were started 
with a pressure-based solution from time zero until a point when the flame speed 
reaches the critical deflagration speed. Switching to the density-based solution is 
possible after this point as the combustion velocity is strong enough. The initial 
boundary conditions are set at the time when the flow reached the supersonic 
conditions. This time differs with different obstacle cross-sections.  
5.3.3 Post-processing Stage 
Although the time steps that have been chosen in the pressure-based solution were 
longer than those used in the density-based one, the write intervals were the same for 
both solutions. This would give uniform output files for every time step for the purpose 
of visualisation and analysis. The open source data visualisation and analysis tool, 
Paraview, was used to review the results for every time step saving screenshots to 
show images for influential time steps. Also, a line has been drawn at the centre of the 
mesh along the x-axis and the data lying on this line have been researched and depicted 
using excel. 
  Simulation Results and Discussions 
The 2-dimensional simulation was used to compare between many internal geometries 
to find the most effective ones that produce higher pressure and require less transition 
distance. Three main geometries are discussed in here, rectangular, semicircular and 
triangular. The blockage ratio, which is the ratio of smooth tube area to the least area 
in the tube, for all of the obstacles is 47%. The domain is divided into ten equal parts 
along the x-axis, each part is 150mm in length measured from centre of an obstacle to 
the centre of the next obstacle. Each obstacle was 10mm long. 
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5.4.1 Combustion Propagation and Flame Speed 
The internal geometry of the detonation tube influenced the combustion propagation 
significantly. The time required to consume the reactants was less for the tube with 
rectangular and triangular obstacles than for the tube fitted with semicircular obstacles. 
This has been ascribed to the sharp edges in the cross-section of the first two 
geometries, which increases drag and its influence on the degree of induced 
recirculation. Thus, the combustion in the tube equipped with rectangular obstacles 
consumed the combustible mixture in 7.15ms, while the tube fitted with triangular 
obstacles consumed the combustible mixture in 7.40ms, and the tube fitted with 
semicircular obstacles consumed it in 8.40ms. 
One feature of the OpenFOAM code used in the present study is determining the 
combustion progress along the domain. Figure 5.4 shows the combustion location 
versus time for the flame when it passes every obstacle. However, when the flame is 
too fast at the last obstacles, the flame passes the obstacle somewhere between two 
sequential intervals. Although the behaviour of the flame was quite similar for the 
three configurations until it reaches the first obstacle, the geometry effect was obvious 
on the arrival time of the flame. The flame arrives the first obstacle at 4.80ms, 4.95ms 
and 5.15ms for the rectangular, triangular and semicircular obstacles, respectively. The 
flame entailed 67.1% of the residence time for the tube equipped with rectangular 
obstacles, while it entailed 66.9% for the triangular and only 61.3% for the 
semicircular obstacles configuration, figure 5.5. This indicates that waves reflected by 
the polygonal obstacles interact with the flame and accelerate it leading to faster flame 
speed. On the other hand, the oscillations in the flame created by the interaction 
between the flame and the semicircular obstacles were very high, which resulted in 
low consumption of combustible mixture, or in other words, slower flame speed.  
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Figure 5.4 Combustion propagation along the tube for the three configurations. 
Depending on the combustion progress, the flame tip is located along the x-axis for a 
line drawn at the centre of the domain. Figure 5.6 shows the flame tip speed for the 
three configurations, where the squares shown on the x-axis represent the position of 
the obstacles. Before delving into details, it is worth to emphasise that as the flame 
speed increases while moving downstream the tube, the flame step increases with time 
and results in a lack of detail for the flame tip. Nevertheless, the oscillation was more 
obvious all along the tube due to the moderate acceleration of the flame speed with 
the semicircular obstacles. 
 
Figure 5.5 The arrival time of flame along the tube. 
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However, the flame tip speed was found to behave in the same manner for the three 
configurations from the beginning of the tube, through the first obstacle until it reached 
the second obstacle. As it is illustrated, the flame tip velocity oscillates during the 
acceleration process due to the interaction of the fresh mixture with the obstacles in 
the tube. The magnitude of the oscillations grows as the flame interacts with more 
obstacles. 
 
Figure 5.6 Flame tip velocity along the tube. 
Generally, the flame decelerates before every obstacle and accelerates while passing 
through them. The mounting mass flux entering the flame near the obstacle stretches 
the flame and accelerates it. The flame is deformed in the short distance gap inside the 
obstacle, leaving an amount of unburned mixture at the windward side of the obstacle. 
The Rayleigh-Taylor instability and the Kelvin-Helmholtz instability are induced by 
the turbulence occurred due to the longitudinal deformation of the flame passed the 
obstacle to the full tube diameter. As the flame front pass the obstacle, it is deviated 
and folded up towards the leeward side of the obstacle. Meanwhile, the flame at the 
windward side of the obstacles turns to be almost vertical whilst burning the fresh 
combustible mixture left there, as illustrated in figure 5.7. The same behaviour for 
flame propagation interacting with an obstacle was found by Singh et. al. [158] and 
Fan et. al. [159]. 
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Figure 5.7 Second obstacle at t=5.9ms. 
Although the smooth cross-section area changes achieved with triangular and 
semicircular obstacles promote the flame with a longer accelerating distance resulting 
in higher flame velocity, it was found to act in a different manner for each geometry. 
The triangular obstacle was found to achieve higher velocity through the obstacle 
passage than the semicircular obstacle. This was mainly because of the separation 
point and its effect on the induced vortex behind the obstacle, in addition to the degree 
of induced recirculation produced by increasing drag due to sharp edges, as illustrated 
in figure 5.8. 
Both polygonal obstacles behaved in almost identical manner until the flame exceeds 
the third obstacle. The influence of the sudden expansion of the rectangular obstacle 
on the flame speed reduction was most obvious after the third obstacle. Yet, both 
configurations undergo a convergent increase until the flame exceeds the sixth 
obstacle. The flame with the triangular obstacles then will experience higher peaks 
and exceeds the detonation threshold at a distance shorter than that for the flame with 
the rectangular obstacles. The flame decelerates for both configurations, leaving the 
tube at detonation speed for the triangular obstacles and below that for rectangular 
obstacles. 
The flame speed experienced higher disturbance along the tube. The flame speed 
decelerates sharply before every obstacle and accelerates through and between the 
obstacles. This led to gradual growing in the flame speed and longer time to consume 
the combustible mixture and lower jump when the flame exceeds the detonation speed 
after the last obstacle. 
Windward side 
Leeward side 
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Figure 5.8 Velocity vectors for the three configurations at the third obstacle. 
Figure 5.9 shows the flame speed along the tube versus time. The first noticeable 
oscillation in the flame speed starts when the flame interacts with the first obstacle. As 
it was mentioned above, the flame in the tube equipped with the rectangular obstacles 
reaches the first obstacles in 4.80ms, which is the earliest among the three 
configurations. As it seen in figure 5.9, the flame speed, for both rectangular and 
triangular obstacles, behaves in quite similar manner. However, the flame accelerates 
earlier with rectangular obstacles, which made it advanced at each point where the 
flame speed experiences a peak. The tube equipped with semicircular obstacles took 
longer time and distance to develop fast flame speed. The shorter recirculation zone, 
as shown in figure 5.8, in addition to the absence of sharp edges, which decreased the 
Rayleigh-Taylor the Kelvin-Helmholtz instabilities, prevents the rapid flame speed 
development. 
t=6.10ms 
t=6.30ms 
t=7.05ms 
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Figure 5.9 Flame tip velocity variation with time along the tube. 
5.4.2 Detonation Velocity Threshold 
The development of products velocity downstream the flame is considered one of the 
most dominant factors responsible for spontaneous pressure increase in detonation. 
The main source of the flame acceleration at the beginning of the combustion, just 
after ignition, is the flame surface area. Reactants enter the flame with a speed equal 
to the burning velocity of the mixture. Expansion combined with a reduction in density 
caused by heating during combustion process accelerates the products, until a certain 
point when the products hit the speed of sound. That leads the pressure waves to 
propagate downstream of the combustion zone. The compression heats the reactants 
in front of the flame and increases the burning velocity and the velocity of the product 
consequently, which eventually leads to a detonation.  
The simulation results, shown in figure 5.6, showed that flame speed exceeded the 
detonation speed threshold in the tube with rectangular obstacles at t=6.95ms before 
the flame enters the seventh obstacle. For the triangular obstacles, detonation speed 
threshold is exceeded at time t=7.15ms where the flame lies between the sixth and the 
seventh obstacle. Finally, the detonation speed threshold is achieved when the flame 
passed the eighth obstacle at t=8.25ms for the semicircular obstacles. The flame 
location when the detonation was achieved for the three configurations with their 
velocity contours are shown in figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10 Detonation location and time for three internal geometry configurations.  
A phenomenon of importance for all geometries is the shock reflection, which has a 
crucial effect on the pressure and velocity gradient along an obstructed tube. When the 
shock wave hits the upper surface of an obstacle it reflects, and when it passes the 
obstacle two more waves are generated: an expansion wave and a diffraction wave, as 
it illustrated in figure 5.11. While the reflection wave strengthens the incident shock, 
the expansion wave weakens it. Mach stem (the wave formed by the incident and 
reflected shock waves fusion) will be generated between the high pressure point of the 
incident-reflected waves interference and the low pressure point of the incident-
expansion waves interference. 
The upper side width of the obstacle plays a pivotal role in generating the expansion 
wave. Wider upper side obstacles produce higher Mach stem and higher incident shock 
pressures as a result. The windward slope (for triangular cross-section obstacles) also 
has considerable influence on the incident shock strength. For the positive slope of the 
triangular obstacle, the reflected wave is generated as soon as the incident shock 
touches the obstacle edge. Thus, there is a phenomenon of more expansion-contraction 
as a consequence of this early reflected shock, and therefore the higher incident shock 
pressure [73]. 
Rectangular Obstacles 
t=6.95ms 
Triangular Obstacles 
t=7.15ms 
Semicircular Obstacles 
t=8.25ms 
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Figure 5.11 Waves generated when an incident shock wave (I) passes an obstacle [73]. 
5.4.3 Pressure Gradient 
Unlike deflagration, detonation waves are compression waves. The pressure ratio 
across detonation wave reaches up to 15.6 [93]. This ratio is liable to increase 
significantly under certain circumstances, like retonation. Retonation is a reflected 
pressure wave. Detonation formation is usually accompanied by strong pressure waves 
propagate through products. When these pressure waves reflected off the closed end 
or obstacles, they propagate back towards the main detonation wave. The increased 
speed of sound in the products helped the retonation wave to overtake the detonation 
wave. For a very short period, a detonation/retonation combination is formed, leading 
to a stronger detonation wave. 
The flame tip pressure along the tube for the three configurations is shown in figure 
5.12. The pressure was almost the same for the three configurations until the flame 
passed through the second obstacles. By that time, the pressure wave emanated at the 
beginning of combustion will reflect by the obstacles and the end of the tube and 
reflect to merge with the flame front. The effect of contraction created by the obstacle 
is more noticeable at the first six obstacles than the last three. This was because of the 
better recorded output data according to the writing time interval with respect to the 
flame speed. The pressure increases as the flame approaches the obstacle and 
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decreases when it goes through it to re-increase in the distance between two sequential 
obstacles. 
The growth gradient in pressure is increasing while the flame is moving downstream. 
Unlike the two other configurations, where the maximum pressure is achieved at the 
end of the tube, the tube fitted with rectangular obstacles hits the maximum pressure 
just before the eighth obstacles, where the detonation has been achieved. The pressure 
then falls sharply followed by a steep rise when leaving the tube. 
  
Figure 5.12 Flame tip pressure along the tube. 
The first noticeable increase of pressure, for the tube fitted with triangular obstacles, 
was as the flame moves from the fifth to the sixth obstacle. The pressure then decreases 
gradually until the flame passes the last obstacles. A sharp increase in pressure is 
shown while the flame is leaving the tube, where the pressure reaches the maximum 
value by the exit of the tube. 
The tube fitted with semicircular obstacles achieved higher pressure than the two other 
configurations. The pressure growth increases slightly along the tube with modest 
leaps before each obstacle followed by a decrease in pressure. While the flame moves 
toward the last obstacle, the pressure increases until the detonation is achieved where 
the pressure upsurge to the maximum heading out of the tube. 
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Figure 5.13 Flame tip pressure along the tube versus residence time. 
Figure 5.13 shows the flame tip pressure with respect to time. The tube fitted with 
rectangular obstacles shows the earliest development of pressure as it was the first 
configuration where the flame reached the first obstacle. In addition, the pressure 
growth with time was higher with this configuration. The maximum pressure is 
achieved before the combustion is completed at t=7.00ms, with another pressure jump 
by the end of combustion, t=7.15ms, at the tube exit plan.  
The tube fitted with triangular obstacles was the second in pressure development. The 
growth was the least among the three configurations until t=7.20ms, when the first 
jump is stated. The pressure then decreases before it hits the maximum by the end of 
combustion process at t=7.40ms. The flame tip pressure in the tube equipped with 
semicircular obstacles was less volatile than the other two configurations until 
t=8.35ms and the step after, when it encounters an enormous surge to reach the 
maximum at t=8.40ms. The three maximum pressure contours for each configuration 
are depicted in figure 5.14. 
Figure 5.15 illustrates maximum pressure traces, over the whole combustion time, 
along the tube with respect to distance for the three configurations. Rectangular 
obstacles showed more systematic behaviour for pressure. Pressure undergoes steep 
augmentation at the beginning of the obstacle, then declines sharply by the end of it. 
It is shown that the maximum pressure along the tube was 73.2bar., and was reached 
just before the eighth obstacle. Figure 5.16 represents the maximum pressure change 
versus time for each point along the tube. Pressure range between 1.01325bar and 
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2.1bar until it reaches the second obstacle at time 5.8ms, then pressure experiences 
high fluctuations moving from the second obstacle to the end of the tube at time 
7.15ms. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Maximum pressure location and time for three internal geometry configurations.  
 
Figure 5.15 Maximum pressure trace during residence time along the tube. 
Rectangular Obstacles 
t=7.00ms 
Triangular Obstacles 
t=7.40ms 
Semicircular Obstacles 
t=8.40ms 
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Figure 5.16 Maximum pressure trace along the tube with respect to time. 
Pressure peaked at the centre of the triangular obstacles for the first four obstacles, 
figure 5.15. Pressure jumped irregularly regarding the location with the next obstacle, 
then it returns to peak at the centre of the sixth obstacle where detonation took place. 
The fluctuation increased from that point, and the pressure peak points were in 
different locations. The maximum pressure of 53.1bar was achieved by the end of the 
tube, which was the least pressure achieved among the three configurations. Pressure 
value ranged between 1.0bar to 2.0bar up to time 6ms, as it illustrated in figure 5.16. 
Pressure experienced alterations that rose eventually at 7.25ms up to 46.6bar, followed 
by a slight decrease previous to a re-increased profile before leaving the tube at the 
maximum pressure value. 
The semicircular obstacles passed through the same conditions of the rectangular 
obstacles until the third obstacle, figure 5.15. Starting from the third until the eighth 
obstacle, pressures peaked at the centre of the obstacle. At the middle distance between 
the last obstacle and the end of the tube, the pressure encountered a dramatic accretion 
up to 82.1bar followed by an enormous reduction. Another dramatic increase in 
pressure occurred by the last 20mm of the tube followed by a tenuous decrease. 
Finally, the flame leaves the tube with a maximum value for pressure at 91.7bar. Figure 
5.16 states that pressure moves slowly from 1.0bar to 2.0bar until 6.6ms, pressure then 
fluctuates with slight build up until 8.25ms when it undergoes a huge surge towards 
the end of the tube.  
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For the three configurations, the effect of the reflection and expansion waves 
interference are obvious. Reflected shocks are formed at the moment when the incident 
shock hits the obstacle, which is the same for the three configurations. For the 
rectangular cross-sectional obstacles, an expansion and diffraction waves are formed 
at the point when the shock wave reaches the last point on the obstacle upper side. 
This will give longer time for the reflected shock to affect the main incident shock 
before the expansion wave generated. This was the reason behind the steep 
augmentations. 
The diffraction of the incident shock caused by the triangular obstacles is started 
around the tip of the obstacle [72]. Hence, the expansion waves merge with the 
reflected waves, which will decrease the expansion waves and the effect of the 
reflected waves on the main incident shock wave. Therefore, the jump in pressure with 
triangular obstacles is less sharp than the one with rectangular obstacles.  
Unlike a sudden constriction in the rectangular obstacle, both triangular and 
semicircular obstacles generate sequential reflected shocks due to the gradual change 
in the flow area [160]. The reflected shocks generated at the second half of the 
obstacle, the part after the apex, will travel downstream. In the triangular obstacles 
case, sharp edges contribute in generating higher vortices which in turn reduce the 
severity of reflected shocks effect on the incident shock as it travelled downstream. 
This is not the case with semicircular obstacles, as the reflected shocks travelled 
towards the pipe exit are gradually consolidated to eventually thrust the pressure by 
the end of the tube. 
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 show the ratios between products to reactants pressure, or the 
pressure ratio across the flame tip. As it was stated before, the pressure across the 
flame starts to fluctuate after the flame passes the second obstacle. The pressure ratio 
for the tube equipped with rectangular obstacles showed growth in both amplitude and 
frequency while moving downstream. When the flame approaches the seventh 
obstacle, the pressure ratio soars severely. The maximum products to reactants 
pressure ratio reached was 62.49 at x=1.1875m and t=7.00ms, which is where the 
maximum pressure has been achieved. The pressure ratio declines when it passes by 
the eighth obstacle and encounter a low increase through the ninth obstacle. 
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The tube equipped with triangular cross-section obstacles underwent less fluctuations. 
After the third obstacle, the pressure ratio steadily increases while the flame moves 
towards the next obstacle, and decreases when it goes through it. The ratio 
inadequately increases between the next pair of obstacles, and experiences more rapid 
rise entering the fifth obstacle and decreases through it. The pressure ratio steadily and 
tranquilly augments toward the eighth obstacle, where it encounters lesser decrease. 
Another increase is recorded at the midway between the last two obstacles. The flame 
finally leaves the tube with a pressure ratio of 45.32. 
 
Figure 5.17 Pressure ratio across flame tip versus location along the tube. 
 
Figure 5.18 Pressure ratio across flame tip versus time along the tube. 
While the flame moves downstream the tube equipped with semicircular obstacles, the 
pressure ratio showed more steady growth between obstacles. However, when the 
flame passes the before last obstacles, it decreased more than the other cases with the 
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previous obstacles. This was followed by a dramatic accretion of pressure ratio 
reaching the maximum value 47.96 at the tube exit.  
 Conclusions 
A comparison of the flame propagation using three obstacle geometries is required to 
understand how obstacle geometry affects flame acceleration. The combustion 
propagation is shown in figure 5.4 and the time versus distance graph shown in figure 
5.5 stated that more than 60% of the residence time is consumed before the flame 
reaches the first obstacle, which is only 10% of the total distance. While it is required 
26.1ms for the flame to reach the end of the tube without obstacles, only 32% of that 
time is required for the tube equipped with semicircular obstacles, this even is lesser 
with polygon shaped obstacles. 
In order to compare the rate of flame acceleration in a stoichiometric hydrogen-air 
mixture for the all three obstacle configurations, the leading flame tip position is 
plotted in Figure 5.19. The slope of the curve at any given point represents the 
instantaneous flame velocity. All three curves show the same slow initial acceleration, 
followed by a more rapid acceleration and then terminating at a rather steady flame 
propagation velocity. 
 
Figure 5.19 Pressure ratio across flame tip versus time along the tube. 
The presence of edges in obstacles shows a clear effect on the flame propagation, even 
before the flame reaches it. The flame reaches the rectangular obstacles 3% earlier 
than the triangular obstacles and up to 7% the semicircular one. Influence then extends 
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along the tube so that the combustion in the tube with rectangular obstacles 
accomplishes 3% earlier than the tube with triangular obstacles, but 15% earlier than 
the tube with semicircular obstacles. Also, it is found that the detonation velocity 
threshold is exceeded once with semicircular obstacles at t=8.25ms and last for a short 
period, while it is exceeded earlier and for longer period for both polygon obstacles. 
However, semicircular obstacles possess two merits, the highest pressure, as the 
pressure is the desired outcome and the location where it is achieved. The curvature 
surface of the semicircular obstacle has produced the flow with the least turbulence, 
which helped in building up the pressure along the tube. Besides, the consolidated 
reflected shocks by the end of the tube, figure 5.20, promoting the pressure by the end 
of the tube to reach up to 91.2bar. 
 
 
Figure 5.20 Flame front and reflected shocks travel ahead one time step before the end of the 
tube equipped with semicircular obstacles. 
Although the earlier detonation was carried out by the tube with rectangular obstacles, 
the shortest deflagration to detonation distance was achieved by the tube with 
triangular obstacles. However, the pressure accomplished was the least among the 
three configurations, which was reached by the end of the tube. For the rectangular 
obstacles, detonation was not only achieved earlier, yet the maximum pressure was 
achieved at 79% of the total length of the tube. Thus, shorter tube might be more 
desirable with this configuration, unlike the two other configurations where longer 
tubes may maintain the continuation of pressure increase. 
 Summary 
A numerical simulation has been performed in OpenFOAM to find out how the 
obstacle geometry could affect the flame propagation for an open end tube. A 
stoichiometric hydrogen/air mixture was used in a 21.2mm diameter and 1500mm 
length tube equipped with three different cross-section geometry obstacles. 
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The results of analysis demonstrated that the shock-flame interaction highly influences 
the flame propagation along the tube. Also, the sharp edges were found to affect 
recirculation produced by increasing drag. Therefore, the detonation speed threshold 
was exceeded earlier for rectangular obstacles. Yet, the flame velocity as higher and 
developed with shorter deflagration to detonation distance with triangular obstacles. 
This was mainly due to the separation point and its effect on the induced vortex behind 
the obstacle. However, as the pressure was the desired outcome, the tube with 
semicircular obstacles surpasses the two other configurations.
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6 Chapter 6 
Geological 
Survey 
 Introduction   
Shale is one of the most common types of sedimentary rocks. They have been formed 
by the deposition of different sediments and as a result vary in colour from red to green 
or black and in properties. High levels of organic matter and low levels of oxygen are 
the main requirements for this type of rock to be created. By lithification the organic 
matter is deposited gradually and as the time passes more material accumulates which 
then results in an increase in pressure and temperature. During this process, the organic 
material is transformed into kerogens which are long hydrocarbon chains [161]. 
This chapter is based on obtaining some of the shale rock characteristics out of samples 
obtained from the Dulais Valley, South Wales, and compare them with some others 
obtained from the Bowland-Hodder area, which has been demonstrated to have 
formations capable of producing good amounts of fossil fuel for human consumption. 
  Area of Interest 
A 2010 report by the British Geological Society identified several potential shale gas 
deposits in northern England. First estimates were around 5.3tcf of gas reserves or 2 
years of reserves based on current UK consumption rates. British gas company 
Cuadrilla Resources then estimated that there could be 200tcf of gas hiding in the 
Bowland shale [162].  
These and posterior studies have determined a very good potential of extraction in this 
region known as the Bowland-Hodder area, figure 6.1. Carboniferous organic-rich 
basinal marine shales are present in this region. The shales are either buried at depth 
or occur at outcrop. These organic-rich shales are recognised to be excellent source 
rocks, in which oil and gas matured before some of it migrated into conventional oil 
and gas fields [163]. 
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Figure 6.1 Bowland-Hodder area, UK [162]. 
Wales is also carrying out several exploration projects through various companies to 
recognise areas where to exploit the resource in order to contribute with this energetic 
revolution. North Wales, having a share in the Bowland-Hodder unit can highly benefit 
from this region. However, there are some other regions of interest close to South 
Wales where the extraction could be linked to a high populated area that includes the 
capital, Cardiff, and the surrounding valleys. According to the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change [164], there is a good prospect for shale extraction in this region. 
  Experimental Setup 
Specimens were collected at the British Geological Survey Centre. In total 11 samples 
were obtained from 6 different boreholes located in South Wales (Dulais Valley) and 
the Bowland-Hodder area (Smeathalls, Wingfield, Edale, Kingsmill and Milfordhall), 
figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 Location of samples. 
The size of the subsample depended entirely on the size of the actual sample which 
varied in each site. It should be noted that most if not all of the samples had a dark 
grey to black colour. Generally speaking, there is a correlation between the colour of 
the shales and the potential content of gas and or oil. The darker the colour the more 
organic material there is [165], which suggest the shale was formed in an oxygen 
depleted environment and hence more likely it is to contain hydrocarbons. Three 
techniques have been used in the present work to characterise and compare the 
samples. 
6.3.1 Volatile Content 
Volatile matter is the material that changes state from a solid to gaseous state when 
heated to specific conditions for a period of time without the presence of oxygen. Most 
of the solid which volatilises in shale is comprised of free hydrocarbons present in the 
sample, i.e. kerogen which is cracked with the heat and yields hydrocarbons and CO2 
among other compounds [166].  
In order to recognise the volatile matter, experiments were carried out based on the 
standard BS ISO 562:2010 Hard coal and coke determination of volatile matter [167]. 
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The objective was to find the volatile matter in the shale rocks. The process was as 
follows: 
1. Crushing of each sample in mill until it reached a fine powder consistency.  
2. Placement of each sample on an evaporating dish and then put all the samples 
inside an oven for an hour at a temperature of 105°C in order to remove moisture. 
3. Measurement of one gram of the sample and then put it inside of a crucible. Repeat 
this step two times, so there are three crucibles, each with one gram of the sample.  
4. Placement of crucibles in oven for seven minutes at a 900°C temperature.  
5. Removal and weight measurement of the sample, recording the mass loss. 
6. Repetition of step 3 to 5 for each of the samples. 
6.3.2 RockEval Pyrolysis [168] 
One of the most common methods used to analyse the potential of shale rocks is 
referred to as RockEval pyrolysis. This was performed in conjunction with a previous 
MSc student [168]. The procedure is as follows: 
1. The rock samples are pulverised. 
2. Pulverised samples are heated for three minutes at a temperature of 250°C. 
3. Then samples are heated gradually from 250°C to 600°C at 25°C per minute. 
The process was carried out in the absence of oxygen, and during the time water, 
carbon dioxide and hydrocarbons are released from the rock [169]. The important 
parameters obtained from the process are: 
• S1: Amount of hydrocarbons measured in milligrams per gram of rock released 
at initial heating of 250°C, table 6.1. 
• S2: Amount of hydrocarbons produced upon pyrolytic degradation of the 
remaining organic matter in the rock, table 6.1. 
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• S3: Amount of carbon dioxide generated during the pyrolysis. 
• Tmax: Temperature at which most hydrocarbons are released. It is an indication 
of the rock thermal maturity [170], [171]. 
• TOC%: Total Organic Carbon, table 6.1. 
• PI: Production Index and also indicates thermal maturity. PI values below 0.4 
are thermally immature, between 0.4-1 are thermally mature and above 1.0 
indicate over mature organic matter [172], table 6.3. 
• Ro%: Vitrine reflectance: Parameter to identify the maximum temperature 
history of sediments. It is used as an indicator of maturity in hydrocarbon 
rocks.  
• HI: Hydrogen Index is obtained using S2 and TOC, and can be used as a 
maturation indicator [170], [171], table 6.2. 
• OI: Oxygen Index is a parameter that correlates with the ratio of oxygen to 
carbon [170]. 
Table 6.1 Geomechanical parameters describing Source Rock Generative Potential [170]. 
Potential TOC (weight %) S1 (mg HC/g rock) S2 (mg HC/g rock) 
Poor 0.0-0.5 0.0-0.5 0.0-2.5 
Fair 0.5-1.0 0.5-1.0 2.5-5.0 
Good 1.0-2.0 1.0-2.0 5.0-10.0 
Very Good 2.0+ 2.0+ 10.0+ 
 
Table 6.2 Geomechanical parameters describing Type of Hydrocarbon Generated [170] 
Type Hydrogen Index (HI) 
Gas 0-150 
Gas and Oil 150-300 
Oil 300+ 
 
Table 6.3 Geomechanical parameters describing Level of Thermal Maturation [170] 
Maturation Production Index (PI) Tmax (°C) 
Top Oil Window Ca. 0.1 Ca. 435-445 
Bottom Oil Window Ca. 0.4 Ca. 470 
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6.3.3 High Resolution Transmission Electron Microscope (HRTEM) 
Laboratory characterizations have revealed that gas shales have low porosity (<10% 
of pore space in a unit volume of rock) and ultralow permeability (tens of nanodarcy), 
with the majority of gas stored in the kerogen nanopores [173]. Scanning electron 
microscopy and transmission electron microscopy images can offer important 
information regarding the nanometer-scaled pore geometry in gas shale. They can also 
offer information about element tracing for the assessment for environmental impacts 
during hydraulic fracturing. Impacts such as potential for acid rock drainage 
generation, distribution of trace elements in shale gas and management of well cuttings 
are just some example assessments that can be carried out with these studies.   
To provide detailed morphological and compositional information about the studied 
samples at micro and nano-scale, a high-resolution transmission electron microscope 
(HR-TEM) system JEOL 2100 (LaB6) was employed. The state-of-the-art instrument 
is equipped with a high-resolution Gatan digital camera (2k x 2k) providing resolution 
of 0.2Å which makes possible detailed observation of the crystal lattice, obtaining 
diffraction pattern and accurate measurement of the lattice d-spacing with the help of 
Digital Micrograph software. In scanning transmission electron microscopy (STEM) 
mode, a dark field (HAADF/Z-contrast) detector was used to provide excellent 
compositional contrast. Energy Dispersive X-ray Spectrometry (EDS) system Oxford 
Instruments equipped with a large-area 80mm2 SDD (Silicon Drift Detector) X-MaxN 
80 T was employed to study the elemental analysis in Point&ID, LineScans, layered 
and elemental mapping modes. To analyse the EDS data, the latest version of 
AZtecTEM software was utilized. For HR-TEM analysis, after preparing a (water) 
suspension from the samples, a drop of about 8µL was put on the TEM grid and dried. 
Launched since March 2013 at Cardiff University, the state-of-the-art instrument 
features high-resolution Gatan digital camera with resolution 0.02nm, dark field 
(HAADF detector) imaging in STEM mode, 3-D tomography with high-stability 
goniometer stage specifically tuned for high tilt tomographic applications, EDS 
elemental analysis with elemental mapping and line scan capability and CRYO 
imaging at -175°C. 
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The diameter of the samples studied was close to 2mm and due to the magnification 
capacity each one was studied at five different locations within each sample. For each 
sample and each location, the percentage of each element was obtained. Subsequently, 
an average value for each sample was calculated. 
  Results and Discussion 
The difference in mass of the samples was divided by the total mass to find the volatile 
contents. Average results are given in table 6.4 for all the samples. Although this is a 
rough estimate of the possible presence of hydrocarbons, the results determine that all 
regions are candidates for the exploitation of fossil sources. As it can be seen the values 
of shale rocks range from 7.05 to 20.65% which is an indication that they may contain 
sufficient hydrocarbons for them to be source rocks. However, it is clear that the region 
in South Wales contains the lowest percentage in the batch, an indication of a poor/fair 
content of hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, the volatiles which are given off should be 
measured to ensure there is oil and or gas with more specialist equipment. 
Table 6.4 Average volatile organic content of each shale rock sample. 
ID Name of borehole location Elevation above sea 
level at surface (m) 
Depth relative to 
surface (m) 
Volatile Organic 
Content (%) 
1A Dulais Valley 1 134.60 166.12 9.62 
2B Dulais Valley 2 134.60 155.83 7.05 
3C Smeathalls 1 10.03 229.34 14.14 
4D Smeathalls 2 10.03 219.89 9.0 
5E Wingfield 1 125.02 31.95 13.76 
6F Wingfield 2 125.02 54.63 11.86 
7G Edale 1 235.10 96.01 15.40 
8H Edale 2 235.10 99.06 14.37 
9I Kingsmill 1 116.12 216.76 15.48 
10J Kingsmill 2 116.12 725.42 20.65 
11K Milfordhall 1 17.55 325.02 9.00 
From the RockEval pyrolysis evaluation average results for all the samples can be 
found in table 6.5. The quantity of organic matter in the samples indicated by the total 
organic carbon (TOC) ranges from 0.63 to 20.12%. All of these values are above 0.5%, 
thus showing that the amount of organic matter in the samples go from fair to very 
good. The thermo-labile hydrocarbons (S1) average value is 0.47mg/g, ranging from 
0.03 to 1.31mg/g. The first two samples from Dulais Valley show the lowest content. 
Hydrocarbons from cracking of kerogen (S2) show an average of 7.88mg/g being in 
 Chapter Six: Geological Survey 
126 
the “good” range. Only three of the samples are categorised to have poor potential, 
those from South Wales with the lowest values.  
Table 6.5 Rock-Eval pyrolysis results from studied samples. 
ID S1 S2 PI Tmax S3 TOC HI OI 
1A 0.05 0.70 0.07 586 1.17 4.05 17 29 
2B 0.03 0.21 0.14 393 0.40 0.63 33 63 
3C 0.55 26.71 0.02 429 4.06 15.31 174 27 
4D 0.19 8.92 0.02 438 0.91 3.79 235 24 
5E 0.23 4.41 0.05 425 0.28 4.22 105 7 
6F 0.24 9.92 0.02 437 0.27 3.35 296 8 
7G 1.31 5.30 0.20 451 0.24 5.84 91 4 
8H 1.08 3.03 0.26 437 0.32 4.56 66 7 
9I 0.12 0.81 0.13 434 0.27 1.00 81 27 
10J 1.15 21.55 0.05 431 6.37 20.12 107 32 
11K 0.20 5.09 0.04 436 0.58 2.91 175 20 
 
Figure 6.3 Hydrogen index vs. oxygen index plot (Modified Van Krevelen diagram). 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the two most widely used diagrams to interpret the origin of 
the organic matter in rocks. Figure 6.3 shows the hydrogen index versus the oxygen 
index. This provides a rough estimate on the type of organic matter present in the 
samples and what hydrocarbon they will mostly yield.  Figure 6.4 is the hydrogen 
index versus Tmax. This diagram is based on the amount of hydrogen the kerogen 
contains and the amount of energy needed to produce hydrocarbons from that type of 
kerogen under laboratory conditions [174]. 
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Figure 6.4 Tmax vs HI plot. 
 
Figure 6.5 Source rock characteristics as interpreted by the relationship between the remaining 
hydrocarbon potential (S2) and TOC. 
Rock Eval thermal maturity parameters, indicated by Tmax and approximate vitrinite 
reflectance between 0.5 and 1.30 Ro%, suggest that most samples from the Bowland-
Hodder area are located in the mature oil window with different kerogen types, figure 
6.4. However, the samples from South Wales show inert, no potential specimens either 
from immature samples or post-mature rocks. Other RockEval parameters (S1, S2, HI) 
are quite low and indicate a poor source potential for the Dulais Valley region, contrary 
to those samples obtained from the Midlands, figure 6.3 and table 6.5. The source rock 
potential was also characterised, figure 6.5. Although the total organic carbon in the 
1A sample is excellent, its remaining hydrocarbon potential is poor. In the case of 
sample 2B, it is clear that its poor characteristics show an immature deposit of rock. 
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Contrary to these findings, shale rocks in the Bowland-Hodder area denote a good 
potential for further exploitation of the resource. 
Regarding element tracing analyses, comparisons between the South Wales samples 
and the Bowland-Hodder region were performed using the average value of the 
averages of the latter with the former, table 6.6.  
The results showed a consistent presence of Iron Sulphide (FeS2) or pyrite in all the 
samples, table 6.6, resembled in the content of Fe and S. One of the main concerns 
with this type of compound is that it is known to cause acid main drainage when 
exposed to oxygen and water. During the process of fracking, this element will be 
dissolved since water will be used for the hydraulic fracturing process and once the 
liquid flows back to the surface it will be exposed to the oxygen in the air. The three 
main problems associated with the release of acid to the main drainage are 
contamination of drinking water, detrimental effects on aquatic plants and animals, 
corrosion of infrastructure such as bridges, monuments, and buildings [175]. 
Table 6.6 Average element composition of all samples. 
Element Dulais 
Valley 
Smeathalls Wingfield Edale Milfordhall Average  
Bowland-
Hodder 
Comparison 
O 43.760 46.310 54.910 49.370 53.950 51.14 0.86 
Si 20.360 18.200 20.470 23.560 20.610 20.71 0.98 
C 16.030 21.250 5.830 15.350 7.280 12.43 1.29 
Al 10.680 8.220 14.580 5.350 12.250 10.10 1.06 
Fe 4.810 2.400 0.770 0.760 1.240 1.29 3.72 
K 2.490 1.190 1.280 0.490 2.420 1.35 1.85 
Mg 0.750 0.890 0.470 0.430 1.070 0.72 1.05 
Ca 0.480 0.150 0.610 2.920 0.060 0.94 0.51 
Na 0.210 0.170 0.002 0.050 0.230 0.11 1.86 
P 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.030 0.04 3.73 
Ti 0.130 0.090 0.340 0.040 0.320 0.20 0.66 
Mn 0.110 0.040 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.02 6.29 
S 0.050 1.090 0.740 1.550 0.060 0.86 0.06 
Cu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.460 0.12 0.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 
However, it is evident that the amount of Fe in the South Wales samples is much higher 
(i.e. more than three times) than those in the Bowland-Hodder region. On the other 
hand, S is at the lowest level, thus showing that the extraction of the shale in this region 
would be less damaging in terms of acid content coming from this molecule. Troilite 
(FeS) and Pyrite (FeS2) were detected in some of the samples, as can be confirmed by 
the structured shape of the rocks and elemental mapping, figures 6.6 and 6.7. However, 
the samples in the Dulais Valley contain CaPO4, CaHPO4 or similar compounds, thus 
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increasing the acidic elements in the sample. It is very likely that gypsum 
(CaSO4·2H2O) is also present in the samples, with clear indication of Ca, S and oxygen 
in all of them, figure 6.8. All samples showed traces of K. Quartz (SiO2) seems to be 
also one of the major components of the rocks, and these elements are present in a 
similar percentage in both regions. Finally, uranium is an element that seems to appear 
only in Milfordhall. Although it does not show traces in other boreholes, further 
considerations need to be evaluated in those sites where these naturally occurring 
radioactive materials are present, a problem that does not seem to affect the Dulais 
Valley. 
 
Figure 6.6 Traces of Troilite (FeS) and Pyrite (FeS2) in samples A) 3C, B) 5E and C) 7G. 
   
Figure 6.7 Mapping of sample. Traces of Troilite (FeS) in sample 3C. 
A                     B                     C 
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Figure 6.8 Mapping of sample. Traces of gypsum in sample 5E. 
 Conclusions 
Several studies were performed to give an indication of the potential of the Dulais 
Valley in terms of producing shale gas. It was found that the resources in the region 
are low, with rocks that show a poor potential for the production of gas. Comparison 
with good sources coming from Yorkshire and the Midlands gave indication of very 
low potential for extraction in the Dulais Valley. In terms of element composition, the 
rocks seem to have higher levels of Fe. However, the low S indicates that these are not 
bounded as FeS or FeS2, and probably a cleaner extraction could take place. This is 
also dependent on the amount of other molecules such as gypsum, which seem higher 
in South Wales. It can be concluded that this region possesses low potential, and 
although being included in the zone of onshore licenses, the benefits of exploitation 
might not be high. However, it is recognised that the amount of samples needs to be 
increased and more research is needed to define if the region of South Wales has good 
potential for the exploitation of the resource.
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7 Chapter 7 Simulation 
of Crack Propagation 
 Introduction 
The mechanical characterisation of shale formation is considered as the main issue in 
modelling crack propagation. The non-uniform sedimentation during the shale 
formation process presents distinct types of patterns in shale. For that, the analysis 
done for a specific shale rock is not valid elsewhere, even along a wellbore [117]. 
In this chapter, the influence of pressure produced by the detonation tube on the shale 
rock in shale formation is investigated. A two-dimensional study using ANSYS 
Parameter Design Language (Mechanical APDL) was performed with shale rock 
properties to predict the pressure pulse generated by the detonation tube on a crack tip 
which assumed to be created by perforation. 
  Simulation of Crack Propagation 
Many researches have been dedicated to simulating fracturing in shale gas extraction. 
However, simplifications adopted and the assumption made led to lack in provided 
information. Dealing with shale rock as an isotropic material, crack branching and 
natural fractures already found in the shale formation represent the major causes of 
deviation. 
Hydraulic fracturing is the dominant way in fracturing process for shale gas extraction. 
Therefore, most of the researches conducted have dealt with hydraulic fracturing. The 
majority of these researches took into account only the influence of the crack 
neglecting the fluid effect. The fluid-crack interaction was included in recent few 
researches [176]–[178]. However, the current study will deal with dry fractures and 
the effect of pressure pulse generated by the detonation tube on the pre-crack generated 
from the perforating stage. 
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   Fracture Mechanics 
Fracture mechanics deal with the conditions under which cracks are formed and 
grown. Fracture mechanics analyse stress in the vicinity of a crack or flaw. They are 
basically based on the analytical procedure related to three variables, which are 
material properties, flaw size and shape, and applied stress [122]. Fracture process is 
summarised by Naman [179] in four steps. The first stage is related to the stress 
concentration in the vicinity of the defects. The second stage is related to the formation 
and initiation of the crack. In the present work, both previous stages are caused 
deliberately during the perforating stage of shale gas extraction. The real beginning of 
the crack starts with the third stage. In this stage, a successive propagation of the crack 
is attained until a certain distance called critical size is reached. In the fourth stage, a 
sudden propagation is caused.  
Depending on the direction of applied load, three modes of fracture are recognised, as 
illustrated in figure 7.1: 
a. Mode I: Opening mode, where the two crack surfaces are pulled apart in the 𝑦
− direction, but the deformations are symmetric about the 𝑥−𝑧 and 𝑥−𝑦 planes,  
b. Mode II: Shearing mode, the two crack surfaces slide over each other in the 𝑥
− direction, but the deformations are symmetric about the x − y plane and skew 
symmetric about the 𝑥−𝑧 plane. 
c. Mode III: Tearing mode, the crack surfaces slide over each other in the 𝑧− 
direction, but the deformations are skew symmetric about the 𝑥−𝑦 and 𝑥−𝑧 
planes. 
The propagation of a crack may follow one of the above modes or a combination of 
them. 
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Figure 7.1 Modes of crack displacement [180]. 
  Stress Intensity Factor 
The stress intensity, caused by a remote load or residual stresses, near the tip of a crack 
in fracture mechanics is predicted by a factor known as stress intensity factor (SIF), 
which is used to estimate the crack growth rate. This factor was first developed by G. 
Irwin in 1957 [121]. Stress intensity factor determination plays a central role in linear 
elastic fracture mechanic problems. The stress field near the crack tip rules fracture 
propagation.  
The stress intensity factors can be calculated using stress and strain analysis or 
parameters that measure the energy released by crack growth. The calculation of the 
stress intensity factor (SIF) under the effect of the dynamic load and identifying its 
behaviour under the influence of dynamic load is a way to predict the emergence of a 
crack. The stress intensity factor is the quantity which dictates if or when the crack 
will propagate. 
Application of cyclic load increases the crack length cumulatively. The nature of the 
problem in the present work led to focus on investigating Mode I stress intensity factor 
calculations at the tip of the crack. The stress near the crack tip, figure 7.2, is 
formulated as [122],  
𝝈𝒙 = 𝝈
√𝒂
√𝟐𝒓
𝒄𝒐𝒔
𝜽
𝟐
(𝟏 − 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝜽
𝟐
𝒔𝒊𝒏
𝟑𝜽
𝟐
),  𝝈𝒚 = 𝝈
√𝒂
√𝟐𝒓
𝒄𝒐𝒔
𝜽
𝟐
(𝟏 + 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝜽
𝟐
𝒔𝒊𝒏
𝟑𝜽
𝟐
)  
         Equation 7.1  
where 𝜎 is nominal stress in N/m2 and a is crack length in m. 
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Figure 7.2 Distribution of stresses near a crack [122]. 
Thus, stress intensity factor of mode I (KI) has been defined in the equation 2.17. There 
are three kinds of cracks, central, double-edge and single-edge crack. In this particular 
case, the crack was assumed to be single-edge crack, which is expected to be produced 
by perforation process, as illustrated in figure 7.3. Thus, assuming linear elastic 
fracture mechanics (LEFM) and plane strain problem, the constant C from equation 
2.16 will be [122],  
𝑪 = √
𝟐𝒘
𝝅𝒂
𝒕𝒂𝒏 (𝝅
𝒂
𝟐𝒘
)
𝟎.𝟕𝟓𝟐+𝟐.𝟎𝟐(𝒂 𝒘⁄ )+𝟎.𝟑𝟕[𝟏−𝒔𝒊𝒏(𝝅𝒂 𝟐𝒘⁄ )]𝟑
𝒄𝒐𝒔(𝝅𝒂 𝟐𝒘⁄ )
  Equation 7.2 
 
Figure 7.3 The shape of the assumed crack. 
Critical intensity factor, also known as fracture toughness, is an important parameter 
that measures the ability of any material containing a crack to resist fracture. The 
critical intensity factor is a measured material property, found by loading standard 
specimens until crack extends. The crack growth occurs when the stress intensity 
factor surpasses the critical stress intensity factor [181]. 
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  Von Mises Stresses  
The geometrical combination of normal and shear stresses acting at a particular 
location is called Von Mises stress. The material yields at a location when the Von 
Mises stress exceeds the yield strength, and ruptures at that location when it exceeds 
the ultimate strength. Von Mises stress is defined as [182] 
 
𝝈𝑽𝑴 = √(𝝈𝒙 + 𝝈𝒚 + 𝝈𝒛)
𝟐
− 𝟑(𝝈𝒙𝝈𝒚 + 𝝈𝒚𝝈𝒛 + 𝝈𝒛𝝈𝒙 − 𝝉𝒚𝒛𝟐 − 𝝉𝒙𝒛𝟐 − 𝝉𝒙𝒚𝟐 )  
         Equation 7.3 
Von Mises yield criterion stated that a material can fail despite none of the individual 
component stresses exceeded the stress threshold for plastic deformation [182].  
 Numerical Setup  
7.6.1 Geometry and Mesh Generation 
The depth of vertical and length of horizontal drilling of any shale gas well depends 
mainly on the area subjected to exploration, figure 7.4. Generally, diameter of the well 
starts from 610mm at the ground surface to 140mm at the horizontal well, through 
three or four intermediate diameters [183]. The horizontal well then is perforated using 
shaped-charge perforator, shown in figure 7.5. The perforating gun detonates the 
shaped charge with a velocity that ranges from 7600m/s to 9100m/s, creating an 
impact pressure of 70GPa to 100GPa. The charge penetrates the casing and 
surrounding rocks with a diameter that ranges from 6mm to 18mm for 0.15m to 1.2m 
in the formation depending on the standoff of the perforating gun from the casing. A 
perforating gun usually shoots 12 to 18 shoots per meter (4-6 spf) [184]. 
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Figure 7.4 Typical shale gas well [183]. 
 
Figure 7.5 Sketch shows perforating gun (right) and shaped charge (left) [184]. 
The mesh was generated using “PLANE183” in ANSYS code, which is a 2-
dimensional 8-node quadratic element, figure 7.6. The number of divisions is 
determined on the lines constructed the modelled body. The divisions then 
concentrated in the vicinity of the crack area using space ratio option. Space ratio is 
the nominal ratio of the last division size to the first division size. 
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To model the stress concentration around the crack tip, the crack tip point was chosen 
as a keypoint, this point was set where the mesh is concentrated and then refined to 
capture the crack propagation. A circle with a radius of one-eighth of crack length (a/8) 
is drawn around the crack tip point. The crack opening is set to be a/200, as 
recommended by the software. The element is degenerated to a triangular-shaped 
circumference around the keypoint and radially away [185]. Figure 7.7 shows the 
mesh around the crack tip area. 
 
Figure 7.6 PLANE183 element geometry [185]. 
Table 7.1 Dimensions and mesh properties for the model. 
Line Length(m) No. of divisions Space ratio 
Geometry height (L1) 0.11 110 - 
Geometry length (L2) 4 4000 - 
Space between holes (L3) 0.1 100 0.2 
Perforating depth (w) 0.1 100 0.2 
Perforating diameter (h) 0.01 20 0.2 
Pre-crack length (a) 0.01 - - 
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Figure 7.7 Mesh near the crack tip. 
7.6.2 Boundary and Initial Conditions 
The geometry used in the simulation is illustrated in figure 7.8. The dimensions of the 
hole generated by perforating have been taken from literature [184]. A pre-crack has 
been assumed to initiate as consequence of perforating. All these dimensions, 
illustrated in figure 7.3, are tabulated in table 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.8 Simulated geometry. 
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The shale rock mechanical properties depend mainly on the conditions that the rock 
has been formed in and the compositions of the rocks, clay and organic matter 
(kerogen) [185]. Therefore, the mechanical properties of shale rock are not alike even 
along the same well, as mentioned previously. Mancos shale mechanical properties 
have been used in the present study [123], mainly because all the mechanical 
properties needed are found in this reference. Table 7.2 shows the input data used in 
the code for crack-plane orientations relative to bedding, assuming that the bedding 
plane was oriented along the x-axis.  
Table 7.2 Shale rock mechanical properties [123]. 
Property  
Fracture Toughness (KIC) 0.21MPa.m1/2 
Tensile strength (σT) 4.54MPa 
Modulus of elasticity (E) 11GPa 
Poisson’s Ratio (ν) 0.2 
The model was loaded by applying a pressure pulse wave that exerts in all directions, 
as it is illustrated in figure 7.8. The magnitudes of pressure used here were (50, 70, 90) 
bar, to cover the pressure range achieved by the detonation tube.  
  Results and Discussion 
One of the most powerful features of APDL is its ability to map any results data onto 
arbitrary path through the model. This enables user to perform many mathematical and 
calculation operations along this path to determine meaningful results: stress intensity 
factors around a crack tip, the stresses along the path, displacement, and so on. Another 
benefit is that it is possible to see, in the form of a graph or a tabular listing, how a 
result item varies along the path. To review results on a path, three steps must be 
followed. The first is defining the path attribute, the environment and the measured 
points. The second is defining the data which will be mapped through this path. The 
last one is interpolating results data along the path [186]. 
In the present work, four paths were chosen to find the stresses and stress intensity 
factors. Two horizontal, the first, crack tip path, starts from the crack tip and extends 
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up to the end of the geometry. The other, edge path, starts from the beginning to the 
end of the geometry but at the level between two adjacent perforating holes. The other 
two paths are vertical, and they are parallel to the perforating base, vertical crack tip 
path at the level of the crack tips, and vertical edge path by the end of the geometry. 
7.7.1 Single Hole Geometry 
The first trials to simulate the crack propagation were done with a geometry that 
contains one hole. The hole was at the middle of a 20mm by 4m geometry. Because of 
the narrow layer dealt with, the displacement of the geometry in x-direction was very 
high. This means the wave will smash the first layer of surrounding rocks. Also, it is 
found that the stresses are more concentrated at the corners of perforating hole than at 
the assumed crack tip at the centre of the hole base. This indicated that the cracks will 
propagate from corners at an angle of 45o. All of that led to work on a multi-hole 
geometry with ten successive holes. 
7.7.2 Multi-Holes Geometry 
This geometry consists of ten successive holes, the distance between the first/last hole 
and the edge of the geometry is 5mm, and the distance between any two adjacent holes 
is 10mm. The displacement in the geometry results from the deformation due to the 
exerted pressure wave pulse, the Von Mises stress, and the stress intensity factor for 
the three magnitudes of pressure found in chapter five. 
7.7.2.1 Displacement 
Figures 7.9 to 7.11 show the displacement in the x-direction for the three cases of 
applied pressure. The displacement increases with the increase of exerted pressure 
wave value. The increase in displacement increases the probability of rock crushing. 
Depending on the porosity in the shale formation, the displacement decays away from 
the surface affected by the wave. The deeper the crushed layer is, the more gas is 
allowed to flow out and the more likely to form cracks. In addition to the possibility 
of taking advantage of the produced fine particles as plugs to keep the cracks open. 
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Figure 7.9 Displacement in the x-direction at p=50bar. 
 
Figure 7.10 Displacement in the x-direction at p=70bar. 
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Figure 7.11 Displacement in the x-direction at p=90bar. 
 
Figure 7.12 Displacement in the y-direction at p=90bar. 
The displacement in the y-direction, shown in figure 7.12, is only 1% of the 
displacement in the x-direction, and its effect is confined to a narrow area located at 
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the top of the perforating hole. Therefore, the y-direction displacement can be 
neglected. 
7.7.2.2 Von Mises Stresses 
One of the most commonly used criteria for elasticity is the Von Mises criterion. As it 
was mentioned previously, a material can fail despite the tensile strength reaches the 
yield point. Figures 7.13 to 7.15 show the Von Mises stress for the three cases of 
applied pressure. It is found that the area at the corners of perforating hole is highly 
influenced by the exerted load. On the other hand, the region slightly after the crack 
tip area is susceptible to compression stresses. As the shale rock is a layered material, 
it is assumed that the cracks will eventually propagate transversely, parallel to bedding 
[123]. Thus, it is believed that the cracks are propagating in the area between holes.  
The Von Mises stress contours, shown in figures 7.13 to 7.15, show that the maximum 
equivalent stress concentrated at the corners are moving up and down away from the 
hole, to meet the stresses formed due to the exerted load on the adjacent hole in the 
area between the two holes. 
 
Figure 7.13 Von Mises stress at p=50bar. 
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Figure 7.14 Von Mises stress at p=70bar. 
 
Figure 7.15 Von Mises stress at p=90bar. 
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7.7.2.3 Stress Intensity Factor 
Stress intensity factor calculations are carried out under the three cases of pressure to 
examine the likelihood of the pre-crack to propagate. As the model was built in 2-
dimensional system, mode III, tearing mode, is neglected. Also, mode II, shearing 
mode, is unlikely to occur due to the bedding nature of the rocks. Therefore, only mode 
I, opening mode, of stress intensity factors were presented in this part of the study. 
Stress is a quantity that is proportional to the forces causing a deformation, and stress 
intensity factor is directly proportional to the external forces applied. Hence, their 
behaviour was similar to some extent. 
Figures 7.16 to 7.18 are the illustrative contours for stress intensity factors at the area 
surrounding the pre-crack for the three cases of applied pressure waves. Again, the 
maximum values of SIF were close to the perforating hole corners and moving in an 
inclined angle away from them. The contours indicate, once again, that the area 
between two holes from the crack tip level and away is more likely to grow cracks. 
 
Figure 7.16 Stress intensity factor at p=50bar. 
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Figure 7.17 Stress intensity factor at p=70bar. 
 
Figure 7.18 Stress intensity factor at p=90bar. 
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7.7.3 Results Along Paths 
In order to compare among the three cases of applied pressure, stress intensity factors 
and Von Mises stress are measured along the four paths mentioned previously. The 
results are depicted with respect to the distance along the path to compare them with 
the fracture toughness and tensile strength of shale rock. 
For all chosen paths, the results showed that the stress intensity factor is much higher 
than the fracture toughness of the material. This satisfies the linear elastic fracture 
mechanics (LEFM) theory threshold of crack growth for brittle materials, equation 
2.16 [118], [122]. However, Von Mises stresses were found to exceed the shale rock 
tensile strength only when the exerted pressure is 70bar and 90bar. Yet, this is only 
achieved from a certain distance from the beginning of geometry, which ascertained 
the Von Mises stress distribution shown in figures 7.13 to 7.15. 
7.7.3.1 Horizontal Crack Tip Path 
This path is starting from the crack tip and ends at the other end of the geometry. The 
Von Mises stress and stress intensity factor are shown in figures 7.19 and 7.20, 
respectively. The Von Mises stress is found to be very high at the crack tip, then it 
decreases sharply due to the compression stresses, produced as a result of exerted load, 
in the vicinity of the crack tip. As a consequence, the SIF was high at the crack tip and 
low in the area around it. The stress gradually increases as the path moves away from 
the crack tip until it stabilises. 
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Figure 7.19 Von Mises stress for horizontal crack tip path. 
 
Figure 7.20 Stress intensity factor for horizontal crack tip path. 
7.7.3.2 Horizontal Edge Path 
This path starts from the left edge of the geometry and ends with the right one. The 
Von Mises stress and stress intensity factor are shown in figures 7.21 and 7.22, 
respectively. The stress decreases along the region between two holes until it reaches 
its minimum before the hole base. The equivalent stress starts to increase along the x-
axis until it hits its maximum at x=0.14m, to face a slight drop followed by a uniform 
value along the remaining distance. Results demonstrated that the stresses varied at 
[123] 
[123] 
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the area around the pre-crack. Thus, it is possible to predict the crack propagation with 
pressure pulse wave applied. The SIFs pass through the same distribution as stresses, 
the only difference was a sharper decline at the hole base area before a further increase. 
 
Figure 7.21 Von Mises stress for a horizontal edge path. 
 
Figure 7.22 Stress intensity factor for a horizontal edge path. 
7.7.3.3 Vertical Crack Tip Path 
To predict the likelihood of propagation in the assumed pre-crack, a vertical path along 
the perforating base passing through the crack tips is taken into account. As it was 
stated above, the Von Mises stress yield for two cases of applied pressure, 70bar and 
90bar, have exceeded the tensile strength, as illustrated in figure 7.23. Results showed 
[123] 
[123] 
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that the stress acts symmetrically on both sides of the crack, which confirms that the 
crack propagates at an angle of 45o. The stress decreases immediately above/beneath 
the crack tip, followed by a small less sharp increase and lesser decrease. The stress 
then increases gradually until the mid-distance between two consecutive holes. The 
acuteness of fluctuations rises with the increases in applied pressure. The SIF, shown 
in figure 7.24, behaves in the same manner of stress with less sharpness. 
 
Figure 7.23 Von Mises stress for vertical crack tip path. 
 
Figure 7.24 Stress intensity factor for vertical crack tip path. 
 
 
 
[123] 
[123] 
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7.7.3.4 Vertical Edge Path 
The other vertical path was at the right end of the geometry, at about 3.90m from the 
crack tip. On this path, figures 7.25 and 7.26, no palpable change in stresses or SIF is 
found, which clarify the influence of crack on stress distribution. 
 
Figure 7.25 Von Mises stress for a vertical edge path. 
 
Figure 7.26 Stress intensity factor for a vertical edge path. 
  Conclusions 
The simulation results show that the crack propagation model behaves reasonable and 
simulations with this model show promising results for two cases of pressure pulse 
[123] 
[123] 
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waves obtained from deflagration to detonation transition simulations. Results 
demonstrated that stresses are concentrated at perforating hole base corners rather than 
the centre of it. Although it is impossible to predict the crack propagation angle, stress 
illustrative contour and stress distribution along the path vertical to the assumed crack 
tip showed that there is a high probability that the crack will propagate at an angle of 
45o. However, it is believed that the orientation of the bedding will force the crack to 
propagate transversely. Figure 7.27 shows the prospective crack propagation path. 
 
Figure 7.27 Prospective crack propagation path. 
The stress intensity factor was found to satisfy the LEFM theory threshold of crack 
propagation for brittle material. This means that the likelihood of crack propagation is 
very high everywhere in the simulated geometry for all the three cases of applied loads. 
Also, results showed the clear influence of the proposed pre-crack on the stress and 
SIF. So that no changes were observed in stress or SIF along the vertical edge path. 
 Summary 
ANSYS Parametric Design Language was used to find the effect of pressure pulse 
wave produced by the detonation tube simulated in chapter five. A 2-dimentional 
geometry of 0.11m ×4m with shale rock properties obtained from literature was used. 
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Ten perforating holes were assumed to create pre-cracks at the base of the hole. Three 
different pressure (50, 70, 90) bar were applied on the geometry to calculate the Von 
Mises stress and stress intensity factor all over the geometry. Also, four paths, two 
horizontals and two verticals, were used to investigate the stresses and SIFs behaviour 
along them. 
Results showed that there is a high probability for crack to propagates as a result of 
applied load. The SIF was higher than the critical fracture toughness everywhere over 
the geometry for all the applied load cases. However, only two cases of pressure 
achieved equivalent stress as higher than the tensile strength of shale rock. One of the 
highest challenges in crack propagation studies is the direction that the crack will take. 
As this work is dealing with a natural rock formation, two factors will highly influence 
crack direction. The first is the orientation of the bedding and the second is the natural 
cracks that already exist in the formation. The stress and SIF distribution demonstrated 
that the crack more likely will propagate at an angle of 45o, which indicates there is a 
high chance that cracks from adjacent holes will intersect and take the same path.
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8 Chapter 8 General 
Discussions 
 The Importance of Shale Gas 
Europe is the third largest energy consumer in the world, it is heavily dependent on 
imported natural gas. The three European Commission goals, economic 
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability, are only applicable in case 
Europe produced its own fossil fuel. Shale gas is one of the scenarios that would 
decrease Europe dependence on imported gas. Although shale gas production is 
unlikely to give the energy security desired for the whole Europe, it will make a 
difference for the communities that will adopt it. In the light of the UK’s decreasing 
energy security due to depleting North Sea reserves and a want for energy dependence, 
the procurement of shale gas is becoming a critical issue. 
The importance of shale gas extraction lies in two main topics, economic and 
environmental. The domestic shale gas production has two economic impacts on 
society, direct by reducing dependence on gas imports and indirect by creating 
employment for the local work force as well as its impact on energy market. The 
environmental aspect is that the use of natural gas together with or replacing of other 
fossil fuel lead to a reducing of harmful pollutant emissions. 
However, the current highly risks recovery technique, hydraulic fracturing, led to 
explore for further techniques to recover shale. This has led engineers to design and 
produce new shale recovery techniques which are Non-Aqueous in their nature, 
reducing the overall environmental impact. 
 Proposed Appliance 
The idea of the system is to use pulse detonation for the increase of pressure at variable 
frequencies in order to crack shale rock for gas recovery. The system is developed 
from the Explosion/Propellant Systems so that it is capable of improving the control 
of pressure wave characteristics, frequency, amplitude and location. The idea was to 
produce an extensive high-pressure wave at the base of the well bore using detonation. 
This technique might overcome both small distance fracturing for fracturing with 
dynamics loading and the environmental disadvantages of fracking, which could allow 
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the propagation of longer localised cracks with higher extraction rates. Shale gas from 
the well will be used as the main fuel in combination with pure oxygen fed from the 
surface. 
Deflagration to detonation transition involves initiating a deflagration, the flame then 
accelerates due to turbulence. Detonation phenomena is influenced by a number of 
factors, including the equivalence fuel air ratio, the diameter and length of the 
confinement tube and the presence of obstacles. In order to reduce the size of the 
system, detonation tubes would be equipped with specially shaped obstacles used to 
improve detonation, whilst a multiple ignition system might provide higher energy to 
the mixture to reduce the length of the transition process, topic left for future work. 
Experiments are held in a 21.2mm inner diameter seamless circular stainless-steel pipe 
with 1500mm length to achieve the deflagration to detonation transition. 
The hazard and operability (HAZOP) study performed for initial bests divided the 
experimental rig into four parts. The first part consists of pipe lines delivering different 
fuel gases to the second part, a mixing chamber. Because of its violent reaction nature, 
oxygen will be delivered to the third part immediately, which is the main body where 
detonation is generated. The fourth part comprises measurement instruments and an 
exhaust tank. The detonation tube is operated in single shot mode. 
To predict the viability of shale gas to detonate and thermophysical properties of 
detonated shale gas, which were the guide in choosing the detonation tube 
specifications, two numerical codes were used, GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro. Another 
software, OpenFOAM, was used to be the guide for the best obstacles configuration 
which could reduce the deflagration to detonation distance and increase the produced 
pressure wave. 
 Shale Gas Viability for Detonation 
The three shale gas composition suggested by Stamford et al. [116] are used to 
numerically calculate the ability of shale gas to detonate. Pure oxygen is used to 
increase the chances of detonation and to increase the produced pressure pulse. The 
initial pressure and temperature are assumed to be 101.325bar and 300K respectively.  
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Using pure oxygen as oxidiser facilitated all the three shale gas scenarios detonation. 
Blends have exceeded the detonation speed threshold, which is 2300m/s as stated by 
literatures [93], [148], over fuel volume ratios ranging between 30% to 50%. Products 
dissociation associated with the use of pure oxygen led to shift the maximum 
detonation velocity to the rich side, achieving it at a fuel concentration of 47%.  
Both GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro codes show similar pressure behaviour and the 
values correspond well. However, the higher detailed combustion reaction mechanism 
used with CHEMKIN-Pro has caused the pressure values to rise up to 5% higher than 
the corresponding calculated using GASEQ. Again, pure oxygen and the increase of 
hydrogen concentration in product species led to shift the maximum pressure to the 
rich side. As the off-stoichiometric mixtures burn cooler than stoichiometric mixtures, 
this would be an advantage as it makes system cooling easier. In addition to the ease 
of detonating oxyfuel mixtures, the presence of pure oxygen will increase the product 
pressure by about 50% at the maximum products pressure. 
 Viability Enhancement  
It has been shown in many experiments that in smooth channels without obstacles only 
turbulent deflagration regimes can be achieved. The presence of obstacles in pipes 
containing moving flames exerts a strong influence on the flame propagation through 
causing rapid flame acceleration and increase the turbulence. Turbulence will increase 
the surface area of the flame and the transport of local mass and energy which will 
increase the local burning rate. Finally, a higher flow velocity in the unburned gas will 
trigger detonation. 
A two-dimensional CFD simulations of the deflagration to detonation transition at 
stoichiometric conditions for hydrogen/air mixture using OpenFOAM toolbox were 
used to examine the obstacle geometry effect on deflagration to detonation transition 
and produced pressure waves. Hydrogen/air was used to reduce computational time 
while understanding the effects of different obstacles. The shape and layout of 
obstacles were found to have a significant effect on flame acceleration, and subsequent 
detonation propagation. The interaction of transverse pressure waves generated at the 
obstructions govern the propagation mechanism. The transverse waves, and its 
frequency appears to play a pivotal role in supporting the detonation wave. 
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Three kinds of obstacles were used here to increase the flame turbulence, rectangular, 
semi-circular and triangular cross-sections. Nine obstacles distributed along the tube 
at equal distance apart. The blockage ratio and location of obstacles were kept constant 
for every configuration. The run-up distance required for deflagration to transform 
into detonation and the produced pressure pulse were the two major features being 
explored to be enhanced here. 
8.4.1 DDT Distance 
The DDT distance, also known as predetonation distance, is the distance required for 
deflagration to transform into detonation. It is influenced by several factors, but the 
most dominant one is turbulence. The dimensions and shape of the obstacle surface 
have influenced the turbulence as well as the strength and shape of reflected waves. 
Detonation has been achieved in all the three configurations, the difference was where 
and when it was triggered. The shortest DDT distances were achieved with the 
triangular obstacles, at 77% of total length of the tube. Yet, the pressure accomplished 
was the least among the three configurations, and it was reached by the end of the 
tube. For the rectangular obstacles, detonation was achieved at 79% of tube total 
length. The maximum pressure with these obstacles was achieved at the same time and 
place. Finally, detonation triggered almost by the end of tube, i.e. 95% of total length, 
showed the highest pressure among the three configurations. 
The degree of induced recirculation produced by increasing drag due to sharp edges, 
in addition to the separation point and its effect on the induced vortex behind the 
obstacle were the main motives behind velocity leap in tubes with polygon obstacles. 
The Rayleigh-Taylor and the Kelvin-Helmholtz instabilities decreased with the 
absence of sharp edges in semicircular obstacles, in addition to the shorter 
recirculation zone prevented rapid flame speed development. Thus, detonation 
necessitated longer time and distance to be triggered with those configurations. 
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8.4.2 Pressure Pulse Wave 
The semicircular obstacles recorded the highest pressure among the three 
configurations. The merge between progressive development of velocity and pressure 
along the tube and the consolidated reflected shocks by the end of tube thrusted the 
pressure at the exit. The absence of sharp edges reduced the induced vortex behind the 
obstacle which in turn reduced the turbulence and caused a moderate growth of flame 
propagation rate. 
Although the pressure accomplished with rectangular obstacles was less than the 
pressure accomplished with semicircular obstacles, the length of tube to reach the 
maximum pressure was only 79% of the total length of the tube. This means the system 
could be shorter with rectangular obstacles. Another advantage of using rectangular 
obstacles is the time required to complete the combustion and reach detonation and 
maximum pressure. It is found that the tube with rectangular obstacles reaches the end 
of tube at 97% of the time required for triangular obstacles, while it is only required 
85% for semicircular obstacles. On the other hand, the time required to hit maximum 
pressure was 95% with triangular obstacles and 89% for semicircular obstacles. This 
could create an opportunity to increase the pressure pulse frequency. 
 Shale Rocks 
A very good potential of shale gas extraction has been found the region known as the 
Bowland-Hodder area. It is estimated that there could be 200tcf of gas hiding in the 
Bowland shale. Also, there is a good prospect for shale extraction in regions close to 
South Wales. Therefore, some works have been performed to determine the potential 
of shale gas production in the Dullais Valley, South of Wales. It was found through 
several tests using BS standard volatile analyses, Transmission Electron Microscopy 
and pyrolysis RockEval evaluation that the potential of extraction in this region is fair, 
with similar concentrations of pyrite but with low energy content compared to those 
resources located in the Midlands and Yorkshire. 
The results of the volatile contents test showed that the shale rock samples may contain 
sufficient hydrocarbons for them to be source rocks. However, samples taken from 
South Wales region showed the lowest volatile organic contents percentage in the 
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batch. This gave an indication of a poor/fair content of hydrocarbons in this region. 
The RockEval pyrolysis evaluation indicated that the amount of organic matter in the 
samples go from fair to very good. Yet, the samples from Dulais Valley showed the 
lowest content of the thermo-labile hydrocarbons (S1) and hydrocarbons from 
cracking of kerogen (S2). The amount of Fe in the South Wales samples is much higher 
than those in the Bowland-Hodder region. On the other hand, S is at the lowest level, 
thus showing that the extraction of the shale in this region would be less damaging in 
terms of acid content coming from this molecule. 
In general, the tests showed that the rocks have poor potential for the production of 
gas, which means that this region possesses low potential for extraction. Also, the 
rocks seem to have higher levels of Fe. Nevertheless, the low S indicates that these are 
not bounded as FeS or FeS2, and probably a cleaner extraction could take place. This 
is also dependent on the amount of other molecules such as gypsum, which seem 
higher in South Wales, thus setting non-aqueous pulse detonation techniques as a 
potential way to recover shale gas difficult to extract in Wales, with low S polluting 
potential. 
 Cracking Shale Rocks 
In order to investigate the effect of pressure pulse generated by the detonation tube on 
a pre-crack generated by perforating, a 2-dimensional simulation was performed using 
APDL. At first, a single hole geometry was used, but results showed that the cracks 
are more likely to propagate at an angle of 45o at the perforating hole base. Therefore, 
a new ten successively holes geometry was studied. 
Results showed that the layer close to the applied load will be displaced, which means 
that it will be smashed. The displacement decreases with the x-axis. The maximum 
Von Mises stresses were found to concentrate at the corners, while the region 
immediately after the crack tip is susceptible to compression stresses. Same behaviour 
was found for the stress intensity factor. According to that, it is believed that the cracks 
will propagate diagonally from the perforating hole base. However, the nature of the 
shale rocks will eventually force the cracks to propagate transversely, parallel to 
bedding. 
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The linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) theory criterion of crack growth for 
brittle materials, which stated that crack propagates when the stress intensity factor 
exceeds the fracture toughness, was found to be achieved for all the applied pressure 
pulse waves. On the other hand, The Von Mises yield criterion, which stated that a 
material can fail despite none of the individual component stresses exceeded the stress 
threshold for plastic deformation, was found to be achieved only for two cases of the 
applied pressure pulse waves (70bar and 90bar). 
 Summary 
The results of this work show the theoretical feasibility of using pulse detonation 
device to recover shale gas recirculate it for continuous operation. Various geometries 
have also shown different performance, leading to concepts that can be assumed in 
future work, i.e. initial triangular shape obstacles to reduce predetonation distance with 
circular obstacles to increase final pressure. Due to the properties of the wave, cracking 
will be produced with initial smashing of the rock, which leads to believe that reservoir 
of fair shale gas content can be exploited by these means, with an increase of porosity 
product of high temperature, combine with pressure for crack propagation, enabling 
good recovery of gas. Rocks in Wales can be potential receivers of this technology, 
with future research to be done on this topic. 
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9 Chapter 9 Conclusions 
and Recommendations 
 Introduction 
The high responsibility towards climate change and environmental improvement felt 
by Europe communities led to the cessation of shale gas exploitation. This was mainly 
because of the controversially hydraulic fracturing process (Fracking) and its influence 
on a great amount of water, as it will be mixed with an extensive list of manmade 
chemicals, and the likelihood of earthquakes and the damaging effects to the 
environment. All of this led to thinking of alternatives that can be considered as being 
environmentally friendly and improving the efficiency of creating and growing cracks 
in the shale formation. 
The production of high-pressure waves at the base of the well bore by using pulse 
detonation could be a potential technique for shale gas extraction. However, most of 
the processes need to go from deflagration to detonation. This process basically occurs 
due to the intrinsic instability of flame surfaces. The presence of obstacles in the pipes 
causes rapid flame acceleration. Turbulence is the result of those obstacles. 
Turbulence, in turn, increases the local burning rate by increasing both the surface area 
of the flame and the transport of local mass and energy. This leads to higher flow 
velocity in the unburned gas. All of these actions, under appropriate conditions, will 
lead to detonation. 
 0-D & 1-D Numerical Analysis 
Although a number of studies have been conducted on deflagration to detonation 
transition, very limited studies involved oxy-fuel cases. In this study, theoretical 
results, calculated by GASEQ and CHEMKIN-Pro codes, were employed to predict 
the detonation products behaviour over a wide range of total equivalence ratio of 
different shale gas compositions with pure oxygen. The aim was to work on the design 
of new systems capable of fracturing shale rock using these efficient processes. 
Three shale gas scenarios proposed by Stamford and Azapagic [116] are used with 
pure oxygen to achieve the highest pressure in the detonation process. Also, 
hydrogen/air blends have been used for the purposes of comparison. Both codes 
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showed good agreement with each other and with results obtained from the literature. 
The main findings of this work can be summarised as follows: 
❖ The detonation velocity threshold for hydrocarbon/oxygen blend has been 
reached over fuel volume ratios ranging between 30% to 50%. 
❖ The maximum pressure and velocity were achieved with a fuel volume fraction 
that exceeds 40% of the total hydrocarbon/oxygen mixture. 
❖ Using pure oxygen with hydrocarbons increased the detonation velocity by 
about 16% more than the hydrogen/air mixture. However, both mixtures found 
to behave in the same manner over a volume percentage of fuel to total mixture 
ranging between 27% to 47%. 
❖ Using pure oxygen made the pressure to reach its maximum on the rich side of 
stoichiometry. This in turn will produce less chemically reactive products 
which means that the mixture will burn cooler than stoichiometric mixtures. 
❖ Finally, numerical results clearly demonstrated the possibility of detonating all 
the three shale gas scenarios as long as pure oxygen is used as oxidiser. Also, 
it was shown that the worst case, regarding the amount of methane, of shale 
gas composition was the best case of produced pressure, which is the main 
objective to be used in fracturing the shale formation. 
 2-D Numerical Analysis 
A numerical simulation of detonation and deflagration to detonation transition using 
solver developed within the OpenFOAM CFD toolbox has been presented in this 
work. Numerical simulations have been carried out for a number of scenarios 
involving flame propagation and acceleration in obstructed channels. A grid size of 
about 0.5mm is used in these simulations. Three cross-section geometries of obstacles 
were used severally. In order to investigate the effect of geometry, the tube dimensions 
and obstacle locations and configurations kept constant. 
The tube used was 1500mm length and 21.2mm inner diameter, nine obstacles were 
distributed evenly along the tube. The blockage ratio was maintained to be 47%. The 
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observed deflagration to detonation transition phenomena caused by impact reflection 
on walls, transitions resulting from the turbulent flow between leading impulse and 
flame, and transitions triggered by shock-flame interaction. The following are the most 
important conclusion derived from this 2-dimensional numerical simulation work: 
❖ It was impossible to achieve a deflagration to detonation transition within the 
tube when it is free of obstacles. 
❖ The impact of the obstacles was explicit on the flame propagation even before 
their overlap, through the time required the flame to reach the first obstacle. 
The least time has been accomplished with the tube fitted with rectangular 
obstacles, which constituted 67.1% of the total residence time. This was 3% 
earlier than the triangular obstacles and up to 7% the semicircular one. Impact 
then extends along the tube so that the combustion in the tube with rectangular 
obstacles finished 3% earlier than the tube with triangular obstacles, but 15% 
earlier than the tube with semicircular obstacles. 
❖ The presence of edges in obstacles played a pivotal role in the flame 
propagation and the location and time of transition. The sharp edge of 
triangular cross-section obstacle resulted in earlier separation for the flow 
behind the obstacle which influenced the induced vortex and the induced 
recirculation produced by increasing drag. As a result of all this, the shortest 
deflagration to detonation distance was achieved by the tube equipped with 
triangular obstacles. 
❖ The longitudinal deformation of the flame passing through two opposite 
obstacle to the full tube diameter will induce turbulence resulting in two types 
of instability, the Rayleigh-Taylor instability and the Kelvin-Helmholtz 
instability. As the flame front passes the obstacle, it is deviated and folded up 
towards the leeward side of the obstacle to burn the fresh combustible mixture 
that still exists there. This will lead to flame deceleration before every obstacle 
and acceleration while passing through it. That was most obvious with 
semicircular obstacles due to its moderate acceleration along the tube. 
❖ The detonation velocity threshold was exceeded by the end of the tube fitted 
with semicircular obstacles for a short time before the flame decelerates to 
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leave the tube with less velocity. Detonation is achieved earlier and for longer 
time and distance in the tube equipped with rectangular obstacles. Yet, flames 
left the tube with a velocity less than the detonation velocity threshold. Once 
the detonation triggered in the tube fitted with triangular obstacles, which 
necessitated the least distance to be achieved among the three configurations, 
it endured to the end of the tube with a slight drop in flame velocity. 
❖ The curvature surface of the semicircular obstacle and the progressive 
evolution of the flame along the tube, led to a dramatic increase in flame 
pressure when it merged with the consolidated reflected shocks by the end of 
the tube. Thus, the highest pressure was achieved with this configuration. 
 Geological Survey 
As both global and domestic energy usage continue to rise so does the interest in 
alternative sources of fuel. For a number of years, the UK has been heavily reliant on 
natural gas to heat the residential sector, power industries and generate electricity. 
Over the recent decades gas consumption in the UK is risen quite dramatically, a trend 
which is set to continue. This has also met declining outputs from the North Sea, 
forcing most of the supplies to be sought from outside the country through either 
pipeline networks or LNG deliveries. This creates security of supply concerns if either 
of these supply routes are obstructed. It also leaves the country vulnerable to large 
price fluctuations. To combat this, many are looking to explore Britain’s 
‘unconventional gas’ reserves, particularly shale gas. Although shale gas in the UK is 
not as vast as in the USA, China or other countries, there is a considerable potential of 
several trillion cubic feet of the gas in the country. Being one potential candidate to 
fill the increasing demand of fuels in the UK, Wales has also started looking at its 
potential to contribute with this energetic revolution. Although some sites are mature 
enough at the north of Wales, those at the South are still under scrutiny. Therefore, 
some works performed to determine the potential of shale gas production in the Dullais 
Valley, South of Wales, is shown here. It was found through several tests using BS 
standard volatile analyses, Transmission Electron Microscopy and pyrolysis RockEval 
evaluation that the potential of extraction in this region is fair, with similar 
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concentrations of pyrite but with low energy content compared to those resources 
located in the Midlands and Yorkshire. It was found the following: 
❖ The resources in the region are low, with rocks that show a poor potential for 
the production of gas. Comparison with good sources coming from Yorkshire 
and the Midlands gave indication of very low potential for extraction in the 
Dulais Valley. 
❖ In terms of element composition, the rocks seem to have higher levels of Fe. 
However, the low S indicates that these are not bounded as FeS or FeS2, and 
probably a cleaner extraction could take place. This is also dependent on the 
amount of other molecules such as gypsum, which seem higher in South Wales. 
It can be concluded that this region possesses low potential, and although being 
included in the zone of onshore licenses, the benefits of exploitation might not 
be high. 
❖ However, fair content of shale could still be recovered by using non-aqueous 
pulse detonation techniques that could ensure longer, localised crackes at high 
pressure, thus increasing porosity of the rock, while low S content will result 
in cleaner recovery using this technique. 
 Crack Propagation 
The influence of pressure produced by the detonation tube on the rock in shale 
formation were investigated. A two-dimensional study using ANSYS Parameter 
Design Language were performed with shale rock properties to predict the pressure 
pulse generated by the detonation tube on a crack tip which assumed to be created by 
perforating. Three different pressure (50, 70, 90)bar were applied on the geometry to 
calculate the Von Mises stress and stress intensity factor all over the geometry. Also, 
four paths, two horizontals and two verticals, were used to investigate the stresses and 
SIFs behaviour along them. 
The following conclusions were derived: 
❖ The stress intensity factor created by pressure pulse as a load was higher than 
critical fracture toughness everywhere over the geometry for all the applied 
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load cases. This satisfies the LEFM theory of crack propagation for brittle 
material. This means that the rocks are frackable under these pressures. 
❖ However, only two cases of applied pressure achieved equivalent stress higher 
than the tensile strength of sale rock. This means only the 70bar and 90bar will 
satisfy the Von Mises yield criterion for plastic deformation. 
❖ The stress and SIF distribution demonstrated that the crack more likely to 
propagate at an angle of 45o, which indicates there is a high chance that cracks 
from adjacent holes will intersect and take the same path. Yet, two factors will 
highly influence crack direction. Those factors are the orientation of the 
bedding and the natural cracks already exist in the formation. 
 Recommendations for Future Work 
One of the main limiting aspects of the present work was the health and safety 
regulations of the university. Using PURE OXYGEN to generate DETONATION 
imposed us to go through an extensive study for all issues that might be caused by the 
designed system. However, this work has indicated directions for further experimental 
work with flame propagation and deflagration to detonation transition in confined 
space. The most obvious recommendations for further work will be: 
❖ Using the designed and assembled rig to generate detonation using shale gas 
composition suggested by Stamford and Azapagic [116] with the three studied 
obstacles geometry. 
❖ Study the effect of ignition position and timing on the transition process. The 
rig is designed to contain three spark plugs at a different position along the 
tube. 
❖ Investigating the interactions between a flame front and the shock waves. This 
includes both rarefaction and compression waves that reach the flame front 
from both the burnt and unburnt side. These investigations should be 
performed with a high-speed camera and by use of Schlieren techniques. 
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❖ Further numerical analysis using the OpenFOAM code with changing the 
obstacles distribution and using different obstacle geometry at the same time. 
For example, remove the seventh to ninth triangular obstacles and mixing 
between the triangular and semicircular obstacle seeking both short 
deflagration to detonation transition distance and achieving high pressure. 
❖ It is recommended to continue with the research of using low sulphur, fair shale 
gas content rocks, as these could be the potential basins where this technology 
could be profitable, environmental amicable and highly efficient for shale 
recovery. 
❖ Investigating the effect of produced pressure on shale rock by putting a sample 
of rock at the exhaust of detonation tube and do the RockEval pyrolysis to find 
the quantity of gases left and compare it with results were obtained from not 
cracked samples. 
❖ Applying the ANSYS code to investigate the influence of multi pressure pulse 
waves on a row of perforating holes and find the interaction between 
propagating cracks for adjacent holes. 
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HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET
Page no:
DESIGN INTENT: To deliver Ammomia gas at 100% to the mixing chamber at various concentrations and flow rates up to 3bar pressure for various experimental conditions.
Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, ZA-D
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1a  Ammonia Delivery System (Gas Cylinder to Mixing Chamber) (Future Plans) 
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More
Excess Ammonia gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
2 Flow Less
Insufficient Ammonia gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve not left open for 
long enough
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
3 Flow No No Ammonia gas flowing
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
Ammonia gas flowing in 
opposite direction
Faulty NRV, Dirt in 
line
2 1 2 Investigate possible solutions AVM
5 Flow Other than
O2 capable of entering 
line
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4
Safety issue  -- O2 entering 
ammonia line -- consequence 
is explosion. Separate 
dedicated O2 line required.
AVM
6 Flow As well as
Ammonia gas and another 
gas entering the same 
tube
Failure of NRV 3 1 3 ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
Ammonia gas flowing 
earlier then needed
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed to provide visual 
confirmation.
Potential Explosion NRV's in place
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / O2 
could lead to an 
explosion
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Standard Operating Procedure 
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8 Flow Later than
Possible for O2 first then 
ammonia
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3
Investigate possible solutions 
to valve sequencing
AVM
9 Flow Where else
Ammonia flowing 
elsewhere 
Leak 3 3 9 Gas detectors & alarm ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of Ammonia Not 100% Ammonia 3 1 3
Test composition of gas 
tanks/gas from lines to ensure 
correct gas used. 
ZA-D
11 Pressure More
Higher pressure then 
required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9
Investigate available 
equipment
AVM
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Leak / equipment fault 3 1 3 ZA-D
13 Pressure No No pressure change
No supply gas, 
blockage
3 1 3
Maintenance & pre 
experimental checks schedule 
required.
ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Pressure decrease Leak 3 1 3 Gas detectors & alarm ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 O2 line to be seperated
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Partial pressure Mechanical Failure 3 2 6 Gas detectors & alarm ZA-D
Release of Ammonia 
into the atmosphere 
and/or contamination of 
other gas lines
Pre experimental checks. SOP.
Same pressure in pipe as 
mixing chamber so gas 
won't flow
Check regulators, gas supply
Loss of gas to the 
atmosphere, 
Pre experimental checks and alarmed 
room to detect gas, 
Gas flow too early, 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Poor supply Check with supplier
Potential VZ zone too 
large
Maximum output regulators / PRV
Lower pressure then 
mixture so backflow 
could occur
Non Return valves in place
Potential Explosion
Follow experimental procedure and 
check gas supply
Release of Ammonia 
into the atmosphere 
and/or contamination of 
other gas lines
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Gas flow too late, 
incorrect mix of gases
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19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Human error -- 
procedural, External 
stimulus
3 3 9 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Human error -- 
procedural, External 
stimulus
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Rapid pressure 
change, external 
stimulus
3 1 3 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural, External 
stimulus
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
Spark created. 2 4 8 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition prior to 
detonation
Ignition in detonation 
tube prior to purge 
and valve shutdown
2 4 8 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Delayed ignition after 
detonation
2 2 4 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere
Spark created outside 
pipeline 
2 4 8 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 Investigate possible solution AVM
29 Composition Less Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas
Incorrect gas tank 
connected to pipeline
2 2 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
Ammonia and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 Procedure document ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Check gas lines prior to start up. SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
NRV's, SOP
Degredation of valve 
seals
Redesign of N2 purge. Investigate 
seal material compatability
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
If flammable gas is 
present it may be 
ignited.
Non spark tools, gas sensors
Ignition of gases leading 
to explosion.
Purge lines with N2, Flash Back 
Arrestor, NRVs, SOP, 
Pre-ignition Flash back arrestor
Ignition of leftover gases 
leading to explosion.
Purge lines with N2, Flash Back 
Arrestor, NRVs, SOP, 
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33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 2 6 Gas sensor ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 3 1 3 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 2 4 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation
Ignition source in 
pipe, spark
2 4 8 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation 2 3 6 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation 1 3 3 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra
Failure of 
valves/valves left open 
and purge stage 
skipped
2 4 8 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation 
Electrical fault with 
ignition plugs
2 4 8 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation 2 4 8 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere
Detonation in the 
atmosphere, spark
2 2 4 ZA-D
48 Frequency More Increased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
Ignition of the 
atmospheric air
Gas detectors, Non spark tools
Explosion and damage 
to equipment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Explosion occurs before 
purge stage
Explosion Flash Back Arrestor, 
Flash Back Arrestor, 
Air (O2) entering 
pipeline, contaminating 
the gas and may lead to 
explosion.
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure.
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
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49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief Equipment failure 2 3 6 Investigate possible solution AVM
54 Relief No No Relief 2 3 6 AVM
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
2 3 6
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/ erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 Maintenance Schedule
60 Corrosion/ erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 Maintenance Schedule ZA-D
61 Corrosion/ erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 Maintenance Schedule ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Leak check procedures to be put in 
place / maintenance schedule 
required
Damage to system and 
leaks
Leak check procedures to be put in 
place / maintenance schedule 
required
DSEAR zone calcs to be carried out.
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Equipment / personal 
damage
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Leak check procedures to be put in 
place / maintenance schedule 
Creation of flammable 
atmosphere when it 
relieves -- fire and 
explosion
DSEAR zone calcs to be carried out.
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64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2
Standard Operating Procedure 
to be written
ZA-D
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
relayed
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
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74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced AVM
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule AVM
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule GH/MS
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
deteriorates
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
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88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off AVM
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of protection 3 3 9 AVM
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3
Alarm and Gas sensors in the 
room
GH/MS
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel
PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Risk assessment. Clothing.
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel
PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Risk assessment. Clothing.
Hazardous to personel
PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Risk assessment. Clothing.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
steps/equipment, 
experiment takes much 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
measures.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Non Spark Tools, gas sensors
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
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102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
A10
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DESIGN INTENT: To deliver Methane gas at 100% to the mixing chamber at various concentrations and flow rates up to 3bar pressure for various experimental conditions.
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1b Methane Delivery System (Gas Cylinder to Mixing Chamber) Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More
Excess Methane gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
2 Flow Less
Insufficient Methane gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve not left open for 
long enough
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
3 Flow No
No Methane entering 
mixing chamber
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
Methane gas flowing the 
opposite direction.
Pressure differential in 
pipe
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering line
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating procedure required. AVM
6 Flow As well as
Methane and another gas 
entering the same line
Failure of NRV 3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
Methane flowing earlier 
then required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
Methane flowing later 
then required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
9 Flow Where else
Methane flowing 
elsewhere
Leak, incorrect supply 
pipe connected
3 3 9
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of Methane Not 100% Methane 3 1 3
Test composition of gas 
tanks/gas from lines to ensure 
correct gas used. 
ZA-D
11 Pressure More Possible Human Error 3 3 9
Investigate possible equipment 
solutions -- BOC
AVM
Potential VZ zone too 
large
Maximum Output regs. Check 
operating pressures of flowmeters 
with manufacturer -- information to 
be placed in Technical File
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure and 
check gas supply
Release of Methane into 
the atmosphere and/or 
contamination of other 
gas lines
Pre experimental checks and ensure 
correct gas tanks used
Poor supply Check with supplier
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
NRVs in place.
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre experimental checks and follow 
experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre experimental checks and follow 
experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed.
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
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12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3
Check all equipment is of a 
certain spec.
ZA-D
13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3
Maintenance & pre 
experimental checks schedule 
required.
ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Pressure decrease Leak 3 1 3 Gas Sensor & alarm ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 2 6 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 2 6 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 3 2 6 ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
3 3 9 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
Spark created. 2 4 8 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
Ignition in detonation 
tube prior to purge 
and valve shutdown
2 4 8 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
2 2 4 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere
Spark created outside 
pipeline 
2 4 8 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 AVM
If flammable gas is 
present it may be 
Non spark tools, gas sensors
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Ignition of gases leading 
to explosion.
Purge lines with N2, Flash Back 
Arrestor, NRVs, SOP, 
Ignition of leftover gases 
leading to explosion.
Purge lines with N2, Flash Back 
Arrestor, NRVs, SOP, 
Release of Methane into 
the atmosphere and/or 
Pre experimental checks. SOP.
Pre-ignition Flash Back Arrestor
Loss of gas to the Pre experimental checks and alarmed 
Gas flow too early, 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Gas flow too late, 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Lower pressure then 
mixture so backflow 
NRVs in place 
Same pressure in pipe as 
mixing chamber so gas 
won't flow
Check regulators, gas supply
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29 Composition Less Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas
Incorrect gas tank 
connected to pipeline
2 2 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
Methane and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 Procedure document ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 2 6 Gas sensor ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 3 1 3 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 2 4 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation
Ignition source in 
pipe, spark
2 4 8 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation 2 3 6 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation 1 3 3 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as
Detonation in shock tube 
and pipeline 
Failure of 
valves/valves left open 
and purge stage 
skipped
2 4 8 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation 
Electrical fault with 
ignition plugs
2 4 8 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation 2 4 8 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere
Detonation in the 
atmosphere, spark
2 2 4 ZA-D
Ignition of the 
atmospheric air
Gas detectors, Non spark tools
Explosion and damage 
to equipment
Standard Operating Procedure, Flash 
back arrestor
Explosion occurs before 
purge stage
Flash Back Arrestor, 
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure.
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Explosion Flash Back Arrestor, 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Air entering pipeline, 
contaminating the gas 
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
NRV's, SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Check gas lines prior to start up. SOP
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48 Frequency More Increased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6 ZA-D
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief Equipment failure 2 3 6 ZA-D
54 Relief No No Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
Leak 2 3 6 ZA-D
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief
PRV set to the wrong 
pressure, Leak
2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere
Leak, Faulty 
equipment
2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Equipment / personal Pressure relief required to protect 
Overpressure leading to Pressure relief required to protect 
DSEAR zone calcs to be carried out.
Potential flammable DSEAR zone calcs to be checked
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66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
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77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off AVM
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
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91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1
Review of all safety 
steps/equipment
ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of protection 3 3 9 AVM
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3
Alarm and Gas sensors in the 
room
GH/MS
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel
PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Risk assessment. Clothing.
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Non Spark Tools, gas sensors
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
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DESIGN INTENT: To deliver Ethane gas at 100% to the mixing chamber at various concentrations and flow rates up to 3bar pressure for various experimental conditions.
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1c Ethane Delivery System (Gas Cylinder to Mixing Chamber) Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More
Excess Ethane gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
2 Flow Less
Insufficient Ethane gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve not left open for 
long enough
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
3 Flow No
No Ethane entering 
mixing chamber
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
Ethane gas flowing the 
opposite direction.
Pressure differential in 
pipe
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering line
Human Error - 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating procedure required. AVM
6 Flow As well as
Ethane and another gas 
entering the same line
Mechanical failure 3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
Ethane flowing earlier 
then required
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
Ethane flowing later then 
required
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
9 Flow Where else Ethane flowing elsewhere
Leak/ incorrect pipe 
connected
3 3 9
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of Ethane
Obstruction in pipe, 
valve not fully open
3 1 3
Test composition of gas 
tanks/gas from lines to ensure 
correct gas used. 
ZA-D
11 Pressure More Possible Human Error 3 3 9
Investigate possible equipment 
solutions -- BOC
AVM
Potential VZ zone too 
large
Maximum Output regs. Check 
operating pressures of flowmeters 
with manufacturer -- information to 
be placed in Technical File
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure and 
check gas supply
Release of Ethane into 
the atmosphere and/or 
Pre experimental checks and ensure 
correct gas tanks used
Poor supply Check with supplier
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
NRVs in place
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre experimental checks and follow 
experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre experimental checks and follow 
experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed to provide visual 
confirmation.
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
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12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3
Check all equipment is of a 
certain spec.
ZA-D
13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3
Maintenance & pre 
experimental checks schedule 
required.
ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Presure decrease Human Error 3 1 3 ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 2 6 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 2 6 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 3 2 6 ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
3 3 9 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
Spark created. 2 4 8 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
Ignition in detonation 
tube prior to purge 
and valve shutdown
2 4 8 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
2 2 4 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere
Spark created outside 
pipeline 
2 4 8 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 AVM
If flammable gas is 
present it may be 
Non spark tools, gas sensors
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Ignition of gases leading 
to explosion.
Purge lines with N2, Flash Back 
Arrestor, NRVs, SOP, 
Ignition of leftover gases 
leading to explosion.
Purge lines with N2, Flash Back 
Arrestor, NRVs, SOP, 
Pre-ignition Flash Back Arrestor
Loss of gas to the Pre experimental checks and alarmed 
Gas flow too early, 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Gas flow too late 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Lower pressure then 
mixture so backflow 
NRVs in place 
Same pressure in pipe as 
mixing chamber so gas 
won't flow
Check regulators, gas supply
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29 Composition Less Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas
Incorrect gas tank 
connected to pipeline
2 2 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
Ethane and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 Procedure document ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 2 6 Gas sensor ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 3 1 3 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 2 4 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation
Ignition source in 
pipe, spark
2 4 8 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation 2 3 6 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation 1 3 3 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra
Failure of 
valves/valves left open 
and purge stage 
skipped
2 4 8 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation 
Electrical fault with 
ignition plugs
2 4 8 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation 2 4 8 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere
Detonation in the 
atmosphere, spark
2 2 4 ZA-D
Ignition of the 
atmospheric air
Gas detectors, Non spark tools
Explosion and damage 
to equipment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Explosion occurs before 
purge stage
Flash Back Arrestor, 
Flash back arrestor
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure.
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Explosion Flash Back Arrestor, 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Air entering pipeline, 
contaminating the gas
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
NRV's, SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Check gas lines prior to start up. SOP
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48 Frequency More Increased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief Equipment failure 2 3 6 ZA-D
54 Relief No No Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
Leak 2 3 6
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Leak check procedures to be put in 
place / maintenance schedule 
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Overpressure, Pressure relief required to protect 
Overpressure, Pressure relief required to protect 
DSEAR zone calcs to be carried out.
Potential flammable DSEAR zone calcs to be checked
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67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too Early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
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78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off AVM
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
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92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of protection 3 3 9 AVM
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3
Alarm and Gas sensors in the 
room
GH/MS
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Non Spark Tools, gas sensors
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
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DESIGN INTENT: To deliver CO2 gas at 100% to the mixing chamber at various concentrations and flow rates up to 3bar pressure for various experimental conditions.
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1d CO2 Delivery System (Gas Cylinder to Mixing Chamber) Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More
Excess CO2 gas entering 
mixing chamber
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 ZA-D
2 Flow Less
Insufficient CO2 gas 
entering mixing chamber
Valve not left open for 
long enough
3 1 3 ZA-D
3 Flow No
No CO2 entering mixing 
chamber
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
CO2 gas flowing the 
opposite direction.
Pressure differential in 
pipe
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering line
Human Error - 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
6 Flow As well as
CO2 and another gas 
entering the same tube
Mechanical failure 3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
CO2 flowing earlier then 
needed
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
CO2 flowing later then 
required
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 Operating procedure required. ZA-D
9 Flow Where else CO2 flowing elsewhere 
Leak/ incorrect pipe 
connected
3 3 9
Maintenance schedule 
required.
ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of CO2
Obstruction in pipe, 
valve not fully open
3 1 3
Test composition of gas 
tanks/gas from lines to ensure 
correct gas used. 
ZA-D
11 Pressure More
Higher pressure then 
required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9 ZA-D
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3
Check all equipment is of a 
certain spec.
ZA-D
Overpressure Pressure relief valve
Lower pressure then 
mixture so backflow 
NRVs in place 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure and 
check gas supply
Release of CO2 into the 
atmosphere and/or 
Pre experimental checks and ensure 
correct gas tanks used
Poor supply Check with supplier
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
NRVs in place
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre experimental checks and follow 
experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre experimental checks and follow 
experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed to provide visual 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Follow experimental procedure
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13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3
Maintenance & pre 
experimental checks schedule 
required.
ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Pressure decrease Human Error 3 1 3 ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 2 6 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 2 6 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 3 2 6 ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
1 1 1 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
1 1 1 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
1 1 1 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere Spark 2 4 8 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
29 Composition Less Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
CO2 doesn't combust
Ignition in detonation 
tube
Flash back arrestor, Standard 
operating procedure, Shut off valve, 
Incorrect mix of gases in Cylinder checks -- see notes
CO2 doesn't combust
CO2 doesn't combust
Loss of CO2 to the 
atmosphere and/or other 
Pre experimental checks. SOP.
CO2 doesn't combust
Loss of gas to the Pre experimental checks and alarmed 
Gas flow too early, 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Gas flow too late, 
incorrect mix of gases
Pressure Relief Valve
Same pressure in pipe as 
mixing chamber so gas 
won't flow
Check regulators, gas supply
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31 Composition Other than Different gas
Incorrect gas tank 
connected to pipeline
2 2 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
CO2 and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 Procedure document ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 2 6 Gas sensor ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 3 1 3 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 2 4 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra 0 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere 2 2 4 ZA-D
48 Frequency More Increased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more 3 2 6 ZA-D
CO2 doesn't combust
CO2 doesn't combust
CO2 doesn't combust
CO2 doesn't combust
CO2 doesn't combust
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Tampered experimental 
results as gas isn't pure.
Pre experimental checks. SOP
CO2 doesn't combust
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Air entering pipeline, 
contaminating the gas 
Pre experimental checks. SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
NRV's, SOP
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber
Check gas lines prior to start up. SOP
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51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6 ZA-D
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
54 Relief No No Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
2 3 6 ZA-D
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Damage to components PRV
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68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
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79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
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92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of Protection 3 3 9 ZA-D
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3 ZA-D
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
mixing chamber / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
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DESIGN INTENT: To provide purge gas to the manifold system
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1e Nitrogen purge to system Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More Excess N2 gas 
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 PRV to be fitted
2 Flow Less Possible Human Error 3 1 3 Rotameter to be fitted AVM
3 Flow No No N2 entering system
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
N2 gas flowing the 
opposite direction.
Pressure differential in 
pipe
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering line
Human Error - 
procedural
2 2 4 ZA-D
6 Flow As well as
N2 and another gas 
entering the same tube
Mechanical failure 3 1 3 ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
N2 flowing earlier then 
needed
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
N2 flowing later then 
required
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 ZA-D
9 Flow Where else N2 flowing elsewhere 
Leak/ incorrect pipe 
connected
3 1 3 Gas Detector ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of N2
Obstruction in pipe, 
valve not fully open
3 1 3 ZA-D
11 Pressure More Possible
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 PRV to be fitted AVM
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3 ZA-D
13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3 ZA-D
Overpressure Pressure relief valve 
Incorrect purge of 
system as flow is 
Pressure checks, Maintenance 
No flow, no purge of 
system, potential 
detonation in pipelines
Pressure checks, Maintenance 
Purge of system too late, 
leading to detonation of 
gas in pipelines
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system and/or 
release of N2 to the 
Maintenance checks 
Incorrect purge of 
system as flow is 
insufficient
Maintenance checks 
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Incorrect composition of 
gas to ensure safe purge 
of system
NRV
Purge of system too 
early, leading to 
reduced/no detonation in 
node 3
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect purge of Investigate addition of rotameter to 
No purge of system Pre-experimental checks, Gas checks
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed to provide visual 
Overpressure Pressure relief valve 
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14 Pressure Reverse Possible Human Error 3 1 3 2 x NRV to be fitted AVM
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 1 3 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 3 9 Procedure checklist ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 2 1 2 Gas Detector ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
1 1 1 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
1 1 1 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
1 1 1 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere Spark 1 1 1 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
29 Composition Less Possible Not 100% nitrogen 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas
Incorrect gas tank 
connected to pipeline
1 4 4 ZA-D
Insufficient purge Cylinder checks
No purge of system Cylinder checks
No nitrogen purge - 
explosion
Cylinder checks
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Ignition in detonation 
tube
Flash back arrestor, Standard 
operating procedure, Shut off valve, 
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Gas flow in incorrect 
area
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of nitrogen to 
the atmosphere
Maintenance checks 
Heating of pipes Nitrogen doesn't combust
Contamination of line NRV 
Gas flow too early, 
contamination 
experimental gases
Standard Operating Procedure 
Gas flow too late, Purge 
of system too late, 
Standard Operating Procedure 
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32 Composition As well as
N2 and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 equipment checks ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 2 1 2 Gas Detector ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 2 2 4 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 2 4 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra
Detonation in 
detonation tube
1 1 1 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere 2 2 4 ZA-D
48 Frequency More Increased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6 ZA-D
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief 2 3 6 ZA-DOverpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Damage to components PRV
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Maintenance checks 
Contamination of 
experimental gases
Maintenance checks 
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Release of nitrogen to 
the atmosphere
Maintenance checks 
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Cylinder checks
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Maintenance checks 
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of nitrogen early 
- tampering with 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of nitrogen late - 
purge too late - 
Standard Operating Procedure 
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54 Relief No No Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
Leak 2 2 4 ZA-D
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief Human error 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-DIncorrect Data Procedure
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Early Purge Standard Operating Procedure 
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Release of nitrogen to 
the atmosphere
Maintenance checks 
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69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
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81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of Protection 3 3 9 ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
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95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3 ZA-D
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
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DESIGN INTENT: To provide purge gas to the O2 line
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1f Nitrogen purge for O2 line Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More Excess N2 gas 
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 PRV to be fitted? ZA-D
2 Flow Less
Insufficient N2 gas 
entering O2 line to purge
Valve not left open for 
long enough
3 1 3 Rotameter? ZA-D
3 Flow No No N2 entering O2 Pipe
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
N2 gas flowing the 
opposite direction.
Pressure differential in 
pipe
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering line
Human Error - 
procedural
2 2 4 ZA-D
6 Flow As well as
N2 and another gas 
entering the same tube
Mechanical failure 3 1 3 ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
N2 flowing earlier then 
needed
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
N2 flowing later then 
required
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 ZA-D
9 Flow Where else N2 flowing elsewhere 
Leak/ incorrect pipe 
connected
3 1 3 ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of N2
Obstruction in pipe, 
valve not fully open
3 1 3 ZA-D
11 Pressure More
Higher pressure then 
required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 PRV to be fitted? ZA-D
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3 ZA-D
Overpressure
Incorrect purge of 
system as flow is 
Pressure checks, Maintenance 
Purge of system too late, 
leading to detonation of 
gas in pipelines
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system and/or 
release of N2 to the 
Maintenance checks 
Incorrect purge of 
system as flow is 
insufficient
Maintenance checks 
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Incorrect composition of 
gas to ensure safe purge 
of system
NRV
Purge of system too 
early, leading to 
reduced/no detonation in 
node 3
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect purge of O2 
line
Procedure
No purge of O2 line
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed to provide visual 
Overpressure Procedure
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13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3 ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Pressure decrease Human Error 3 1 3 ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 1 3 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 3 9 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 2 1 2 ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
1 1 1 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
1 1 1 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
1 1 1 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere Spark 1 1 1 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
29 Composition Less Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
Insufficient purge Cylinder checks
No purge of system Cylinder checks
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Ignition in detonation 
tube
Flash back arrestor, Standard 
operating procedure, Shut off valve, 
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Gas flow in incorrect 
area
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of nitrogen to 
the atmosphere
Maintenance checks 
Heating of pipes Nitrogen doesn't combust
Contamination of line
Gas flow too early, 
contamination 
experimental gases
Standard Operating Procedure 
Gas flow too late, Purge 
of system too late, 
Standard Operating Procedure 
No flow, no purge of 
system, potential 
detonation in pipelines
Pressure checks, Maintenance 
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31 Composition Other than Different gas
Incorrect gas tank 
connected to pipeline
1 4 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
N2 and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 2 1 2 ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 2 2 4 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 2 4 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra 1 1 1 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation 1 1 1 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere 2 2 4 ZA-D
48 Frequency More Increased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more 3 2 6 ZA-D
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Maintenance checks 
Contamination of 
experimental gases
Maintenance checks 
Nitrogen doesn't combust
Release of nitrogen to 
the atmosphere
Maintenance checks 
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Cylinder checks
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Maintenance checks 
Nitrogen purge isn't as 
effective
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of nitrogen early 
- tampering with 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of nitrogen late - 
purge too late - 
Standard Operating Procedure 
No nitrogen purge - 
explosion
Cylinder checks
A41
Appendix A: HAZOP Spredsheet
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6
PRV is at node1g which is 
sufficient relief
ZA-D
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
54 Relief No No Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
2 2 4 ZA-D
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Damage to components
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68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
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79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
A44
Appendix A: HAZOP Spredsheet
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of Protection 3 3 9 ZA-D
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3 ZA-D
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Purge of system 
disrupted
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
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DESIGN INTENT: To provide oxygen to the detonation tube.
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Node 1g Oxygen (O2) supply and delivery to Experimental Rig Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More Excess O2 gas 
Valve left open for too 
long
3 1 3 ZA-D
2 Flow Less Insufficient O2 
Valve not left open for 
long enough
3 1 3 ZA-D
3 Flow No No O2 entering line
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
O2 gas flowing the 
opposite direction.
Pressure differential in 
pipe
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering line
Human Error - 
procedural
2 2 4 ZA-D
6 Flow As well as
O2 and another gas 
entering the same tube
Mechanical failure 3 1 3 ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
O2 flowing earlier then 
needed
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
2 3 6 ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
O2 flowing later then 
required
Human Error - 
procedural &/or 
Mechanical failure
3 1 3 ZA-D
9 Flow Where else O2 flowing elsewhere 
Leak/ incorrect pipe 
connected
3 1 3 ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of O2
Obstruction in pipe, 
valve not fully open
3 1 3 ZA-D
11 Pressure More
Higher pressure then 
required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9 ZA-D
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3 ZA-D
Overpressure Pressure Relief Valve
Reduced detonation as 
there is insufficient 
Pressure checks,
Delay in experiment Experimental procedure
Release of O2 to the 
atmosphere
Maintenance checks
Insufficient O2 added to 
detonation tube - affects 
experimental results
Maintenance checks
Contamination of other 
gas lines - risk of 
Separate line, Standard experimental 
procedure
Nitrogen purge Shut off valve on nitrogen line
O2 added too early - risk 
of explosion
Standard Operating Procedure 
Reduced detonation as 
there is insufficient 
oxygen entering 
detonation tube
Procedure 
Reduced detonation as 
there is insufficient 
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Contamination of other 
gas lines.
Non return and Shut off valve 
installed to provide visual 
Overpressure Procedure & Pressure Relief Valve
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13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3 ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Pressure decrease Human Error 3 1 3 ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 3 9 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 1 3 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 3 1 3 ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
3 3 9 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Detonation prior to 
purge of system and 
shutdown of node
2 4 8 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 1 3 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as
Ignition in pipe and shock 
tube
Ignition in detonation 
tube prior to purge 
and valve shutdown
2 4 8
Oxygen is an oxidiser and 
needs a fuel to be present for it 
to ignite.
ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
Ignition in detonation 
tube prior to purge 
and valve shutdown
2 4 8
Oxygen is an oxidiser and 
needs a fuel to be present for it 
to ignite.
ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
2 2 4 ZA-DDelay in experiment Standard operating procedure
Oxygen will aid in the 
burning of fuel
Flash back arrestor, NRV, standard 
experimental procedure
Oxygen will aid in the 
burning of fuel
Flash back arrestor, NRV, standard 
experimental procedure
Damage to components
Standard Operating Procedure, Flash 
back arrestor, PRV
Gas flow in incorrect 
area
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of O2 to the 
atmosphere
Maintenance checks
Pre-ignition
Thermocouple, Flash back arrestor, 
Standard operating procedure
Reverse flow Non Return Valve
Gas flow too early, O2 
mixed with flammable 
gases too early
Standard Operating Procedure 
Delay in experiment Standard Operating Procedure 
Reduced detonation as 
there is insufficient 
oxygen entering 
detonation tube
Pressure checks,
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27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere Spark 2 4 8 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
29 Composition Less Possible Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition Gas supply 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas Nitrogen in pipe 2 1 2 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
O2 and another gas 
entering the same line
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 1 3 ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Inpurities 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak in pipe. 3 1 3 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corroded pipes 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of NRVs 2 1 2 ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation 2 4 8 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation Incorrect mix 2 3 6 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 1 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation Detonation 1 3 3 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra 2 4 8 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation Early Ignition 2 4 8 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation Late Ignition 2 4 8 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere
Purge of previous 
nodes not carried out
2 2 4 ZA-DDamage to components
Standard operating procedure / flash 
back arrestor
Detonation in node 3 
prior to node 1 shutdown 
Flash back arrestor / nitrogen purge / 
shut off valves / Operating procedure
Delay in experiment Operating procedure
Damage to components Flash back arrestor
Damage to components Flash back arrestor / nitrogen purge / 
Not 100% oxygen 
delivered to detonation 
Gas checks / maintenance schedule
O2 flowing into nitrogen 
line / release of O2 to 
Maintenance checks
O2 will support the 
Release of O2 to the 
atmosphere
Not 100% oxygen 
delivered to detonation 
Gas checks   
Release of O2 to the 
atmosphere
Effects experimental 
results as nitrogen is 
present
Gas checks / Standard experimental 
procedure
Release of O2 too early - 
mix with gases - 
Standard operating procedure
Delay in experiment Standard operating procedure
Not 100% oxygen Cylinder checks
No oxygen delivered to Cylinder checks
Effects experimental 
results as no oxygen 
Gas checks / Standard experimental 
procedure
Ignition in detonation 
tube
Flash back arrestor, Standard 
operating procedure, Shut off valve, 
Pure oxygen Cylinder checks
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48 Frequency More Increased Frequency Repetative Detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency Weak detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more Detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
Vibration 2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6 ZA-D
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
54 Relief No No Relief 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
2 3 6 ZA-D
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure 
Pressure relief required to protect 
flow meter and personel -- regulators.
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Overpressure, Damage Pressure relief required to protect 
Damage to components
Damage to components
Damage to components PRV
Damage to components
Damage to components
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66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
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77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
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91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of Protection 3 3 9 Review current safety ZA-D
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3
Alarm and Gas sensors in the 
room
ZA-D
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube / faults 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Non Spark Tools, gas sensors
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
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DESIGN INTENT: To mix the gases and supply them to the detonation tube
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Mixing Chamber and Delivery to Detonation Tube Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More Excess gas 
Human error - 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
2 Flow Less Insufficient gas
Human error - 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
3 Flow No No gas entering tube
Block in Pipe/Valves 
closed
3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
Gas flowing in opposite 
direction
Pressure differential in 
system
2 1 2 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering tube
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 ZA-D
6 Flow As well as
Mixture and another gas 
entering the same tube
Failure of NRV 3 1 3 ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
Gas flowing earlier then 
needed
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
Gas flowing later then 
required
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
9 Flow Where else Gas flowing elsewhere Leak 3 3 9
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of Gas Obstuction in pipe 3 1 3 ZA-D
11 Pressure More
Higher pressure then 
required
Human Error 3 3 9 ZA-D
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator
3 1 3 Pressure checks ZA-D
13 Pressure No No pressure change
Incorrect/faulty 
regulator, insufficient 
gas
3 1 3 ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse Pressure decrease Leak 3 3 9
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
Backflow / release of 
flammable mix to the 
Maintenance checks
Overpressure Pressure Relief Valve
Reduced flow of gases / 
insufficient pressure - 
NRV
No flow of gas NRV, Purge system
Delay in experiment Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of flammable 
gas mix to the 
Maintenance checks
Some gas left in pipes Nitrogen purge
Nitrogen entering 
cylinder contaminating 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Oxygen mixing in 
cylinder - explosion
NRV, Shut off valves, Experimental 
procedure
Release of flammable 
gas mix to atmosphere 
Standard Operating Procedure 
Underpressure Standard Operating Procedure 
No gas to ignite in 
detonation tube
Pre-experimental checks, 
maintenance schedule
Gas flowing back to 
node 1
Non return valve, Flash Back 
Arrestor
Overpressure Pressure Relief Valve
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15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Leak, faulty valves, 
valves left open
3 2 6 ZA-D
16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Faulty regulator / 
procedural error
3 2 6 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure Leak, faulty valves 3 3 9
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
3 3 9 ZA-D
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low 1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Detonation prior to 
purge of system and 
shutdown of node
3 3 9 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Temperature change 
in the room
3 3 9
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as Increased ignition
Ignition prior to 
shutdown of node
2 4 8 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
Electrical 2 4 8 ZA-D
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
Electrical 2 2 4 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere Spark 3 2 6 ZA-D
28 Composition More Possible Incorrect mix 3 1 3 ZA-D
29 Composition Less Possible Incorrect mix 3 1 3 ZA-D
30 Composition No No composition No gas 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas
Nitrogen/oxygen in 
cylinder
2 2 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
Correct Mixture and extra 
gases entering the tube
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
Oxygen mixing in 
cylinder - explosion
NRV, Shut off valves, Experimental 
procedure
Incorrect mix of gases / Standard operating procedure, 
No gas to ignite in Purge system and investigate why
Incorrect composition of 
gas in cylinder
Purge system and investigate why
Delay in experiment 
Ignition in detonation 
tube
Flash back arrestor, Standard 
operating procedure, Shut off valve, 
Incorrect mix of gases / Standard operating procedure, 
Detonation of 
atmospheric gases
Protective screen
Ignition of leftover gas 
and damage to 
Flash back arrestor, Standard 
operating procedure
Ignition of leftover gas 
and damage to 
Flash back arrestor
Ignition of leftover gas 
and damage to 
components
Standard Operating Procedure, Flash 
back arrestor, PRV
Gas flow in incorrect 
area
Standard Operating Procedure 
Release of flammable 
mix to the atmosphere
Maintenance checks
Pre-ignition
Thermocouple, Standard operating 
procedure, Flash back arrestor
Flow occurs earlier then 
needed
Standard Operating Procedure 
Delay in experiment Standard Operating Procedure 
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33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 2 6
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Incorrect mix 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Leak 3 3 9 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corrosion in area 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines
Failure of valves 2 3 6
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation Incorrect mix 2 4 8 ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation Incorrect mix 2 3 6 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation 1 1 1
No Detonation in Node 2 is 
the correct outcome. 
ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse Detonation Detonation 1 4 4 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra 2 4 8 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation Early Ignition 2 4 8 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation Late Ignition 2 4 8 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere
Purge of previous 
nodes not carried out
2 4 8 ZA-D
48 Frequency More Increased Frequency Repetative Detonation 3 3 9 ZA-D
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency Weak detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more Detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
Vibration 2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 2 3 6 ZA-D
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief
Obstruction of relief 
valve
2 3 6 ZA-D
Overpressure, Damage 
to components
Pressure Relief Valve
Damage to components
Damage to components
Damage to components Pressure Relief Valve
Damage to components
Standard operating procedure / flash 
back arrestor
Damage to components
Damage to components
Detonation in node 3 
prior to node 2 shutdown 
Flash back arrestor / nitrogen purge / 
shut off valves / Operating procedure
Delay in experiment Operating procedure
Damage to components Flash back arrestor
Damage to components Flash back arrestor / nitrogen purge / 
Contaminant would 
affect experimental 
Maintenance checks
Release of mix to 
atmosphere / node 1
NRV, Maintenance checks, Standard 
operating procedure
Overpressure - damage PRV, flash back arrestor
Release of flammable 
gas mix to atmosphere
Poor mix of gas - 
tampers with final 
Standard operating procedure
Oxygen mixing in 
cylinder - explosion
Maintenance checks
Gas flow early Standard operating procedure
Delay in experiment Standard operating procedure
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54 Relief No No Relief Failure of relief valve 2 3 6 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
Leak in cylinder &/or 
Valves
2 3 6
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief Failure of PRV 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of PRV 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere Mechanical failure 2 3 6
Gas Sensor/Alarm & 
Maintenance checks
ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-DIncorrect Data Procedure
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Relief of mixture from 
cylinder 
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Relief of mixture to 
atmosphere
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Overpressure, Damage 
to components
Pressure Relief Valve
Damage to components, 
release of gases to 
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
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69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
ZA-D
70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as Shut-down and more 1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
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81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1 ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of Protection 3 3 9 ZA-D
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
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95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
3 1 3
Alarm and Gas sensors in the 
room
ZA-D
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Non Spark Tools, gas sensors
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DESIGN INTENT: To fill with gas mix and then detonate using electronic ignition
System: Pulse Detonation Test Rig
Team composition:
MG, AVM, MS, 
GH, Z A-D,
Date:  
Part considered: Detonation Tube Page no:
HAZOP STUDY RECORD SHEET Laboratory Pulse Detonation Experiment
Parameter
Guide 
Word
Deviation Possible cause
  L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
   
Se
ve
ri
ty
 R
is
k
RECOMMENDATION
Action 
by
Time 
scale
Consequence Protection / Safeguards
1 Flow More Excess gas 
Large pressure 
difference
3 2 6 ZA-D
2 Flow Less Insufficient Gas 
Small pressure 
difference
3 1 3 ZA-D
3 Flow No No Gas entering tube Blocked inlet 3 1 3 ZA-D
4 Flow Reverse
Gas flowing back to node 
1 & 2
Higher pressure 1 3 3 ZA-D
5 Flow Other than Other gas entering Tube Nitrogen entering 2 1 2 ZA-D
6 Flow As well as
Another gas entering the 
same tube
Nitrogen entering 2 1 2 ZA-D
7 Flow
Sooner 
than
Gas flowing earlier then 
needed
Procedural 2 3 6 ZA-D
8 Flow Later than
Gas flowing later then 
required
Procedural 3 1 3 ZA-D
9 Flow Where else Gas flowing elsewhere Leak 3 3 9 ZA-D
10 Flow Part of Partial flow of Gas Blocked pipes/valves 3 1 3 ZA-D
11 Pressure More
Higher pressure then 
required
Overcharge 3 3 9
Rupture disc to be fitted & 
tested
12 Pressure Less
Lower pressure then 
required
Vac valve leak 3 1 3 Equipment checks.
13 Pressure No No pressure change Vac valve leak 3 1 3 Equipment checks. ZA-D
14 Pressure Reverse
Pressure in tube is higher 
then node 1 & 2
Vac valve leak 3 3 9 ZA-D
15 Pressure
Sooner 
than
Pressure change too 
quickly 
Large pressure 
difference
3 2 6 ZA-D
Flow of gas in reverse Ensure vac pump is working
Surge of pressure 
causing damage to 
Rupture disc
Overpressure Pressure relief through rupture disc
Slower flow of gas Ensure vac pump is working
No flow of gas Ensure vac pump is working
Delay in experiment Procedure document
Gas mix entering room, 
hazardous 
Pre experimental checks, gas detector 
and alarm in the room
Insufficient gas entering 
tube so would disrupt 
Pre experimental checks
Purge of system Shut off valve
Purge of system / 
decreased detonation
Shut off valve
Potential for danger if 
gas mix and oxygen are 
Procedure document
Underpressure Pressure tranducer
No gas in tube to ignite Pre-experimental checks, 
Reverse flow
NRV, Vacuum detonation tube prior 
to use
Overpressure
Rupture valve, pressure transducer, 
pressure guage
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16 Pressure Later than Pressure change too late
Small pressure 
difference
3 2 6 ZA-D
17 Pressure Where else
Pressure change 
elsewhere
Human error -- 
procedural, valve fault
3 2 6 ZA-D
18 Pressure Part of Decreasing pressure leak 3 3 9 ZA-D
19 Temperature More Temperature too high
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
3 3 9 Equipment checks.
20 Temperature Less Temperature too low
Ambient conditions, 
external factors
1 1 1 ZA-D
21 Temperature
Sooner 
than
Temperature change too 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 3 9 ZA-D
22 Temperature Later than
Temperature change too 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
23 Temperature Where else
Temperature change 
elsewhere
Detonation outside of 
tube
3 3 9 ZA-D
24 Ignition As well as Increased ignition Incorrect mix 2 4 8 ZA-D
25 Ignition
Sooner 
than
Ignition earlier then 
required
Electrical 3 3 9
26 Ignition Later than
Ignition later then 
required
Electrical 1 1 1 ZA-D
27 Ignition Where else Ignition elsewhere Spark 2 4 8 ZA-D
28 Composition More Too much of a gas Incorrect mix 3 1 3
29 Composition Less Too little of a gas Incorrect mix 3 1 3
30 Composition No No composition No gas 3 1 3 ZA-D
31 Composition Other than Different gas
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 ZA-D
32 Composition As well as
Correct mixture and 
another gas entering the 
tube
Human error -- 
procedural
3 2 6 ZA-D
33 Composition
Sooner 
than
Change in composition 
early
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
34 Composition Later than
Change in composition 
late
Human error -- 
procedural
3 1 3 ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube
Operating procedures
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube
Operating procedures
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube
Operating procedures
Different magnitude of Check gas composition
No detonation Purge system with Nitrogen
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube
Operating procedures
Delay in ignition Electrical isolation prior to use
If flammable gas is 
present it may be 
Non Spark Tools, 
Different magnitude of Check gas composition
Damage to components 
and hazardous to 
Purge of previous nodes prior to 
detonation
Pre-ignition Electrical isolation prior to use
Delayed ignition
Thermocouple fitted to give 
temperature reading, wait until its at 
the correct temperature.
Early ignition 
Late ignition
Damage to components
Release of flammable 
Pre-ignition
Ensure purge takes place and 
controlled flow
Late detonation
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35 Composition Where else
Composition in different 
location
Leak 3 2 6 Gas Sensors & Alarm ZA-D
36 Composition Part of Decrease in composition Incorrect mix 3 1 3 ZA-D
37 Contamination More
External gases entering 
pipework
Incorrect mix 3 3 9 ZA-D
38 Contamination As well as Reduced purity of gas Corrosion in area 2 1 2 ZA-D
39 Contamination Where else
Contaminate of other 
lines / atmosphere
Failure of valves 2 3 6 Gas Sensors & Alarm ZA-D
40 Detonation More Increased detonation Incorrect mix 3 4 12 Extra Protection / Screening ZA-D
41 Detonation Less Decreased Detonation Incorrect mix 3 2 6 ZA-D
42 Detonation No No Detonation Electrical Fault 3 2 6 ZA-D
43 Detonation Reverse Reverse detonation 2 3 6 ZA-D
44 Detonation As well as Detonation and extra 2 4 8 ZA-D
45 Detonation
Sooner 
than
Early Detonation Early Ignition 2 4 8 ZA-D
46 Detonation Later than Late Detonation Late Ignition 2 4 8 ZA-D
47 Detonation Where else Detonation Elsewhere
Purge of previous 
nodes not carried out
2 4 8 ZA-D
48 Frequency More Increased Frequency Repetative Detonation 3 3 9
49 Frequency Less Decreased Frequency Weak detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
50 Frequency As well as Frequency & more Detonation 3 2 6 ZA-D
51 Frequency Where else
Frequency waves felt in a 
different location 
Vibration 2 2 4 ZA-D
52 Relief More Increased Relief Overpressure 3 2 6
53 Relief Less Decreased Relief
Obstructed Rupture 
Disc
2 2 4 ZA-D
54 Relief No No Relief Failure of rupture Disc 2 2 4 ZA-D
55 Relief As well as
Relief of gas in pipe and 
to atmosphere
Leak in tube &/or 
valves
2 3 6 Maintenance schedule ZA-D
Overpressure, Rupture 
of components
Rupture disc
Overpressure, Rupture 
of components
Rupture disc
Damage to components
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Rupture disc
Rupture of components
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Rupture of components Use of mylar screen
Detonation where it isn't 
wanted
Procedure
Rupture of components Rupture disc
Poor experimental Procedure
Damage to components Rupture disc
Rupture of components
Isolated ignition source, operating 
procedure
Delay in detonation
Poor ignition of gases Procedure
No explosion Abnormal operating procedures
Damage to components Rupture disc
Tampered experimental 
results
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Release of flammable 
gas mix to atmosphere
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Rupture of components Protection screen
Release of flammable 
gas mix to atmosphere
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Incorrect mix of gases in 
detonation tube
Operating procedures
Tampered experimental 
results
Check gas composition
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56 Relief
Sooner 
than
Early Relief Failure of rupture disc 2 2 4 ZA-D
57 Relief Later than Late Relief Failure of rupture disc 2 3 6 ZA-D
58 Relief Where else Relief Elsewhere Leak 2 3 6 ZA-D
59 Corrosion/erosion More
Increased 
Corrosion/Erosion
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6
Maintenance schedule / 
Cleaning cycle
ZA-D
60 Corrosion/erosion As well as
Corrosion/Erosion in pipe 
and to the surrounding 
equipment
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
61 Corrosion/erosion Where else
Corrosion/Erosion 
Elsewhere
Condensation, 
reaction
3 2 6 ZA-D
62
Instrumentation/  
controls
More
Extra 
Instrumentation/Controls
Overengineering 2 1 2
Review required Control & 
Instrumentation
ZA-D
63
Instrumentation/  
controls
Less
Not enough 
Instrumentation/Controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
64
Instrumentation/  
controls
No
No 
Instrumentation/Controls
1 1 1 ZA-D
65
Instrumentation/  
controls
Reverse
Incorrect Instrumentation 
/ controls
2 1 2 ZA-D
66
Instrumentation/  
controls
As well as
Instrumentation / controls 
& more
2 1 2 ZA-D
67
Instrumentation/  
controls
Sooner 
than
Recordings / 
Measurements too early
Information gathered 
early
3 1 3 Procedure document ZA-D
68
Instrumentation/  
controls
Later than
Recordings / 
measurements too late
Information gathered 
late
3 1 3 ZA-D
69
Instrumentation/  
controls
Where else
Recordings / 
measurements in different 
location
Multiple recording 
points
2 1 2
Operator panel with all 
required equipment / 
information
Incorrect Data Procedure
Information in different 
locations
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data being 
relayed
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Data from node and 
surroundings being 
Panel with firing mechanism and 
information gauges
Incorrect Data Procedure
Too much information, 
distracts operator, 
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Insufficient 
information/control for 
the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
No information/control 
for the operator
C&I Engineer - P&ID Diagram 
Reviewed
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Damage to system and 
leaks
Planned Maintenance schedule and 
checklist put in place.
Relief of detonated 
mixture too early
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Overpressure, Rupture 
of components
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
Rupture of components
Maintenance schedule and pre-
experimental checks
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70 Start up/shut down More Too many steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2
71 Start up/shut down Less Too little steps to follow
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
2 1 2 ZA-D
72 Start up/shut down No
No start up / shut down 
procedure
No procedural 
document &/or 
training
1 1 1 ZA-D
73 Start up/shut down
Sooner 
than
Start up / shut down too 
early
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
74 Start up/shut down Later than
Start up / shut down too 
late
Incorrect procedure 
document & 
insufficient training
3 1 3 ZA-D
75
Emergency shut- 
down
More Too many steps to follow Overengineering 2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced
76
Emergency shut- 
down
Less
Emergency shut down too 
sensitive so it occurs too 
often
2 1 2 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
77
Emergency shut- 
down
No
No Emergency Shut-
down
1 4 4 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
78
Emergency shut- 
down
As well as
Shut-down of tube and 
room
1 1 1 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
79
Emergency shut- 
down
Sooner 
than
Shut down too early 3 1 3 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
80
Emergency shut- 
down
Later than Shut down too late 2 3 6 Shut down drill practiced ZA-D
81
Inspection & 
Maintenance
More
Too many inspections and 
maintenance 
Overengineering 2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
Damage is caused and 
emergency could get out 
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Dangerous to equipment 
and personel
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Takes too long for 
emergency shut down
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Experiment cut short
E-stops and gas shut off solenoids / 
warning lights
Too little time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Dangerous to equipment 
and operator if 
experiment run 
incorrectly
Standard Operating Procedure 
Too much time spent on 
start up / shut down - 
possibilty for mistakes to 
be made
Standard Operating Procedure 
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82
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Less
Not enough inspections 
and maintenance
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
83
Inspection & 
Maintenance
No
No inspections & 
maintenance 
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
1 1 1 Create Schedule ZA-D
84
Inspection & 
Maintenance
As well as
Inspection & 
Maintenance & more
Node and room 
inspection & 
maintenance
2 1 2 Create Schedule ZA-D
85
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Sooner 
than
Inspection & maintenance 
too early
Overengineering 3 1 3 Create Schedule ZA-D
86
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Later than
Inspection & maintenance 
too late
Lack of time / poor 
organisation
2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
87
Inspection & 
Maintenance
Part of
Full inspection & 
maintenance not carried 
out
Lack of time 2 2 4 Create Schedule ZA-D
88
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
More
Too much Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too much detail in 
training documents
2 1 2 Training Manual & Sign off 
89
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Less
Not enough Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
Too little detail in 
training documents
2 2 4 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
90
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
No
No Information / 
instruction / training 
provided
No training provided 1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
91
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Later than
Information / instruction / 
training provided too late
Training provided 
after running 
experiment
1 3 3 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
92
Information/ 
Instruction/Trainin
g
Part of
All Information / 
instruction / training not 
provided 
Training disrupted by 
external factors
2 3 6 Training Manual & Sign off ZA-D
93 Safety More
Too many safety 
measures in place
Overengineering 1 1 1
Safety Procedures 
Documentation
ZA-D
94 Safety Less Lack of Protection 3 3 9 ZA-D
95 Safety No No protection 1 5 5 ZA-D
96 Safety As well as Safety & more 3 1 3 ZA-D
Hazardous to personel & PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Time/money wasted on 
unneeded 
HAZOP report complete to determine 
the correct amount of safety 
Hazardous to personel & PPE. Correct tooling. Cosh and Dsear 
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Operators don’t know 
what to do, could lead to 
an explosion if incorrect 
steps are followed
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Danger to equipment & 
personal
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Time wasted, experiment 
takes much longer then 
it should
Competency of operators to be 
confirmed and recorded.
Faults remain 
undetected, equipment 
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Takes longer as more 
parts must be inspected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not efficient use of time
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
Not everything gets 
checked / faults remain 
undetected
Inspection & maintenance 
documentation and checklist
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97 Safety Where else
Safety measures from 
elsewhere
Safety measures in 
room
3 1 3
Alarm and Gas sensors in the 
room
ZA-D
98 Safety Part of
Not all safety 
requirements met
2 3 6 ZA-D
99 Sequence / Time More Too Long / Too Late
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
100 Sequence / Time Less Too Short / Too Soon
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
101 Sequence / Time No Sequence step skipped
Human error -- 
procedural
2 3 6 Operating sequence ZA-D
102 Sequence / Time As well as Sequence / Time & more
Human error -- 
procedural
2 1 2 Operating sequence ZA-D
103 Sequence / Time
Sooner 
than
Too early/quick
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
104 Sequence / Time Later than Too late/slow
Human error -- 
procedural
2 2 4 Operating sequence ZA-D
Incorrect mix of gases  / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases  / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases  / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases  / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Hazardous to personel & 
equipment
Incorrect mix of gases  / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Incorrect mix of gases  / 
faults in experiment
Standard Operating Procedure 
Non Spark Tools, gas sensors
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Appendix B1: DSEAR Risk Assessment 
DSEAR risk assessment aims to find the area 𝑉𝑧 in which ignition sources must be 
controlled. This is done via calculating the magnitude (if there is one) of the mass 
flow rate of a substance release from a pipe, ventilation rate and the volume over 
which this ventilation is required. This is aimed at maintaining an area in which the 
lower explosive limit (LEL) of a particular gas is not reached, resulting in no 
explosive atmosphere being formed.  
In this particular experiment, the propellants that will used are methane, ethane, 
carbon dioxide, nitrogen and oxygen. Nitrogen, carbon dioxide and oxygen do not 
require analysis of their potential to create an explosive atmosphere.   
DSEAR spreadsheet key 
  Green boxes require data input.  
  Orange boxes provide calculated information. 
  Blue boxes give additional information. 
 
By examining the DSEAR risk assessment forms it can be deduced that for high 
ventilation to be achieved, an extraction fan with an extraction rate of 4𝑚3/𝑠 is 
needed. This is the upper value of the two gases thus ensuring that the minimum 
requirements for both of the gases are reached. 
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DSEAR assessment for Ethane.  
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DSEAR assessment for Methane 
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Appendix B2: COSHH Risk Assessment 
A COSHH risk assessment is used to assess the likelihood and severity of possible 
exposure to hazardous substances during the conducting of the experiment. In the 
COSHH assessment form found in appendix (). The document reviews a number of 
issues regarding the experiment including; the harmful substances being used (in this 
case methane and ethane), the potential dangers (inhalation/asphyxiation), the control 
measures used to reduce these risks including emergency measures, the assessment 
of risk to health and if this is too high additional control measures are outlined to 
reduce the health risk.  
Conclusions of this assessment can be seen that before additional control measures 
had been entered the risk to health was too high and additional measures were 
required to ensure the safety or the operating staff. After additional control measures 
were introduced such as; ATEX rated extraction fan in accordance to DSEAR, gas 
alarms, training for present operators and devices such as flashback arrestors to limit 
any potential risk. With this measures in place the severity of any incident still 
remains at the highest possible level (due to the nature of detonating gases) but the 
likelihood of any event occurring has been decreased to the lowest possible level. 
This will ensure that if the experiment is conducted according to the procedure and to 
a professional standard any harmful event is very unlikely to happen.  
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Who is at risk?                                                             X
How is exposure likely to 
occur? 
X 
Frequency of Process or Activity     
Staff x Absorption  
Daily (up to 20 runs per day).  
Students x Inhalation x 
Process or Activity Duration 
(mins) 
Cleaners / Contractors x Ingestion  
10 seconds per run 
High Risk Groups (e.g 
New and expectant 
mothers) Identify - 
 Are health effects X 
Any substance/group that 
substance(s) must not come into 
contact with 
Others (Identify)-  Carcinogenic, Mutagenic  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 11/04/2016 Location 
Engines laboratory 
W0.02 
Assessment No. 1 
What is the 
process or 
activity? 
Different blends of Methane, Ethane, Carbon Dioxide and Oxygen, to simulate 
shale gas formation and re-circulated gases, are going to be used in detonation 
tube to study the effect of different obstacle geometry on deflagration to 
detonation transition and its parameters, including produced pressure.   
School of Engineering COSHH Assessment 
What is being used/produced/handled/stored? 
Is the substance: 
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Ethane    x     20 40 ppm x  x  x x  x x  
Methane    x      200 250  x  x     x x  
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Controls to Reduce Risks 
Personal Protective 
Equipment Required & Type 
X 
Engineering 
Controls Required 
X 
Storage 
Requirements 
X 
Other Controls 
Required 
Hand Protection                                      x
Open Bench OK / 
None 
 
Locked 
Cupboard 
x 
 
Eye / Face Protection                              
 
x 
Fume Cupboard 
(ATEX extraction) 
x 
Cool/Dry/Dark 
conditions  
x 
Respiratory Protection 
(when using Al2O3 to 
track particles) 
   
 
x 
Total Enclosure / 
Glove Box 
x 
Fireproof 
cabinet 
x 
Protective Clothing                                 x 
Local Exhaust 
Ventilation 
x 
Other 
(Identify) 
 
Other (Identify)   Other (Identify)    
Actions Required  X 
Instruction, Training and 
Supervision 
X 
First Aid: What 
Action should be 
taken if substance: 
Monitoring of 
Exposure 
 x 
Work is not to be carried out 
without direct personal supervision 
x 
Is Ingested:  
Call 999 
Workplace Air 
Monitoring 
 x 
Work can be carried out without 
direct personal supervision 
 
Is Inhaled: Seek fresh 
air immediately  
 
Health Surveillance  x 
Details of Special Instructions or 
Training Required: 
Risk Assessment Training. Laser 
training. Laboratory Induction Training. 
DSEAR training.  
 
Comes into contact 
with eyes: 
Wash by cold water  
Other   
Comes into contact 
with skin: 
Wash by cold water 
and soap 
 
 
 
Emergency Procedures 
Fire Precautions: What actions will be taken in the event of a fire involving this substance?  
The emergency button will be pressed to avoid any more gas coming out. 
Activate the fire alarm to summon assistance and alert others of an emergency situation if necessary. 
Call the Emergency Services immediately by dialling 999.  
How should an accidental release / spillage be dealt with? 
Extraction fan will be used to decrease any risk that the area will become harmful in accordance with 
DSEAR.  
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Assessment of Risk to Health 
Scoring Criteria for 
Likelihood of Harm 
1-Very Unlikely, 2-
Unlikely, 3-Likely, 4-
Very Likely, 5-
Extremely Likely 
Scoring Criteria for 
Severity of Injury or 
Illness 
1-First Aid is adequate, 
2-Minor Injury, 3-
Three Day Injury, 4-
Major Injury, 5-Fatal 
or Disabling Injury 
Likelihood 
(1 - 5) 
Severity 
(1 - 5) 
Level 
of 
Risk 
(1 - 
25) 
Justification Notes 
 
2 
 
5 10 
𝐶2𝐻6and CH4 are flammable, toxic and 
explosive.  
1 – 5 Low 
No further action required 
 
6 – 11 Medium 
Appropriate additional control 
measures should be 
implemented 
Don’t have ATEX extraction in place, 
therefore need to install one to bring level 
of risk down.  
12 – 25 High 
Additional control measures 
must be implemented.  Work 
must not commence until 
such measures are in place. 
Insufficient control measures in place.  
Additional controls required identified in 
the next section. 
 
 
Sources of Information 
Used 
Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 
EH40/2005 Workplace exposure limits 
 
Additional Control Measures to Reduce Risks 
The cylinders to be located outside the lab. Gas alarms (Methane & Ethane) required inside the lab. 
ATEX rated extraction system required for continuous operation. System emergency shutdown 
buttons required for the entire system. Flashback arrestors to prevent flashback during the experiment. 
Experiment is located inside a fume cupboard. Constant air monitoring required.  Training required, 
undergraduates not allowed to conduct experiment, two PhD students to be present for all experiments 
and system checks (documented procedure) required to ensure integrity of equipment. 
ATEX extraction system required.  
Emergency procedures to be documented. 
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Assessment of Risk to Health after Additional Control Measures 
Scoring Criteria for 
Likelihood of Harm 
1-Very Unlikely, 2-
Unlikely, 3-Likely, 4-
Very Likely, 5-
Extremely Likely 
Scoring Criteria for 
Severity of Injury or 
Illness 
1-First Aid is adequate, 
2-Minor Injury, 3-
Three Day Injury, 4-
Major Injury, 5-Fatal 
or Disabling Injury 
Likelihood 
(1 - 5) 
Severity 
(1 - 5) 
Level 
of 
Risk 
(1 - 
25) 
Justification Notes 
1 5 5 
New risk assessment in place taking into 
consideration new extraction systems, 
location of fuels, setup characteristics, 
alarms in the labs, protection against 
malfunctions and any accident. The risk 
assessment has been carefully planned 
with all the involved parties (workshop, 
managers, users, etc.).  
1 – 5 Low 
No further action required 
 
6 – 11 Medium 
Appropriate additional control 
measures should be 
implemented 
 
12 – 25 High 
Additional control measures 
must be implemented.  Work 
must not commence until 
such measures are in place. 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION   
 Name: Signature: Date:   
Assessment 
completed by: 
Zaid Al-Dulaimi  11/04/2016 
  
Supervisor/Line 
Manager: 
Agustin Valera-Medina   
Review 
By: 
 
 
REVIEW   
Reviewed By:    
Review 
By: 
 
Reviewed By:    
Review 
By: 
 
Reviewed By:    
Review 
By: 
 
 
 
 
 
